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Abstract
My dissertation is a comparative study of the role of memory in four intersecting spheres of
contemporary cultural production: (memory) art, (war) photography, (trauma) literature and
the (memory) museum. I am particularly interested in how the recent turn to memory as a site
of resistance in culture and politics reflects the logic of enclosure intrinsic to capitalist
accumulation and expansion. The sites of memory in this study—including museums of
memory and human rights, the famous Sonderkommando photographs and experimental
works in conceptual art and literature—are characterized by a preservationist aesthetic that
emphasizes memory’s property form in the post-crisis cultures of global capitalism. The
phrase “preservationist aesthetic” here refers to the principle of preservation at the heart of
both new practices of cultural resistance and new forms of political and economic enclosure.
I argue that the rhetoric of recovery in these texts—from Robben Island Museum to Alfredo
Jaar’s Real Pictures to W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz—requires us to both recognize the
relationship between cultural aesthetics and the ongoing process of primitive accumulation
and rethink the politics of memory in relation to the most recent wave of global enclosures
(signified by intersections of the global housing crisis with international occupation
movements and museum politics).
The impetus for this project stems from a deep ambivalence about the ways in which
theories of trauma, which emerged to address the lingering effects of historical violence, are
guided by the liberal principles of empathy and identification. These same principles have
become the cornerstone of memory movements worldwide. My argument is that an adequate
understanding of resistance movements based on memory, witnessing and trauma requires a
study of how these movements reflect the contemporary conditions of colonization and
ii

enclosure within the context of global capitalism. Drawing on Marx, Freud, Debord and
Krauss, as well as a number of contemporary thinkers of primitive accumulation, my project
examines how movements to preserve the memories of historical violence in the 21st century
reflect the ways in which images of the past have become the ground of the new enclosures.

Keywords
Preservationist Aesthetics, Memory Politics, Trauma Theory, Primitive Accumulation,
Modern Museum, Installation Art, Photography, Marx, Freud, Sebald.
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Chapter 1

1

Recovering the Commons: The Politics of Memory after
Occupy

Midnight Notes Collective begins their revolutionary exposé ominously and boldly:
“Glasnost, End of the Cold War, United Europe, We are the World, Save the Amazon
Rain Forest…these are typical phrases of the day. They suggest an age of historic
openness, globalism, and the breakdown of political and economic barriers. In the midst
of this expansiveness, however, Midnight Notes poses the issue of ‘The New
Enclosures.’ For a corrosive secret is hidden in the gleaming idols of globalism, the end
of the blocs and the Gaian ecological consciousness: the last decade has seen the largest
Enclosure of the worldly Common in history” (Midnight Notes 1). Nigerians are
displaced in the name of structural adjustment; in America, epidemic homelessness is
attributed to any number of crises, from the farming crisis to the decline of real wages;
and the unabashed displacement of millions of Chinese citizens is simply an unfortunate
effect of the tumultuous transition to free market democracy after the fall of communism
(1-2). The collective explains that while these scenarios—“the debt crisis,”
“homelessness,” and “the collapse of socialism”—“are frequently treated as different
phenomena by both the media and left journalists,” they are, in fact, “aspects of a single
unified process [named] the New Enclosures” (2). Midnight Notes documents and
analyses these new enclosures of common land that comprise the ongoing process of
primitive accumulation in the current era. While for Marx primitive accumulation—
defined in basic terms as the separation of workers from the means of production—is first

2

and foremost an historical event that marks the beginning of capitalism, for Midnight
Notes, and other contemporary thinkers of primitive accumulation, it is a continuous and
repeating process, “a regular return on the path of accumulation” (Midnight Notes 1).
Midnight Notes identifies five main ways in which the New Enclosures operate:
1) “by ending communal control of the means of subsistence”; 2) by “seizing land for
debt”; 3) by making “mobile and migrant labor the dominant form of labor”; 4) by
forcing the “collapse of socialism”; and finally, 5) by taking control of human
reproduction. There is, however, a sixth, more abstract and more recent aspect of the New
Enclosures not explicitly identified by the collective: this is the enclosure of common
knowledge.1 Evident in the recent resurgence of museums as “political centers,”2 these
epistemic enclosures, which accompany and reinforce land enclosures, take place largely
in the realm of the imaginary; specifically, in the case of memory, in images of the past.

1

In his article, “The Topicality of Prehistory,” Sandro Mezzadra claims, “[e]xamples of

the contemporary conditions of primitive accumulation are abundant, including
enclosures of heterogeneous ‘commons,’ from land to knowledge, from water to the
abstract code of life (DNA)” (303-4; emphasis mine).
2

For example, in the first chapter of The Museum Establishment and Contemporary Art:

The Politics of Artistic Display in France after 1968 titled “Museums as Political
Centers,” Rebecca DeRoo argues that museums in the 1960s and 70s were highly
contested centres of political activism. “My aim,” she states in the final sentence of this
chapter, “is to render museums as they are today — sites of political struggle” (18).

3

Three recent struggles concretely exemplify this aspect of the New Enclosures:3 the
rebranding of the Canadian Museum of Civilization (CMC), the relocation of the
Vancouver Art Gallery (VAG) and the emergence of Occupy Museums (OM) in the
wake of the more general Occupy Movement (Occupy). The rebranding of the CMC by
the Harper government is couched in terms of the preservation of a more authentically
Canadian history for coming generations. The $350-million relocation of the VAG is
justified in terms of the preservation of its valuable art collection while the eviction of
small artist run space and art houses along with other undesirables on Vancouver’s
Downtown East Side (DTES) remains largely invisible. By contrast, Occupy Museums
appears as a specific response to the control of public space and funds by both the
government and the cultural and financial elite. OM resists the privitization of history and

3

Recently, in various news stories, questions of Harper’s engagements with cultural

institutions have been framed in terms of “libracide” and “knowledge massacre.” For
example, two Huffington Post articles, “Why is the Harper Administration Throwing
Away Entire Libraries” and “How the Harper Government committed a Knowledge
Massacre,” discuss the closure of seven of nine Fisheries and Oceans libraries in order to
digitize the collections, most of which were actually “consigned to dumpsters, were
burned or went to landfills” (Greene n. pag.). On January 4, 2014, Cory Doctorow wrote:
“Unsurprisingly, given the Canadian Conservatives’ war on the environment, the worstfaring archives were those that related to climate research.” In a third article, biologist
Jeff Hutchings states that these closures are clearly ideological, though the specific
ideology is unclear. The article claims that “[m]any scientists, including Hutchings and
world famous water ecologist David Schindler, compared the government’s concerted
attacks on environmental science to the rise of fascism and the total alignment of state
and corporate interests in 1930s Europe” (Nikiforuk n. pag.).

4

seeks to reclaim museums as common rather than merely public spaces.4 Thus, on the one
hand, we have the conservative rhetoric of historical preservation driving the distribution
and redistribution of public space and, on the other hand, we have the progressive
imperative to reclaim the commons. Collectively, as I will demonstrate in the following
section, these three cultural exemplars highlight the ways in which the museum, as a site
of political struggle in the current era, participates in the ongoing enclosures of both
public space and common knowledge.
Through observations concerning the relationship between the logics of
preservation and enclosure, my project conducts a comparative study of the role of
memory in four intersecting spheres of contemporary cultural production: (memory) art,
(war) photography, (trauma) literature and the (memory) museum. Expanding on recent
theories of primitive accumulation, I argue that the recent turn to memory as a site of
cultural and political resistance reflects the logic of enclosure intrinsic to capitalist
expansion. The New Enclosures documented by collectives like Midnight Notes and
affirmed by the endless circulation of stories of rent and land struggles on various sites of

4

In the context of capitalism, “public” and “private” are not contrasting terms, but

different degrees of the same phenomenon. In contrast to the commons, these terms
represent the rise of private property through the enclosures of common land. The UKbased collective, Endnotes, explains that with the rise of capitalism, the sphere of the
economic (the private) transcended the bounds of the household (its original sphere) and
spread out over the “entire social landscape” (n. pag.). What formerly constituted public
space (the political) was occluded by the generalization of the economic. After
capitalization, the private and the public are both forms of private property controlled by
the state and the capitalist respectively.

5

social media point to a reversal in the logic of primitive accumulation whereby
enclosures of land follow rather than precede the enclosures of common knowledge.
Indeed, the ground of enclosure has shifted: where enclosures of knowledge served to
reinforce or fortify the outward thrust of capitalist expansion in the form of land
enclosure they are now the primary medium in which processes of re-enclosure take
place. My main argument is this: current global memory movements not only reflect the
aesthetic and epistemic dimensions of primitive accumulation but at the same time
demonstrate the ways in which the image of primitive accumulation reified in the ruins of
historical violence and placed under the transcendental sign of Trauma are the primary
ground for the redistribution of common space after globalization, in the age of real
subsumption. The sites of memory in this study are characterized by what I call the
preservationist aesthetic, which emphasizes memory’s property form in the post-crisis
cultures of global capitalism. Preservationist aesthetics, in this case, names the principle
of preservation at the heart of new practices of cultural resistance and new forms of
enclosure through which social, political and economic exploitation are reframed, as
aesthetic problems, in terms of loss and erasure. As we will discover in the following
examples, the New Enclosures are both facilitated and concealed (on the left and on the
right!) by an imperative of preservation, which is manifest in multiple spheres of
production, including cultural, historical and material.

1.1 Museum Politics in the 21st Century
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the radical push to reclaim the commons gained
renewed strength. While the self-proclaimed left proffered the language of occupation
most assiduously, in the spirit of reclamation all manner of dissidents took to the streets

6

in droves. As protesters seized Zuccotti Park, artists took occupation from the Wall Street
financial district into some of New York’s most prestigious cultural institutions. On
October 19, 2011, New York artist Noah Fischer’s revision of the original Occupy
Museums Manifesto claimed, “art and culture are the soul of the commons” and implored
occupiers to “reclaim space for meaningful culture by and for the 99%” (Fischer n. pag).
Fischer’s online manifesto sought to expose the continued elitism of America’s cultural
institutions; it argued against the “intense commercialization and co-optation” of the art
world by philanthropic tycoons; and it chastised museums for their conspicuous
affiliation with “corrupt ratings agencies or investment banking houses.”
Fischer’s proposed action provoked a variety of responses. Feminist artist Mira
Schor’s immediate ambivalence stimulated a six hour dialogue on Facebook in which
interlocutors expressed a range of opinions: accusations that high entrance rates exclude
blue collar workers from museum culture; claims that museums are merely the
“symptom” while Wall Street is the “cause”; and assertions that “public institutions”
should remain “accountable to a public” (Schor n. pag.). Fischer himself entered the
dialogue only briefly in order to issue a reminder that the mandate of Occupy has always
been “to claim back the commons from the 1%—from economic justice to public space,
to art” (Fischer n. pag.; emphasis added).
Meanwhile, curator-critic and ArtInfo blogger Karen Archey expressed less
ambivalence than outright disdain. In her original post for the now defunct blog “Image

7

Conscious,”5 Archey asks, “Why would you occupy a non-profit institution over a forprofit one in the same sector?” and suggests that this desire to target museums is
ultimately the result of a “misdirected bitterness” (Archey n. pag.). Two years later,
Archey’s original post was re-published in Red Hook Journal under the sub-heading
“Second Thoughts” as an annotated screen-shot in which her initial claims were amended
using the “track changes” function.6 In this version, Archey comments on her earlier
decision to convey sarcasm through the use of scare-quotes around the word “occupy” in
her discussion of the protestors’ supposed occupation of the train cars that would
transport them to the more official sites of occupation. Her comment reads: “The words
of Georgia Sagri fresh in my ear, ‘Occupy everything! Take what is already yours.’ I still
don’t understand how one could think they ‘own’ public space, be it Occupy or a
corporation” (n. pag.). In response to Archey’s question of why Occupy would protest
museums instead of “super rich galleries and art fairs,” Art Fag City writer Will Brand

5

In her repost (cited below), Archey cites the lack of compensation by ARTINFO as the

reason for discontinuing her affiliated blog “Image Conscious,” which (as with most
unpaid internships) did not bring the hoped-for future compensation despite high levels of
exposure.
6

See Karen Archey’s “Why is Occupy Wall Street Protesting NYC Museums, and Not

Super Rich Galleries and Art Fairs?” Second Thoughts. Red Hook Journal. CCS Bard, 8
Feb. 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2014. http://www.bard.edu/ccs/redhook/why-is-occupy-wallstreet-protesting-nyc-museums-and-not-super-rich-galleries-and-art-fairs/
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not only calls out what he considers to be Archey’s personal vendetta;7 he also reminds
us that Adbuster’s original call was aimed at government and not private corporations.
“For Occupy Museums to direct its criticism at state-funded, public-serving museums,”
he argues, “is in exact accordance with the methods of the Occupy movement as a whole”
(Brand n. pag.). One of the central demands of Occupy was, in fact, for Obama to “ordain
a Presidential Commission tasked with ending the influence money has over our
representatives in Washington” (n.pag.).
What is most striking about the general rhetoric of the Occupy Museums
movement is not that it pits the museum’s submission to corporate greed against its
assumed symbolic value (which it does), but rather the degree to which resistance to
corruption and the restoration of the “common good” is suffused with the language of
ownership and private property. In Fischer’s words: “We occupy big museums as both
real ties to Wall Street fraud money and as symbols of a culture thats [sic] been stolen
from the 99% by the elites” (Fischer n. pag.; emphasis added). More importantly,
however, what the debates surrounding Occupy Museums’ political legitimacy and
efficacy reveal is that the left, in this case, seems to appropriate, for purposes of
resistance and critique, the very logic of ownership central to the forms of economic
domination it rivals.

7

Archey’s so-called vendettas are clearly linked in Brand’s mind to her previous

internship at ARTINFO.
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Despite the high level of disagreement about the precise relation of the museum
industry to the Occupy movement, what Fischer’s initial call suggests is that museums in
the twenty-first century continue to operate, in the words of Rebecca DeRoo, as “political
centers” (DeRoo 2006). The validity of this line of argument is affirmed by a series of
recent developments in Canadian culture. For example, less than a year after Fischer
announced the intention to Occupy Museums, Heritage Minister James Moore announced
the plan to rebrand the Canadian Museum of Civilization (CMC) as the Canadian
Museum of History (CMH). Backed by $25-million of government funding and a $1million partnership with the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, the revamped
institution will focus more specifically on Canadian historical events, such as the
construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Moore’s framing of the project in terms of
a pressing need to tell and celebrate the stories of our country advocates a decidedly
preservationist imperative; “our children,” he says, “need to know more about Canada’s
past”8 (“Civilization Museum’s” n. pag.).
Opponents, however, recognize the limiting and exclusionary effects of this
imperative. The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), one of the
project’s most vociferous critics, argues that “such a ‘great-man’ approach to history
leaves no opening for crucial processes that don’t fit into a rigid time-line or political

8

See “Civilization museum’s $25M rebranding to focus on history: Opposition accuses

Tories of turning museum into Conservative ‘spin machine’.” CBC News: Ottawa.
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 16 Oct. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/civilization-museum-s-25m-rebranding-to-focuson-history-1.1225802
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biography—for example, the colonization of First Nations, industrialization, gender
relations, migration, and ethnic conflict, environmental change, and much more” (“New
Museum” n. pag.). Subsumed under the preservationist imperative, history is reduced to a
series of past events that affirm the existing order of things. Moreover, as CAUT notes,
the reductive notion of history-as-heritage conceals a harmful political agenda: “the
government’s high-profile announcement about transforming the CMC into the CMH fits
into a pattern of politically motivated heritage politics” that “reflects a new use of history
to support the government’s political agenda—that is, the evocation of particular features
of our past as worthy of official endorsement and promotion”9 (to the exclusion of others,
one might add). The original mandate of the CMC was “to increase throughout Canada
and internationally, interest in, knowledge and critical understanding of and appreciation
and respect for human cultural achievements and human behaviour by establishing,
maintaining and developing for research and posterity a collection of objects of historical
or cultural interest, with special but not exclusive reference to Canada, and by
demonstrating those achievements and behaviour, the knowledge derived from them and
the understanding they represent” (“Civilization Museum’s” n. pag.). By contrast, the
new Canadian Museum of History Act, yet to be fully approved by the senate, not only
advocates “events, experiences, people and objects that reflect and have shaped Canada’s
history and identity” rather than “human cultural achievements” but also strikes from the

9

See “New museum must preserve research and breadth of exhibitions.” Retain

Canada’s Museum of Civilization. Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2012.
Web. 28 Apr. 2014. http://www.canadaspastmatters.ca/museum-ofcivilization/preserve.aspx
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act altogether the mandate for “maintaining and developing for research and posterity a
collection of objects of historical or cultural interest.” CAUT warns that these significant
changes not only exhibit a “narrowing of focus” but, perhaps, more insidiously, “an end
to the institution’s mandate as a knowledge-creating institution.”10 (“New Museum” n.
pag.).
While groups opposing the CMH transformation share some overlapping
concerns—including, for example, the high cost of the transformation during a time of
heavy cuts to federal social and cultural programs—criticisms of the transformation are
far from unified. Victor Rabinovitch, former president of the CMC, claims that changes
to the national icon are driven by the impulse to reject the Liberal vision of Canada as a
center for diversity and cosmopolitanism (for which the CMC has served as a “symbolic
temple”) and replace it with a vision of Canada as “a land of victorious armed forces,
brawny resource extractors and compliant monarchists” (Butler n, pag.). The current
president, however, sees things slightly differently. In his recent article “How Stephen
Harper is rewriting history,” John Geddes accentuates Mark O’Neill’s dismay regarding
the fact that the current exhibits do little to convey “actual historical events” (Geddes n.
pag.).11 Guiding Geddes through the displays, O’Neill remarks on the fact that the “intact

10

See “CAUT opposes the destruction of Museum of Civilization.” Retain Canada’s

Museum of Civilization. Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2012. Web. 28
Apr. 2014. http://www.canadaspastmatters.ca/museum-of-civilization/caut-opposes.aspx
11

See “How Stephen Harper is rewriting history: Starting with a $25-million museum

overhaul, the Conservatives want to change the way Canadians perceive their past.”
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early 20th-century Ukrainian Catholic church” fails to tells us about the lives of Ukrainian
internment; and he makes similar claims about the “mock-up of a square in 18th-century
New France, the “lonely text panel…about Louis Riel’s rebellions,” and the
“meticulously reconstructed…Chinese laundry” (n. pag.). For O’Neill, the government’s
rebranding project signifies a missed opportunity, one that might have exposed the
invisible social relations buried in the monuments of cultural heritage.
Despite the fact that critics of the project emphasize its Conservative celebration
of the “great man of history” as opposed to the Liberal lauding of ordinary lives, Geddes
argues that the CMC’s turn actually began under Liberal rule with Rabinovitch’s
endorsement of the Canadian War Museum.12 And contrary to opponents’ reservations,
O’Neill maintains that Canada’s darker activities, such as the internment of Japanese
Canadians during the Second World War, the October Crisis of 1970 and the “suspension
of civil liberties in Quebec” (Geddes n. pag.) will be displayed alongside a long list of
accomplishments—albeit excluding the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In part,
O’Neill’s enthusiasm derives from the fact that, in his own words: “It will be the single

News. Macleans, 29 Jul. 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/written-by-the-victors/

12

In the article itself “Liberal” seems to refer to both the Liberal Party and to liberalism

or liberal ideology; it is the same for “Conservative.” This conflation threatens to obscure
the political significance of ideological positions by subsuming political ideology, which
has populist dimension, under the Party politics.
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largest pan-Canadian narrative ever developed” (n. pag.). Geddes concludes with the
hope that the transformation, which coincides with the country’s 150th birthday, means
that O’Neill will no longer have to illuminate the history the CMC “fails to teach” (n.
pag.). Amidst a dearth of contradictory views, junior researcher Amanda Watson argues
that many critics are missing what she calls “the more harrowing insinuation: that the
largest and most popular cultural institution in the country will succumb to the Harper
Government’s militarization of Canadian national identity” (Watson n. pag.). The
museum plan,” Watson continues, “is not a rearrangement of artifacts and a name change.
It is a reorientation to Canadian history, one that promotes a master narrative in the hopes
of recasting a unified Canadian citizen.”13
On the opposite side of the country, another significant debate surrounds the
restructuring of the Vancouver Art Gallery (VAG). In April of 2013, Vancouver mayor
Gregor Robertson voiced his approval for the relocation of the Vancouver Art Gallery to
an empty lot in Larwill Park, a move with a projected budget of approximately $350million. The move comes as a solution to real material problems with the gallery’s
present condition. Since 1983, the VAG has occupied the former provincial courthouse—
an iconic, stately neo-classical structure designed by Sir Francis Mawson Rattenbury in
1906—which has recently been burdened by a leaky membrane beneath the North Plaza
fountain, a commissioned structure gracing the entrance grounds of the gallery that has

13

See “Civilization Museum to be history as Conservatives re-define Canada in their

vision.” IPolitics, 21 Oct. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
http://www.ipolitics.ca/2012/10/21/amanda-watson-civilization-museum-to-be-historyas-conservatives-re-define-canada-in-their-vision/
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on more than one occasion been referred to as an obstruction to rather than facilitator of
community events. Along with a lack of storage space and limited conservation
resources, the threat of water damage prompted gallery director Kathleen Bartels along
with the past and present chairs of the VAG Foundation, David Aisennstat and Michael
Audain respectively, to approach the Vancouver Board of Trade with a proposal for a
new building. While Audain claims that “much of the opposition to moving the gallery
comes from many patrons’ nostalgic attachment to the current site” (Tinari n. pag.),

14

the

loudest opposition comes not from nostalgic patrons but from wealthy art collector and
real estate marketer Bob Rennie who touts the project as an “artistic Gallipoli, an
expensive building that the city can’t afford and doesn’t need” (Bula n. pag.).15
Partnering with Vancouver economist David Baxter and referring to Bartel’s plan as a
reliance on “starchitecture” (n. pag.), Rennie has proposed an alternative plan for the
VAG that would involve its dispersion throughout the city. Opposing the VAG director’s
proposal for a monumental new building, Rennie suggests instead building a series of
smaller venues (approximately seven) placed in various neighbourhoods around the city.
While the “condo king”16 speaks in terms of city-building, and his partner frames the
decentralized gallery as “a real opportunity as we move into the Twitter age to ask what
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See “The Vancouver Art Gallery’s $350 Million Plan.” News & Features. Vancouver

Magazine, 1 Jun. 2010. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
http://www.vanmag.com/News_and_Features/Urban_Fix/The_Vancouver_Art_Gallerys_
350_Million_Plan?page=0%2C0
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are other ways that this collection could be presented,” Bartels presents the proposed
changes as, on the one hand, a response to material crisis, and, on the other hand, an
economic opportunity for the city of Vancouver (Tinari n. pag.).
Though passionate declarations of city building and decentralization may sound
promising and perhaps even forward-thinking, Andrew Witt, a writer for the progressive
online newspaper The Mainlander, argues that Rennie’s plan reads less like a radical
Situationist redistribution than a “blatant urban renewal project”17; and that critiques of
the real estate magnate in mainstream media have “only served to pathologize larger
structural inequalities” (Witt n. pag.). In Part 1 of “The Vancouver Art Gallery and the
Eviction of a Political Idea,” Witt maintains that media coverage of the debate, in which
the “crisis” oscillates “between the anodyne and the banal,” has covered over more
pressing issues. “Real political and social antagonisms between the city’s financial elite
and its cultural producers” Witt argues, “were suspended or displaced, while concerns
over the production and circulation of art in the city were reduced to apolitical
transactions of real estate, finance and state support” (n. pag.).18 Furthermore, while the
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Jane Jacobs wrote her critique in 1961, which stimulated opposition movements, but not
until after hundreds of historic buildings had been demolished; we now have ecological
and cultural preservation projects that purport to strengthen communities by preserving
public space, but these projects have just as vehemently displaced the poor as did the
earlier renewal projects documented by Jacobs.
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VAG’s move has been largely framed as an emergency response, Witt reveals that the
proposed move is accompanied by a series of evictions plaguing small artist-run spaces in
Vancouver’s Downtown East Side (DTES). In a follow-up to the original article, Witt
demonstrates that these evictions, which rose sharply following the 2010 Olympics, are
the result of “high rents, restructured state funding, profit-driven renovictions [sic], and
an apathetic city council”—in short: neoliberal gentrification.
Implicit in his comparative look at the relocation of the Vancouver Art Gallery
and the series of art-house evictions are questions of the role of cultural memory in The
New Enclosures. While his analysis of the VAG debates reveals the “developer logic” of
the contemporary museum, his recognition of the relationship between this move and the
simultaneous series of evictions gestures toward a more insidious capitalist logic—the
logic of enclosure. In his attempt to answer the question of what the “new Vancouver Art
Gallery represent[s] in this environment of eviction and displacement,” Witt turns to
cultural theorist Andreas Huyssen’s analysis of the modern museum as a “mass medium”
reflecting two dominant “cultural desires: the need to forget and the desire to remember.”
Arguing that despite his apt identification of competing desires Huyssen ultimately fails
to recognize the “localized question” of the role of the city’s elite in the museum’s
repurposing and redeployment (Witt n. pag.), Witt sets erasures of memory alongside the
material conditions of eviction in Vancouver. His pointed reference to the exhibition of
Audain’s collection “Shore, Forest and Beyond” as a “shameless celebration” of the
“master-collector” (one might even say, the capitalist-auteur) “amidst one of
Vancouver’s worst housing crises” is an indictment in itself. Yet he takes this indictment
a step further by claiming that “[t]he folktales of official culture always omit the dark
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violence that makes history possible in the first place.” This dark violence becomes
visible in the airing of Audain’s dirty laundry; not only was his father Robert Dunsmuir
apparently a “ruthless strikebreaker” but he was also a “founder of the first phase of
primitive accumulation in British Columbia” (n. pag.). Such violence is concealed from
the enthusiastic crowd of museum patrons. Beyond the public forgetting of these aspects
of Audain’s personal history, Witt describes Vancouver’s project of gentrification more
broadly as a kind of “conservative amnesia.” “Founded on forgetting,” he argues, “the
city’s official image sets out to ruin any vestige of working-class culture and community.
Erasure is almost total” (Witt n. pag.). The erasure of common knowledge in this case
accompanies the redistribution of public space; and despite finding themselves on
opposite sides of the politico-aesthetic fence, real estate tycoons like Audain and Rennie
are equally culpable in the social-economic effects of this redistribution.
Not surprisingly, Witt concludes his article with a discussion of the 2011
occupation of the VAG grounds in solidarity with the Occupy movement, in which he
relays Vancouver lawyer Ben Parkin’s concerns about the real material threat of the
occupiers to the museum collection. The main concern was that occupiers’ trench digging
might rupture the underground membrane protecting the gallery vaults from the external
threat of rainwater. Making explicit the clear psychological element of this threat, Witt
argues that, “condensed into little droplets of water, the occupation ate away at the
Vancouver Art Gallery’s institutional edifice” (Witt n. pag.). The rhetoric of water
damage reveals institutional ruin as the collateral damage of occupation; the threat of
penetration assumes the form of rupture, a discourse that underlies the current scene of
political struggle.
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1.2 Forms of Rupture
Each of the preceding examples provides a brief snapshot of the present relationship
between the late capitalist museum (Krauss) and The New Enclosures (Midnight
Notes)—in particular, they demonstrate the ways in which the new enclosures not only
conform to the logic of preservation proffered by the heritage industry but do so on
aesthetic grounds.
Recently, however, the museum industry has been the site of another artistic and
cultural counter-movement. In the decade or so preceding Occupy, museums of memory
and human rights, both repurposed and purpose-built, emerged across the globe in
conjunction with politically charged memory movements.19 In these movements, the
struggle to recover collective memories of historical violence merges with the
transformation of former spaces of social exclusion into spaces for public collaboration.
Commemorative buildings and structures are erected on public land, and previous sites of
torture and suffering are transformed into sites of collective memorialization. Here, the
aim is not primarily the reclamation of common space but, first and foremost, the
reclamation of repressed knowledge. Significantly, these left-leaning movements have
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Examples of these new museums include: the Museum of Memory and Tolerance in

Mexico City (2010); the Canadian Museum for Human Rights in Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada (2014); the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC
(1993); the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile (2010); the
Museum of Memory in Buenos Aires, Argentina (2002); the Lugar de la Memoria in
Lima, Peru (2010); and the Kigali Memorial Centre in Rwanda (2004).
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responded to oppressive state regimes through the recovery of historical memory,20 which
necessarily imbues memory, or images of the past, with emancipatory potential.
Inevitably, however, this potential is foreclosed not only by the fact that within a situation
of global subsumption memory discourses are redirected for productive ends but equally
by the fact that these movements tend to simply replace one particular image of the past
(the history of the victors) with another (the memory of the repressed). This has three
significant consequences: first, replacing one image with another enacts a reversal that
remains within the logic of the existing system and does nothing to directly alter
structures of inequality and exploitation; second, recovering and commemorating brutal
histories of state violence does not in itself expose the capitalist dimension of these
histories; and finally, relegating this violence to the past ultimately covers over the
ongoing violence of primitive accumulation in the present, as well as the complicity of
such recovered images with these existing conditions.
While the concept of rupture signifies a threat in the context of occupation, in
contemporary memory projects it signifies emancipation. Indeed, the emancipatory
potential of recovered memory is often modeled on a notion of traumatic rupture, which
ostensibly provides an opening for the coming to consciousness, however belatedly, of a
previously repressed experience. Recent theories of trauma (Caruth and Felman),
postmemory (Hirsch and Landsberg) and other aspects of trauma and memory studies
(such as Mark Seltzer’s notion of wound culture or Arthur Frank’s concept of the
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The political significance of the recovery and reclamation of historical memory will be

discussed in more detail in chapter two.
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wounded storyteller) locate emancipatory potential in repressed counter-narratives, which
speak back to and against dominant historical narratives. Victims’ stories of trauma and
violence break open the opaque veil of history. The limitations of importing such a
psychic model of traumatic rupture into the political sphere, however, rest on a
fundamental assumption about history: it assumes that history proceeds chronologically
according to the Newtonian laws of linear time.21 Within this framework, the politics of
memory is sutured to a temporal rupture in the smooth progression of history, one that is
not only modeled on traumatic subjectivity but also does nothing to challenge the
abstract, universal time of a politics structured by historical progress. What is recovered
in the counter-narratives of memory politics is necessarily this or that repressed memory
of this or that historical trauma. As a result, the recovery of historical content hitherto
excluded from the discourse of official history is conceived analogously to the recovery
of the analysand’s repressed memory in the psychoanalytic context. What should strike
us as significant in this regard, however, is not the recovery of a lost experiential content
that might point us in the direction of some truer truth but rather the potential
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In contemporary theories of primitive accumulation linear historical time is associated

with the capitalist mode of production (See, for example, Tomba and Mezzadra). Before
these, however, Walter Benjamin famously connected “homogenous, empty time” of
history with the capitalist production of standardized, universal time. And in Society of
the Spectacle, Guy Debord argues that historical time has become the universalized form
assumed by irreversible time within the capitalist mode of production. Specifically, he
states: “With the development of capitalism, irreversible time has become globally
unified” (43). I discuss the issue of historical time at length in chapter five.
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revitalization of an alternate aesthetic form, one that has until now remained latent in the
structure of the social relation.
As I have suggested, the concept of rupture is not exclusive to theories of trauma;
in recent years it has framed our understanding of politics as well, particularly in the
structuralist theories of post-Althusserian philosophers like Jacques Rancière and Alain
Badiou. Rancière’s theory of the “distribution of the sensible,” for example, announces
the ways in which the oppressed, or those excluded from the official count, can disrupt
and radically reorganize the aesthetic categories (i.e. the modes of speaking, acting,
doing, etc.) of the dominant distribution, which he names the police order. While
Althusser associated the function of the police with the ideological interpellation of the
subject—recall the officer’s hailing call, “Hey, you there!”—Rancière argues on the
contrary that the police are in fact on the side of preventing ruptures in the normative
relations of alienated subjects—Althusser’s hailing call becomes Rancière’s marshaling
imperative, “move along now, there’s nothing to see here.” Influenced by Lacan,
Badiou’s theory of the event similarly articulates a rupture in the normal structures of a
situation: in his own words, the event is both a “rupture of the laws of the situation” and
the “creation of a new possibility” (Badiou “Is the Word…”). Stimulated by the inherent
contradictions of a given situation, like Lacan’s eruption of the real in the realm of the
symbolic, Badiou’s event provides a glimpse of the invisible void around which the
situation is structured. Post-structuralist political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe ground their idea of the political in what they call “points of rupture.” Similar to
Badiou and Rancière, these points of rupture are not related to the coming-toconsciousness of traumatic experience; rather, they are tied to a notion of political
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antagonism, which operates as a disruption that appears at the limits of language (125). In
each case, politics is not merely the struggle for recognition but the aesthetic presentation
of the effects of a structure in which misrecognition is the norm. Put differently, politics
takes shape as a mode of exposure that disrupts the smooth progression of history as
usual.
For Slavoj Zizek the immediate consequence of such a temporal short circuit is
the emergence of a new political subject he calls the “post-traumatic subject” (Zizek
2008). This detached, indifferent, affectless subject develops when the traumatized
subject survives its own death; not simply as the survivor of an overwhelming experience
of trauma (a train accident, a brain tumour, the death camps, and so on) but as a subject
that reflects the alienating logic of capitalist accumulation. The post-traumatic subject
diverges from Freud’s traumatized subject whose symptom takes the form of repetition in
its abandon of traumatic truth. Following Catharine Malabou, however, Zizek argues that
this Freudian model of trauma is highly Western-centric and cannot account for
experiences of trauma that do not take the form of a sudden, unexpected event. In
countries suffering from chronic civil war, for example, trauma is a permanent feature of
everyday life and, indeed, of existence itself. Zizek maintains that Freud, when
confronted with cases of chronic trauma, “is not ready to accept the direct destructive
efficiency of external shocks—they destroy the psyche of the victim (or, at least, wound
it in an unredeemable way) without resonating in any inner traumatic truth” (11). From
this perspective the subjects of war-torn countries are surely not plagued by the same
unconscious and libidinally infused anxieties as Freud’s traumatized subjects but by an
absolute psychic destruction that leaves no concrete remainder. The detached post-
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traumatic subject, however, does not simply replace the libidinal subject of Freudian
trauma, it destroys it: “Malabou’s thesis here is very precise and radical: her point is not
only to add to the Freudian libidinal unconscious another, cerebral, unconscious. The
problem is that the Freudian unconscious only makes sense when (if) we refuse to admit
— we erase the possibility of — the cerebral unconscious…which is the truly material
unconscious” (18-19). With the birth of this new subject, rather, only form remains: pure
death drive, a subject devoid of its meaningful content. In this sense, the post-traumatic
subject is “the empty form deprived even of unconscious formations encapsulating a
variety of libidinal investments” (27). The post-traumatic subject is the embodiment of
pure form.
Demonstrating the limitations of Malabou’s theory, however, Zizek argues that
this critique of traumatic repetition focuses too intensely on content rather than form.
Traumatic shock, he suggests, should not be understood as a repetition of substance—that
is, of this or that particular memory—but of the very act of erasure, of forgetting, of
repression—rather, “the traumatic shock REPEATS the past, i.e. the past traumatic loss
of substance which is constitutive of the very dimension of subjectivity” (emphasis in
original). The crucial point is this: traumatic repetition is not the repetition of a specific
historical event that forms the traumatic content of the repressed memory; it is the
repetition of the form of trauma itself, “the very gesture of erasing all substantial content”
(27).
Here we return to our claim that this new subject is not merely a survivor of
historical violence condemned to eternal repetition but also an effect of the logic of
enclosure central to the project of capitalist accumulation. In his concluding paragraphs
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Zizek draws a connection between the rise of three contemporary figures of the Cartesian
subject—the proletariat, the totally mediated subject, and the post-traumatic subject—and
three respective modes of enclosure—the enclosure of common culture, of external
nature and of internal nature. Each of these subject-enclosure dyads are further linked to
an internal antagonism with enough potential force to prevent the indefinite reproduction
of capitalism: ecological catastrophe, the failure of private property, and the ethics of new
scientific technologies. (The fourth antagonism, the “new forms of apartheid”
characterized by “Walls and slums,” is conspicuously bereft of a corresponding dyad.)
The main point we should take from Zizek’s discussion of the post-traumatic subject, and
its connections to a particular mode of enclosure, is that the invention of trauma cannot
be thought apart from the history of capitalist accumulation. Both are predicated on the
logic of separation and violent erasure.22 In this context, trauma describes the appearance
of the pure form of primitive accumulation in the world of sense perception, which is not
simply alienation from the products of one’s own labour but, more significantly,
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This violent erasure is most certainly a gendered concept through which the victims of

primitive accumulation are feminized. In her most recent book Changing Difference,
Catherine Malabou argues that the female essence is one of violent erasure. In the
introduction she states: “It may be that woman is only defined negatively with respect to
the violence that is done to her and the attacks on her essence, but this negative definition
nonetheless constitutes the resistant stock that distinguishes the finite from all the other
types of fragility, from overexposure to exploitation and brutality” (2). We can draw an
earlier connection between the erasure of subjectivity and the gendered and voiceless
expression of traumatic experience in Freud’s studies of hysteria.
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alienation from one’s very existence in the world.23 In this sense, the discourse of trauma
translates the pure form of primitive accumulation into the language of aesthetic
experience.

1.3 Against the Grain
Given the eradicating dimension of primitive accumulation, it is no surprise that the
politics of memory and trauma are inflected with the logic of preservation, which finds
itself in conflict with the reclamation of the commons. Despite the fact that memory
movements seem to be largely unrelated to Occupy movements in terms of both context
and intentionality, linked by the logic of primitive accumulation these two socio-political
counter-forces register the series of enclosures that have accompanied urban renewal and
cultural heritage projects since the late 1980s. At the same time, they illustrate the
contradictory aspects of these movements. On the one hand, previous sites of primitive
accumulation (including concentration camps and political prisons) are re-absorbed into
the capitalist system through their transformation into sites of cultural and historical
preservation; on the other hand, the occupation of museums and other existing cultural
spaces in the name of reclaiming common space. Accordingly, each of the opening
vignettes—Occupy museums, the rebranding of the CMC and the relocation of the
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In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt describes the concept of world alienation as

a loss of intersubjectivity that has the negative effect of diminishing our sense of reality. I
discuss this concept in further detail in chapter five with respect to the literature of W.G.
Sebald.
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VAG—illustrates fundamental tensions between current forms of cultural resistance in
the form of memory politics and the pervasiveness of a preservationist aesthetic.
Each of the following chapters illustrates a particular manifestation of these
tensions. In this vein, Chapter two, “The Paradox of Preservation: Museums of Memory
and the New Enclosures,” takes a closer look at the ways in which preservationist
impulses—from environmental and ecological to cultural and historical—participate in
what I call the epistemic enclosures of late capitalism through the aestheticization of
historical violence and the rhetoric of historical recovery. Against the hypothesis that
memory politics emerge as a defence against obsolescence and forgetting in the age of
global capitalism, I argue that the international proliferation of memorial and so-called
post-memorial practices both anticipate and collaborate with the wave of New Enclosures
currently sweeping the globe. Through an analysis of two early museums of memory and
human rights (Robben Island and the ESMA), I suggest that current practices and
institutions aimed at the preservation of historical memory and cultural heritage
paradoxically form new sites of primitive accumulation. In fact, the preservationist
aesthetic at work within these institutions not only responds to the erasures of historical
memory within official national discourses but is also a critical element in the
transformation of the residue of previous enclosures into raw material for the New
Enclosures.
The third chapter, “Archives of Resistance: Memory Art and the Logic of
Capital,” analyzes the work of three contemporary conceptual artists whose installations
confront histories of state violence: Christian Boltanski (France), Marcelo Brodsky
(Argentina) and Alfredo Jaar (Chile). Drawing on Rosalind Krauss’s analysis of the logic
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of the late capitalist museum, I demonstrate the ways in which the post-minimalist
installations of these three second-generation artists anticipate the next moment in the
history of capital in which historical recovery becomes a ground for the new enclosures.
Significantly, the absence of images of violence in these works, which at first looks very
much like an affirmation of the unrepresentability of trauma, in fact presents the ways in
which the logic of enclosure in the age of global capitalism is reinforced at the level of
representation through the recovery and reification of images of the past. Whereas
minimalism anticipated the merging of the art object with the space of exhibition that
would lead to the experience-driven forms of contemporary art, the generalization of
experiential art lead to the production of post-minimalist installation, which anticipated
the intersection of memory archives with the logic of enclosure. Struggles over both
material and conceptual property are reflected in struggles over how to recover, represent
and preserve images of the past. Each of the artists discussed in this chapter elucidates
one particular aspect of these struggles. Boltanski’s work foregrounds the return of what
Walter Benjamin famously called the “aura of the work of art,” its centrality to current
memory projects and its strong connections to an imaginary time before; Brodsky’s work
demonstrates the ways in which memory politics are coupled with the logic of
commodity production through which the social relations of witnessing are reified in
memorial objects; and Jaar’s work reveals the ways in which the substitution of images of
violence with the logic of archival accumulation is an inversion of the process of
primitive accumulation through which images of violence are produced as the remains of
this process. All three, I suggest serve as archives of primitive accumulation that
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demonstrate the ways in which the New Enclosures take place largely in and through the
production and circulation of images of the past.
Chapter four, “The Image in Crisis: The Controversial Case of Four Photographs
from Auschwitz,” reframes the question of exhibiting and viewing photographs of
violence in terms of the politics of enclosure rather than representation. In this reframing
I am less concerned with the particularities of longstanding debates on the so-called
unrepresentable and more concerned with the ways in which these debates intersect with
the logic of capitalist production and reproduction. My point of departure for such an
analysis is a relatively recent controversy regarding the inclusion of four famous
Sonderkommando photos in the 2001 exhibition Memoire des camps curated by Clement
Cheroux, the director of photography at Le Centre Pompidou. Documented in Georges
Didi-Huberman’s monograph Images in Spite of All: Four Photographs from Auschwitz,
the debate is framed by the concept of the unrepresentable and addresses the issue of
whether certain events not only defy representation but also, in fact, ought not to be
represented at all. I argue that this imperative of prohibition is not simply a symptom of
resistance, psychic or political, but an indicator of the ways in which the discourse of the
unrepresentable conceals the role that images play in the ongoing enclosures of global
capitalism. Drawing on Tony C. Brown’s discussion of the two temporalities and
corresponding levels of representation that characterize the process of globalization, I
argue that the perceived separation of material enclosures from the development of a
generalized photographic consciousness results in a failure to recognize the aesthetic
dimensions of primitive accumulation, namely its pre-figural aspect. Re-reading the
debate from this perspective reveals the ways in which the four photographs from
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Auschwitz articulate the logic of primitive accumulation through contradictions between
their material existence as relics of this process (whose re-entry into the realm of visual
circulation highlights the cumulative logic of primitive accumulation) and their
metaphorical existence as tombs of the dead (which seals the logic of primitive
accumulation off into the past).
The final chapter, “Trauma in the Time of Capital: Allegories of Primitive
Accumulation in the Literature of W.G. Sebald,” reads the contemporary trauma text not
as a rupture in the official narrative of history but as an allegory of primitive
accumulation that reflects the generalized sense of alienation characterizing modern
experience. Trauma text, here, names the recent emergence of a new genre of art and
literature that conveys the weight of historical violence through a blend of the more
traditional genres of biography, memoir and travelogue with historical fiction. Following
Dean Franco’s claim that trauma in Toni Morrison’s Beloved should be understood as an
expression of the loss of property rights, I argue that the notion of trauma cannot be
conceived apart from the production of private property at the center of the capitalist
economy. Accordingly, this chapter provides analyses of two novels by W.G. Sebald—
The Rings of Saturn (1995) and Austerlitz (2001)—whose incorporation of photography
has proffered them as testing grounds for theories of postmemory and traumatic rupture.
Re-conceptualizing trauma as a placeholder for the experience of expropriation that
characterizes the ongoing violence of enclosure (which Marx identified as the foundation
for capitalist accumulation), I read these texts instead as allegories of primitive
accumulation that situate the quest for historical recovery within the context of capitalist
expansion.
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The impetus for this project stems from a deep ambivalence with current theories
of memory and trauma that, despite assertions of political resistance and radical
intervention, remain guided largely by the liberal principles of empathy and
identification. I argue that an adequate understanding of resistance based on trauma,
witnessing and the recovery of memory requires a study of how such resistance reflects
the contemporary material conditions of enclosure within the context of global
capitalism. These forms of resistance, I contend, not only reflect the logic of enclosure
but also anticipate the next moment in the history of capital through which the logic of
enclosure merges with the imperative of preservation. Actualizing Debord’s “society of
the spectacle,” the image of the past becomes the ground for the New Enclosures. My
theoretical framework is informed by theories of memory, trauma and primitive
accumulation as well as contemporary photography and art criticism; and the cultural
objects in this study exemplify a new order of primitive accumulation which is neither the
original accumulation signified by the separation of the worker from the means of
production (and ultimately from the means of subsistence), nor the corresponding
symbolic enclosures (of memory and knowledge) that maintain the original accumulation
through the separation of the subject from the history of expropriation; rather this new
order of primitive accumulation is characterized, paradoxically, by the very forms of
material and historical preservation that articulate themselves as modes of resistance. Put
differently, this new order of primitive accumulation is characterized by a general
aesthetic of preservation through which the recuperation and recirculation of the alienated
subjects and objects of historical enclosure has become a foundation for the redistribution
of knowledge and space “after globalization” (Cazdyn & Szeman). Overall,
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Preservationist Aesthetics seeks to read current theories of memory and trauma against
the grain and in relation to the logic of primitive accumulation that characterizes the
ongoing series of enclosures sweeping the globe today.
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Chapter 2

2

The Paradox of Preservation: Memory Museums and
the New Enclosures

Saving this historical memory is crucial if we are to find an alternative to capitalism.
—Silvia Federici

We begin with a collection of scenes from the recent series of global memory
movements: a mass of more than 4000 shoes belonging to those who perished in
concentrations camps during the Second World War gathered and piled high in a room on
the second floor of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, one of the first
museums devoted to memories of Holocaust violence; reflecting this trope of the pile, in
a temporary installation housed in the Park Avenue Armory in New York City, heaps of
used clothing are arranged pyramid style while a giant crane distributes the articles from
a towering central pile;24 in a stark photographic image, scraps of film are scattered amid
the rubble produced by the 1994 bombing of the AMIA, a Jewish community center in
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The scene referred to here is a public art installation called “No Man’s Land,” designed

by French artist Christian Boltanski.
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Argentina.25 These scenes diverge from the more traditional forms of memorialization
that accompany catastrophic events in world history. Not only do they take shape in
practices belonging to the world of post-minimalist or conceptual art, but they also
transform the monument of violence into an archive of terror.
Renowned memory scholar Andreas Huyssen suggests that the rise of this new
field of global memory politics reflects a “crisis of history”26 linked to a shift in our
experiences of time and space after globalization (Huyssen 1). Arguing that “too much of
the contemporary memory discourse focuses on the personal—on testimony, memoir,
subjectivity, traumatic memory—either in poststructuralist psychoanalytic perspective or
in attempts to shore up a therapeutic popular sense of the authentic and experiential” (8),
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This image is taken from Marcelo Brodsky’s second major project Nexo, a series of

photographs and public installations that confront the lasting impact of the military
dictatorship that governed Argentina for nearly a decade. Both Boltanski’s and Brodsky’s
work is explored in more depth in Chapter Three, “Archives of Enclosure: Memory Art
and the Logic of Late Capitalism.”
26

Huyssen opens his book Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory

with a discussion of the so-called crisis of history, which has all but replaced earlier
discussions of the “end of history.” He begins with the claim, “Historical memory today
is not what it used to be” (1), suggesting that the crisis of history is also a crisis of
memory. Questions about historical crisis in the form of the “crisis of history” proliferate
in contemporary culture, both in academic and popular discourse. See, for example,
James Vernon’s “Thoughts on the present ‘crisis of history’ in Britain” (2001); Harvey J.
Kaye’s The Powers of the Past: Reflections on the Crisis and the Promise of History
(1991); Christophe Prochasson’s “Is there a ‘crisis’ of history in France?” (1998); and
Robert Kluijver’s recent series of exhibitions in Amsterdam titled Crisis of History.
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Huyssen instead hypothesizes that “memory and musealization together are called upon
to provide a bulwark against obsolescence and disappearance, to counter our deep anxiety
about the speed of change and the ever-shrinking horizons of time and space” (23).
Huyssen seeks a less subjective and more structural explanation for the proliferation of
memory in the current era.
Other recent attempts to explain the memorial turn in art, literature and politics
range from implicitly affirmative to outright pessimistic. In this regard, American
historians Jay Winter and Kerwin Lee Klein represent diverging points of view: while
Klein is deeply suspicious of this turn, attributing it to the revitalization of a certain form
of mystical thinking that represents “memory as re-enchantment” (Klein 136),27 Winter
characterizes the recent “memory boom”28 in more concrete terms as a generalized
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In his polemic “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” Klein argues:

“At the moment, there are two popular discursive modes of memory as re-enchantment.
The first involves weak appropriations of Freudian language to vaporize sentimental
autobiography. … [The second] represents itself as an engagement with postmodernism
and appeals to the ineffable—the excess, the unsayable, the blank darkness, or some other
Absolute whose mysteries can be grasped only by the initiates armed with the secret
code” (136-7).
28

According to Winter, this seemingly sudden proliferation of memory in cultural and

historical discourse was due to an important set of preconditions that emerged following
World War One: the creation of identity politics, through which narrative counterhistories challenged the exclusion of certain social groups from official historical
discourse; an increase in affluence and disposable income, which allowed for an increase
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response to changes in social and economic conditions following the Second World War.
Specifically, he argues: “In the West, one important precondition of the memory boom
has been affluence. Rising real incomes and increased expenditure on education since the
Second World War have helped to shift to the right the demand curve for cultural
commodities” (57-8). While Winter admits that the causes of this trend are surely more
complex than this, he nevertheless maintains that “[d]welling on memory is a matter of
both disposable income and leisure time” (59). From this perspective the rise of memory
discourses is a matter of class privilege rather than mystical fetishism.
A critical understanding of memory politics must include an analysis of the
relationship between the expansion of capital and the emergence of cultures of trauma.
While much of the current writing on memory politics addresses the roles of
globalization and mass media in such movements, it often does so from the point of view
of traumatic experience or the “crisis of history.” However, few address the role of
capitalism directly in the emergence of memory movements worldwide, or the ways in
which the past functions as a material resource for the reproduction and accumulation of
capital in the present. Not surprisingly, the crisis of history and the development of
trauma theory (extending to what would eventually become Holocaust studies) coincided
with the economic recession that began in the late 1970s. These social phenomena were

in public spending on cultural preservation; and new developments in information
technologies that facilitated the material preservation of memory narratives.
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accompanied by a turn to autobiography and family history (Klein; Winter), along with
the widespread transition to neoliberal economic practices. Around this same time urban
renewal projects,29 beginning with the Housing Act of 1954, accelerated in major cities
throughout the United States, suggesting that practices of preservation became materially
grounded in the ideology of (sub)urbanization within which memory projects have
flourished. Recalling that for Marx enclosures of the commons were at the heart of the
transition to capitalism, I argue that it is not enough to simply recognize the capitalist
context of global memory politics as if memory politics are merely an effect of changes
in economic conditions. Rather, we must recognize and illuminate the ways in which
memory itself is implicated in the ongoing expansion of capital from the very beginning.
Accordingly, using the theory of primitive accumulation as a framework of analysis, I
consider how new memorial practices anticipate, in Rosalind Krauss’s words, “the next
moment in the history of capital” (Krauss 10), in which, as Huyssen points out, “memory
discourses themselves [paradoxically] partake in the detemporalizing processes that
characterize a culture of consumption and obsolescence” (Huyssen 10). More
specifically, I argue that what Pierre Nora has famously called “sites of memory” are also
sites of primitive accumulation that both resist and collaborate with the New Enclosures
in which memorial practices and institutions, such as “trauma tourism” and “memory
museums,” assume the grammar of cultural preservation and historical recovery, and
ultimately foster what I am calling a preservationist aesthetic.

29

See Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961).
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This chapter begins with a brief analysis of the birth of the memory museum, a
new cultural institution located at the intersection of global memory politics (which
emphasizes the role of memory in political resistance) and the heritage industry (which
capitalizes on the preservation of historical memory and cultural heritage). The second
section reconsiders the relationship between capitalism and memory through the lens of
primitive accumulation in order to claim that what we might call enclosures of memory
have been an essential aspect of capital accumulation from the outset. The remainder of
this chapter focuses on two exemplary case studies—Robben Island Museum in South
Africa and the Museum of Memory in Argentina—in order to demonstrate the ways in
which the present drive to preserve memories of historical violence is a crucial aspect of
the ongoing processes of primitive accumulation.

2.1 The Memory Museum
The past two decades or so have witnessed the emergence of a new institution related to
global memory movements: the Memory Museum. Since the inauguration of the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC (instituted in 1993), museums of
memory and human rights have emerged in a number of major cities across the globe.
According to Silke Arnold-de Simine, “these ‘new museums’ try to tread a fine line
between history and memory, between transnational and national memory cultures, but
also between different memory media such as the memorial and the museum” (Arnold-de
Simine 18). Broadly speaking, these spaces take one of two general forms: they are either
newly constructed institutions built to house mementos of historical violence—what
Laurie Beth Clark calls “purpose-built” (Clark 69)—or they are already existing spaces of
social and political persecution that have been transformed into spaces of witnessing and
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memorialization—in Clark’s words, “site-specific”(68). Notable institutions of the first
variety include The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Jewish Museum in
Berlin designed by Polish architect Daniel Libeskind (opened in 2001), the Museum of
Memory and Human Rights in Santiago Chile (formed in 2010) and the Canadian
Museum of Human Rights (set to open in 2014). Of the second variety,30 we have
institutions such as the Museum of Memory in Buenos Aires, Argentina (founded in
2002), housed in the former ESMA, a Navy Mechanical School that operated as a covert
concentration camp during the seven-year military dictatorship, and the Robben Island
Museum in South Africa (established in 1997). This new breed of museum, I argue, not
only operates as a site of historical memory and memorialization but, as a protected zone
of memory preservation, it also serves as a site of primitive accumulation.
In many senses, memory museums respond to early critiques of the modern
museum advanced by artists such as Marcel Duchamp and reinvigorated in the wake of
May ’68 by artists such as Christian Boltanski. As a forerunner of minimalism,
Duchamp’s introduction of “readymades”—defined by Andre Breton as “manufactured
objects raised to the dignity of works of art through the choice of the artist” (Breton
88)—into the space of the exhibition challenged the authority of the museum in defining
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The earliest institutions of this sort were arguably the Auschwitz and Breendonk

Memorials, both of which were WWII prison camps and sites of torture transformed into
national memorials in 1947 through initiatives by the Polish and Belgian governments
respectively.
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what counts as art. Conceptual art movements that developed in relation to the political
protests of 1968 extend Duchamp’s initial critique into the realm of memory. According
to art historian Rebecca DeRoo, artists like Christian Boltanski and Annette Messager
have used everyday objects and personal memorabilia to call attention to the absolute
failure of museums to respond adequately to critiques of elitism leveled by the their
predecessors. At the same time, work like Boltanksi’s, she insists, “typif[ies] a broader
cultural move in the last two decades to open up art and its institutions not only to
histories that had been marginalized and previously suppressed but also to new
audiences, who it was thought were likely to be engaged by these new images and
stories” (3). Contemporary installation artists, in other words, both extended avant-garde
critiques and opened a space for the recovery and circulation of repressed histories.31
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The series of political movements now referred to as identity politics emerged from the

civil rights movement and second wave feminism and attempted to recuperate those
social experiences or subjects that have historically been erased or covered over by the
dominant culture. These movements often rest on shared experiences of oppression.
Accordingly, the memoir genre has been especially important in exposing these repressed
histories. Joan Scott discusses the role of experience in the rise of identity-based social
and political movements in her essay “The Evidence of Experience.” Through an analysis
of Samuel Delany’s The Motion of Light in Water, Scott demonstrates the limitations of
the recovery of experience through “metaphors of visibility” or otherwise, arguing that
the evidence of experience underlying contemporary identity politics “reproduces rather
than contests given ideological systems—those that assume that the facts of history speak
for themselves” (Scott 778).
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In the introduction to an edited collection on memory and museums, Susan A.
Crane examines the museum’s role in the preservation cultural memory in general. While
scholars have rightly linked the transformation of “cabinets of curiosities” into public
museums with the “creation of a bourgeois public sphere in Europe” (3), Crane argues
further that “[t]he changing sensibilities of Enlightenment and Romantic thinkers who
added historical value to economic, scientific, and aesthetic values in their consideration
of objects prompted the construction of museums for the preservation of the past” (4). In
the same collection, both Suzanne Marchand and Wolfgang Ernst link the development
of the modern museum to struggles between text- and object-based claims to knowledge
(Crane 11). Ernst in particular frames this as a transition from historical knowledge
(whose primary medium is narrative or text) to archeological knowledge (whose
formative medium is the museum) (Ernst 21). Accordingly, he argues:
The realm for information (represented by archival documents and archaeological
inscriptions) confronts the icons of history (Clio, the statue of Cleopatra/Ariadne)
through the (new) medium museum. An ideological confrontation charges this
clash: whereas the symbols of history (as signs of the Roman Church) represent
the possibility of an identity or identification with antiquity, claiming continuity
of power, the archival and archaeological fragments (belonging to allegory)
designate primarily a distance in relation to their own origin, and, renouncing
nostalgia and the desire to coincide, establish a museal void of temporal
difference (23).
From this vantage point, the museum serves as a “memory-producing machine” (27) that
no longer operates as a mere “terminal” or receptacle in which so-called historical
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memory is permanently deposited but as a “transformer” or processor through which
historical memory is produced and transmitted (Ernst 25). Crane extends this argument,
adding that in the “age of citation” (Crane 12) the museum itself operates as a metaphor
for the operation of collective memory (5). She is nonetheless compelled to ask why
history and memory in general and the preservation of the past in particular have become
so influential in our current era (6).
Cultural theorist Jonathan Boyarin suggests that contemporary memory politics
and its related institutions are organized around a universal need for common human
identification (3). Within this framework, he argues, memory movements emerge at the
intersection of two complementary forms of identification: the identification with distant
contemporaries (which he links to “Foucault’s call for a spatialized struggle”) and the
identification with “our ancestors who have died unjustly” (which he links to Benjamin’s
articulation of the past as a field of political struggle) (Boyarin 11). The first mode of
identification corresponds with the new wave of global memorialization practices, while
the second is more closely aligned with the recent revival of cosmopolitan discourses,
two areas of study whose intersection has resulted in the concept of “cosmopolitan
memory,” introduced by Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider to capture the role of memory
in the shaping of an imagined global community. The articulation of memory politics
with cosmopolitan discourses reflects a drive to reconcile the desire for common human
identification with the continued violence of uneven economic globalization, however
unsuccessfully. Accordingly, Levy and Sznaider suggest global memory cultures could
play foundational role in the advancement universal human rights (88). While Andreas
Huyssen agrees that human rights must be the foundation of the new globalized memory
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politics, he questions the political efficacy of anchoring this in common human
identification, a moral category in which empathy is the primary organizing principle.
Huyssen voices two concerns in this regard: 1) the issue of globalizing Holocaust
memory and using it as a touchstone for analyzing global memory projects and 2) the
problem of conceptualizing history as trauma, which goes hand in hand with an ethic of
identification and does little to elucidate the complex political dimensions of memory
today even if it does represent its most common expression (9).
Suggesting instead that current discourses of memory coincide with our changing
conceptions of time and space, he argues that the question of whether or not memory
cultures can be read as a reaction to economic globalization should form the “terrain on
which new comparative work on the mechanisms and tropes of historical trauma and
national memory practices could be pursued” (16). In short, the political possibilities
arising from this new trend might best understood by reading memory politics in relation
to the material conditions of economic globalization rather than the abstract ideal of
cosmopolitan ethics.
In any case, the imperative of identification has remained a central feature of
contemporary memory discourses in which the image has played an essential role. In
spite of Susan Sontag’s well-known condemnation of traumatic images, photography
remains a vital aspect of collective identification across the distances of space, time and
culture; and it has facilitated the production of new cultures and forms of memory.
Marianne Hirsch argues that the promise of photography is to grant access to and transmit
unimaginable events (108). She describes the photograph itself as both an archival
inscription with an embodied dimension (117) and a “space of projection” that draws on a
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storehouse of “pre-established forms” which resonate in the popular imagination.
Photography has certainly been a willing accomplice in the desire to reproduce traumatic
memory along experiential lines. Like Hirsch’s postmemory, Alison Landsberg’s
“prosthetic memory” recognizes the turn to embodied knowledge and experience in
contemporary memorial practices. Using the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
as a case in point, Landsberg explains that the “transferential space” of the memory
museum might inaugurate what she calls a “radical politics of memory” by installing
rather than uncovering symptoms “or prosthetic memories through which we didn’t
actually live, but to which we now, after a museum experience or filmic experience, have
a kind of experiential relationship” (Landsberg 82). Since this position is based on the
logic of identity, Marco Abel argues, prosthetic memory may, in fact, “be one of the key
symptoms of the very problem she addresses” in which the “mobile subjectivity
embodied by prosthetic memory…is the mobility of capitalism itself” (395). In this sense,
prosthetic memory does not succeed in instituting a radical new politics but as much as it
reflects and indexes the very social relations vital to the continued success of the
capitalist mode of production against which such a politics is aimed in the first place.
With this in mind, we can reconfigure the global scope and significance of
memory museums by drawing on early critiques of the modern museum leveled by artists
and groups such as Duchamp and the Situationist International whose work introduced
the collapse of art and life. While museums were not precisely sites of occupation during
earlier protest movements like May ’68, they nonetheless played a central role in the
development of new forms of political resistance. Not only have artists since Duchamp
continued to challenge the social and political authority of the modern museum, artists
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have variously used occupation as a tactic for this resistance. Indeed, while the artists of
the Paris uprising—most notably those belonging to the Situationist International—
occupied the Sorbonne, students hosted sit-ins at the Ecole des Beaux Arts. Debates
regarding the political efficacy of Occupy Museums are situated in this trajectory of the
politics of art, which stretches from earlier avant-garde and minimalist practices to
relational and object-oriented modes of production. The recent condemnation of the
museum institution by Occupy artists echoes earlier critiques, which rejected the
traditional space of exhibition based on its elite bourgeois sensibility.
A recent exhibition highlights continued tensions concerning the status of the
modern museum. dOCUMENTA(13), the world’s largest contemporary art show, was
hosted in four locations in as many countries; and in the Banff location a material
collection was conspicuously absent. In his artist talk at the Banff Centre, exhibiting artist
Pierre Huyghe used the language of presentness to think through this absence alongside
questions of the exhibition-in-itself.32 He describes an earlier project “The Host and the
Cloud”: In his retreat from the musealized space of exhibition, Huyghe explains, his
search for a venue lead him purely by chance to the Musee d’art et tradition populaire, a
museum of French folk culture designed by a student of Le Corbusier and erected atop a
(human) zoo. One imagines a Situationist map of the artist’s amblings and the wonder
expressed when his journey stopped at the base of an abandoned museum, a cultural ruin
ripe for reclamation. The artist describes the ways in which he occupies the museum and
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See Pierre Huyghe’s full lecture recorded at the Banff Centre through iTunes or on

Youtube.com https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aRC5iFlxfnU
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sets the conditions for the aesthetic experiment without knowing the outcome. The
characters—a top model, a magician, a hypnotist—are lead not by the narrative, the reenacted trial of the urban guerilla group Action Directe, or the image of their occupation,
but by the structure of social relations that emerges within the experimental landscape.
Meanwhile, in absentia, the object-oriented curator33 asks: “What does the
meteorite want?” She recounts the story of El Chaco and the withdrawn proposal to
transport the second heaviest meteorite in the world (and single the heaviest object to be
transported by humans) from its long resting place in northern Argentina to the largest
exhibition of contemporary art in Kassel, Germany. El Chaco, a 37-tonne fragment of the
Campo del Cielo meteor, which fell to earth more than 4000 years ago, plays a sacred
role in the cultural heritage of Moqoit First Nations. The ancient mass of iron emerged
from its sacred slumber as the unwitting subject of political conflict, its potential sojourn
abroad opposed by scientific and indigenous communities alike. The minister of trade
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Caroline Christov-Bakargiev, curator of Documenta(13), was unexpectedly unable to

attend The Retreat in person, and so delivered her talk as a video lecture instead. In this
talk she relays the story of El Chaco, a story that foregrounds the importance of the new
field of object-oriented ontologies (OOO) that inflected much of curatorial practice in
Documenta(13). In this vein, the question of what objects desire was a prominent and
highly controversial theme of The Retreat. For more information on the branch of
philosophy known as Speculative Realism of which OOO is a sub-genre see the
collection of essays edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman called The
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialsim and Realism (2011). For a brief overview of
the new trend of object-oriented curating in contemporary art see Kyle Chayka’s article
in Hyperallergic, “Object-Oriented Curating Continues in 2013 Venice Biennale.”
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ventured its brief retreat would encourage tourism, boosting the cultural capital of
Argentina’s poorest region, but the traditional custodians claimed a violation of rights.
Argentinean heritage amassed in the dense object. The proposed retreat from its
traditional resting place unearthed a buried image of colonial theft, which conflicted with
new forms of social encounter proposed by the question of what the object wants.
Ultimately, the plan for El Chaco to hitch a free ride with a Hamburg shipping company
was aborted and the object remained unmoved.
While such language of presentness and anthropomorphization is reminiscent of
the logic of minimalism rejected by Michael Fried in the 1960s for its so-called
theatricality, it is also the language of the movement that, for Rosalind Krauss,
anticipated the “next moment in the history of capitalism” (Krauss 11). Fried explains
that the “death of art” resulting from this new theatricality was announced through Tony
Smith’s experience on the unfinished New Jersey turnpike,34 in which the experience of
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This experience of avant-garde artist and architect Tony Smith to which Fried refers

was initially described in a now-famous interview with Samuel J. Wagstaff Jr. for
Artforum in December 1966, an excerpt of which was included in Fried’s collection of
essays Art and Objecthood. In describing his experience, Smith says: “When I was first
teaching at Cooper Union in the first year or two of the fifties, someone told me how I
could get onto the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike. I took three students and drove from
somewhere in the Meadows to New Brunswick. It was a dark night and there were no
lights or should markers, lines, railings, or anything at all except the dark pavement
moving through the landscape of the flats, rimmed by hills in the distance, but punctuated
by stacks, towers, funds, and coloured lights. The drive was a revealing experience. The
road and much of the landscape was artificial, and yet it couldn’t be called a work of art.
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duration, or timelessness, saturated the pictorial field that previously belonged to
painting. In contrast to painting, Minimalism sought an object whose immense scale
would saturate the spectator’s field of sensation, producing its own objecthood as an
aesthetic Gestalt.35 For Fried, then, the problem was one of presence; the intensity of
experience effaced the object of art altogether. In “The Cultural Logic of the Late
Capitalist Museum,” Rosalind Krauss refers to a second turnpike experience of the same
era. She describes Tom Krens’ encounter with a series of factory-museums scattered
alongside the Autobahn. These newly transformed industrial sites, Krauss argues,
announced the end of the “encyclopedic nature of the museum” (9). She elaborates: “The
synchronic museum—if we can call it that—would forego history in the name of a kind
of intensity of experience, an aesthetic charge that is not so much temporal (historical) as
it is now radically spatial, the model for which, in Krens’ own account, was, in fact,
Minimalism.” This fulfilled the desire for “a cumulative, serial crescendo toward the
intensity of experience” (7). The experience of the turnpike is doubled: it is, on the one

On the other hand, it did something for me that art had never done before. At first I didn’t
know what it was, but its effect was to liberate me from many of the views I had had
about art. It seemed that there had been a reality there that had not had any expression in
art” (qtd. in Fried 157).
35

We are reminded here of the “limitless, unbounded” feeling, the “sensation of eternity”

that Freud refers to in Civilization and its Discontents as “oceanic” and uses to describe
the “ego-feeling” of infancy and religious experience alike.
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hand, the reduction of all art to aesthetic experience and, on the other hand, the full
identification of the art object with the space of exhibition.
Borrowing from Fredric Jameson’s observations on the cultural logic of late
capitalism, Krauss argues convincingly that the minimalist movements of the late 60s and
early 70s anticipated a further development in capitalist history, one in which the
museum itself, “as a space from which the collection has withdrawn” (Krauss 4), would
become the object of our aesthetic experience, the pure presence of empty space. In its
pursuit of the “intensity of experience (7), minimalism reproduces the “serializing,
stereotyping, and banalizing [logic] of commodity production” (8). It is in this sense that
minimalism reproduced the alienating logic of capital (which it sought to resist) in a purer
form in which the language and modes of industrialization came to saturate the field of
representation, setting the stage for what would eventually become relational art.36 The
capitalist market, argues Krauss, simply exploited the logic of seriality inherent to
minimalism. Thus, the withdrawal of the collection from the space of exhibition
announces not only the so-called death of art but also the next moment in the history of
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French curator Nicolas Bourriaud defines relational aesthetics as “a set of practices

which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human
relations and their social context, rather than and in depended and private space”
(Bourriaud 113). In his review of his work, Christopher Mooney claims that Huyghe is,
in fact, “a founding member of the relational art movement,” a movement which has
since been the centre of a significant debate in the world of contemporary art criticism.
For a seminal critique of this movement see Claire Bishop’s “Antagonism and Relational
Aesthetics” (2004); cf. Janzen (2014).
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capital in which the pure presence of empty space is synonymous with the new object of
art. Krauss describes this phenomenon as a paradox of modern capitalism:
it could be said to be of the very nature of modernist art’s relation to capital, a
relation in which, in its very resistance to a particular manifestation of
capital…the artist produces an alternative to that phenomenon which can also
be read as a function of it, another version, although possibly more ideated or
rarified, of the very thing against which he or she was reacting. (11)
Extending this cultural logic of resistance in anticipation to the functioning of the
contemporary memory museum, we can argue that the so-called transferential space of
these museums is, in fact, reflective of the next moment in the history of capital.
Anticipated by global memory movements, the space of exhibition is transformed into a
space of witnessing in the name of resisting the very thing that provided its foundation: a
culture of obsolescence and forgetting. And it does so under the guise of cultural
preservation. Within the current climate of memory politics, memory museums therefore
operate not only as spaces for the production and preservation of historical memory but
also as spaces in which the logic of primitive accumulation is reproduced in the name of
historical recovery on an ever-expanding scale.

2.2 Primitive Accumulation
The history of global capitalism, as we know, is not only the history of class struggle but
also the history of primitive accumulation. In the well-known chapter of Capital titled
“So-called Primitive Accumulation,” Karl Marx demonstrates the need to presume an
original accumulation in order to escape the tautological circularity of capitalist
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accumulation wherein accumulation presupposes a surplus and surplus value or capital
presupposes an initial accumulation. Accordingly, Marx argues we must assume “an
accumulation which is not a result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of
departure” (873). Adapting Adam Smith’s un-dialectical understanding of a “previous”
accumulation,37 Marx argues that “this primitive accumulation plays approximately the
same role in political economy as original sin does in theology” (Marx 873). With his
tongue firmly in his cheek, he writes:
Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is
supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past. In times long
gone by there were two sorts of people; one, diligent, intelligent, and, above all,
frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous
living. The legend of the theological original sin tells us certainly how man came
to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history of
economic original sin reveals to us that there is a people to whom this is by no
means essential. Never mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort
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In the introduction to Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith describes this “previous

accumulation” as the “accumulation of stock” that must precede the division of labour
that constitutes the capitalism mode of production. In this sense, the concept of a previous
accumulation demonstrates the transition between the logic of hoarding and the logic of
accumulation.
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accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to sell except their own
skins. (873)
According to the analogy of original sin, the split between the wealthy and the poor is a
result of a moral weakness whereby the underdog excessively squanders while the
privileged accumulate wealth through hard work and perseverance, a story that continues
to be one of the founding myths of American culture. In his analysis of this passage,
Sandro Mezzadra claims that the ironic reference to original sin signals the ways in
which, for Marx, primitive accumulation serves as a critique of classical political
economy in which it appears only as an original accumulation. By contrast, Marx
understood primitive accumulation not only as a historical event in which an original
accumulation is amassed and set into circulation, but also as a form of extra-economic
violence that is “nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from
the means of production” (Marx 874-5). In other words, as Mezzadra states, “[f]or Marx,
primitive accumulation is not a concept” (Mezzadra 306) but rather the emergence of the
conditions of possibility for the capitalist relations of production, namely the separation
of the workers from the means of production through “conquest, enslavement, robbery,
murder” (Marx 874).
Despite the fact that primitive accumulation in Marx’s political economy appears
as both an historical event that marks the transition to capitalism and the condition for its
reproduction, contemporary theorists have overwhelmingly emphasized its continuous
rather than historical nature. Massimiliano Tomba refers to this as the “permanence of
primitive accumulation” (Tomba 55), while Mezzadra articulates it in terms of a
“repetition of transition” (Mezzadra 314). Drawing on observations by Rosa
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Luxemburg38—a vanguard of the “inherent-continuous” approach (Bonefeld 4)—Werner
Bonefeld argues that “the extra-economic prerequisite to capitalist production—what we
shall call primitive accumulation—is an inherent and continuous element of modern
societies and its range of action extends to the entire world” (3). Marx himself alludes to
the perpetual nature of primitive accumulation when he states that the capitalist relation
“not only maintains this [initial] separation [of the worker and the means of production],
but reproduces it on a constantly extending scale” (Marx 874). From the perspective of its
structural permanence, we are pressed to consider the ways in which the logic of
primitive accumulation operative in the present moment has initiated a series of New
Enclosures referred to by the Marxist collective Midnight Notes as the “large-scale
reorganization of the accumulation process which has been underway since the mid1970s” (Midnight Notes 3). According to Mezzadra, this large-scale reorganization
involves the continuous “redrawing [of] geographical coordinates” which makes
“migrant labor the dominant form of labor” (Mezzadra 303). Importantly, these large-
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Section III of The Accumulation of Capital. Already in 1913 she writes: “At the time of
primitive accumulation, i.e. at the end of the Middle Ages, when the history of capitalism
in Europe began, and right into the nineteenth century, dispossessing the peasants in
England and on the Continent was the most striking weapon in the large-scale
transformation of means of production and labour power into capital. Yet capital in
power performs the same task even to-day, and on an even more important scale—by
modern colonial policy. It is an illusion to hope that capitalism will ever be content with
the means of production which it can acquire by way of commodity exchange. …[With
the systematic annihilation of all non-capitalist social units] we have passed beyond the
stage of primitive accumulation; this process is still going on” (350).
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scale reorganizations involve not only enclosures of common space but enclosures of
common knowledge or historical memory as well.39
Massimiliano Tomba’s claim that the “primary violence of accumulation must be
repeated ever anew” emphasizes the centrality of time to the accumulation process
(Tomba 60). In “The Topicality of Prehistory,” Mezzadra refers to the new enclosures of
global capitalism in terms of a “temporal short circuit” through which a “whole set of
‘real abstractions’ becomes for the first time in history ‘embodied’ as real powers”
(Mezzadra 305). Citing Dipesh Chakrabarty, he explains that “the short circuit between
the abstract and the concrete must repeat itself every day in order for the capitalist mode
of production to continue to exist and reproduce itself” (305). Anchoring this claim in a
discussion of formal and real subsumption under capital, Mezzadra argues that from the
perspective of an original accumulation these forms of subsumption appear as distinct
stages of production “destined to succeed one another in a linear way” (313). However,
despite the fact that the process of primitive accumulation is dominated by formal
subsumption through which old “pre-capitalist” forms of production are assimilated to
the capitalist agenda of extracting surplus value, these prior modes of production are not,
as many argue, replaced by new modes of production but continue to exist alongside
them. For Marx, Mezzadra argues, formal subsumption is not a less developed stage in
the history of capital but the “general form of any capitalist production process” (Marx
qtd. in Mezzadra 314). Indeed, “progressivism and historicism are actually and materially
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See Mezzadra on the enclosure of the commons “from land to knowledge” (304) in

“The Topicality of Prehistory” (2011).
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inscribed in the temporal code of capital (and critics must take this into account), though
only constituting one vector—literally and deeply Utopian—that is always interrupted by
the violent (catastrophic) reopening of the problem of the origin” (314). As a
consequence, primitive accumulation should not be read within the closed time of
historical progress as a founding moment, but rather as the emergence of a process whose
logic is circular rather than linear (305).40
Similarly, in “Historical Temporalities of Capital,” Tomba focuses on the
temporalities that characterize the landscape of global capitalism in order to show that the
postmodern image of plurality fails to make connections between disparate temporalities
and, as a result, creates the “false image of an ‘ahistorical’ present” (44). The connections
between different temporalities, he argues, are implicit in Marx’s thought regarding
absolute and relative surplus value (increase in labour versus increase in value produced
by the same labour). Through a discussion of the concept of value and its relationship to
labour, Tomba suggests that the best image for representing the temporalities of global
capital is neither the historicist progression from one mode of production to another nor
the ahistorical topography of postmodern plurality but the anti-historicist montage of a
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The trope of the line and the circle is a familiar one in discussions of the time and

history of capitalism. In his article “The Time of Globalization: Re-thinking Primitive
Accumulation,” Tony C. Brown discusses the “articulation of the line and the circle”
(582) in relation to figurative logic of primitive accumulation, which I discuss in more
detail in chapter four. Guy Debord made similar observations regarding the cyclical time
of the agrarian mode of production versus the linear time of the capitalist mode of
production, which I examine further in chapter five.
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“plurality of historical temporalities synchronised by the temporality of sociallynecessary labour” (44). Accordingly, Tomba provides a critique of the historicist
tendency to view the development of the capitalist mode of production as the progression
to more advanced forms of capitalism, such as immaterial labour, in which the “survival”
of earlier modes of production is an indication of “backwardness” or primitiveness.41
Referencing Benjamin’s critique of historical progress, Tomba states: “If we want to
think politics differently, we have to learn to think history differently” (45), which means
resisting the historicist tendency to see certain forms of production and exploitation as
anachronistic. Our task, according to Tomba, is to “retrace Marx’s movement from the
abstract to the concrete” in order to “re-articulate [the subjective insurgencies] on new
foundations” (46).
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This idea that the survival of earlier modes of production is somehow backward or

primitive fails to recognize the ways in which old modes of production serve as both the
ground and the content of the new modes of production. Marshall McLuhan’s
observations regarding the relationship between old and new media is relevant here. In
his well-known essay, “The Medium is the Message,” McLuhan argues that “the
‘content’ of any medium is always another medium. The content of writing is speech, just
as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph”
(McLuhan 23). Just as a “new medium is never an addition to an old one” (23), a new
mode of production is never an addition to an old mode of production, a fact which is
evident in the incorporation of the logic of hoarding into the processes of accumulation.
This, of course, did nothing to eliminate earlier practices of hoarding, but rather made
them the ground for a whole new mode of production.
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Contemporary memory politics and theories of primitive accumulation intersect
with respect to their emphasis on nonlinear temporalities or temporal ruptures, which, as I
suggested in the introductory chapter, is also one of the foundational concepts in trauma
theory.42 Within the field of trauma studies, ruptures in time are understood to wield
emancipatory potential based on their capacity to expose previously marginalized
experiences or repressed histories. This focus on personal experience has lead thinkers
such as Jonathan Boyarin, Jay Winter and Andreas Huyssen to conceive memory
movements as an extension of identity politics. Winter, in particular, argues that “[t]he
creation and dissemination of narratives about the past arise out of and express identity
politics” (Winter 54). In fact, he even suggests that memory has supplanted previous
categories of political struggle, such as class, race and gender, to become “the central
organizing concept of historical study” (52). Citing a number of cases in which the rituals
of commemoration center on the “tragic history of persecuted minorities,” Winter asserts
that “the hyphen of identity is strengthened by commemoration” (55). On the contrary,
Huyssen contends that despite their shared theoretical roots there is nevertheless a
distinction between the politics of memory and its identity-based predecessors;
specifically, he argues that the former departs from the latter with respect to its
orientation to time. Whereas identity-based political movements challenged the canonical
tradition of History writ large through forms of representation and re-signification,
memory-based movements pose this challenge as a temporal disruption. In this sense,
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In Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth emphasizes the logic of rupture not only in her

references to trauma’s belated representation but also to its appearance as a “break in the
mind’s experience of time” (Caruth 61).
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global memory movements appear to be responding to what Huyssen calls the “crisis of
history,” in which the pastness of the past is no longer guaranteed, by indexing shifts in
the experience of time and space in the era of globalization. Taking history (or
representations of the past) as the site of contestation, these perspectives grant the
recovery of historical memory tremendous potential for liberation from oppression,
exploitation and violence. By contrast, in his analysis of the time of globalization Tony
C. Brown argues that, from the perspective of a continuous primitive accumulation, the
act of historical recovery is inadequate since Marx stressed a particular understanding of
primitive accumulation that does not seal its violence “off into the past” (Brown 578).
The relationship between primitive accumulation and contemporary memory
politics, however, is not simply one of homologous structures and a shared temporality.
Although Marx illuminated the workings of primitive accumulation predominantly in
terms of land enclosures using 16th century England as a case in point, he nevertheless
gestured toward the repression of memory in these early enclosures when he states: “By
the nineteenth century, the very memory of the connection between the agricultural
labourer and communal property had, of course, vanished” (889). Silvia Federici makes a
similar observation in her discussion of the European witch-hunts in which she argues
that the genocidal attacks on women that characterized the mass persecution of so-called
witches beginning in the 15th century destroyed an entire body of reproductive knowledge
whose eventual institutionalization by the state as codified medical expertise ensured the
control of women’s bodies in the reproduction of the labour force. In the preface to
Caliban and the Witch, she remarks: “Saving this historical memory is crucial if we are to
find an alternative to capitalism” (Federici 10). Of course, Federici is not talking about
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memories of the enclosure of common land, but rather memories of the enclosure of
women’s bodies. It is important to note here not only the immediate relationship
established between genocide and the destruction of particular bodies of knowledge but
also the delayed or mediated repression of cultural memory that ensures the continued
effacement of any connection between state violence and capitalist accumulation. What
this reveals is the fact that primitive accumulation has both material and symbolic
dimensions in which the enclosures of land that separate the worker from the means of
production are accompanied by enclosures of knowledge and memory in which workers
and other disenfranchised social groups are separated from the very history of their own
expropriation. It is in this context of both material and symbolic enclosures that we must
consider the rise of new memorial practices comprising the field of global memory
politics: specifically, the invention of the memory museum.

2.3 The Cases of Robben Island and the ESMA
Two recent memory museums—The Space for Memory and the Promotion and Defense
of Human Rights43 in Argentina and the Robben Island Museum in South Africa—
provide relevant case studies for considering the relationship between the ongoing
process of primitive accumulation and the global proliferation of memory discourses.
Situated on Libertador Avenue in the heart of Buenos Aires, one of the most
cosmopolitan urban centers in Latin America, the Escuela de Suboficiales de Mecánica
de la Armada (ESMA), a Navy Mechanics School that served as the largest illegal
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This institution is often referred to simply as the Museum of Memory, which is how I

will refer to it henceforth.
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detention center during the so-called National Reorganization Process (more commonly
known as “the Dirty War”), which lasted from 1976 until 1983, Argentina’s Museum of
Memory operates as a site of knowledge transmission that attempts to keep alive
memories of the military repression. Like Robben Island, this icon of “state-sanctioned
terrorism” (Parsons 83) became a site of symbolic struggle over national memory, and its
proposed transformation into a museum of memory and human rights was hotly
contested.44 On the one hand, President Menem’s decree in 1998 that the school be
transferred to Puerto Belgrano and the building be torn down and replaced by a park for
reconciliation was met with public outrage. On the other hand, the call by human rights
organizations, including the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires, to transform it
into a “museum of terror” (Huyssen) fuelled intense military opposition. Despite the fact
that the museum doors were officially opened in 2004, the premises were not fully
evacuated by military personnel until 2007. In her exploration of the museum’s
development, Emily Parsons reveals that before vacating the premises soldiers destroyed
several of the buildings, a gesture that not only participated in attempts to “erase this
memory from national consciousness” but also displayed a “logic that paralleled tactics
used in the dirty war” (86); after the failed Falklands War, she explains, the military
attempted to erase the evidence of their crimes, and “many years later, [this] attempt to
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For further elaboration of these debates, see: Fran Lisa Buntman’s book Robben Island

and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid (2003); Seelan Naidoo’s contribution to History
Matters: Promoting citizenship and democracy in South Africa, “The meanings of
Robben Island” (2009); and Rick Lyman’s article in the Philadelphia Inquirer, “S. Africa
Debates and Island Prison’s Future” (1992).
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destroy the buildings at ESMA appears to be an extension of this intent to eliminate
physical evidence in order to discourage memory of the experience” (86).
The image cannot be display ed. Your computer may not hav e enough memory to open the image, or the image may hav e been corrupted. Restart y our computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, y ou may hav e to delete the image and then insert it again.

Figure 1: Banner commemorating the Disappeared in front of the ESMA
(photograph by Marcelo Brodsky)

Figure 2: Silhouette commemorating the Disappeared, many of whose bodies were
dumped into the Rio de la Plata (photograph by Marcelo Brodsky)
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Around the same time, similar debates were taking place concerning the creation
of El Parque de la Memoria, a purpose-built monument dedicated to the more than 30
000 desaparacidos—those forcibly disappeared by the military during the seven-year
terror. The Memory Park, which was inaugurated in 2001, is located between the ESMA
and the Rio de la Plata, the river into which the bodies of the disappeared were routinely
discarded. Debates concerning this park were not only linked to the broader history of
activism in Argentina, in which the Mothers of the Disappeared have been the most
active and ongoing presence, but also to the difficulties of how to adequately represent
histories of violence without aestheticizing them. Huyssen indicates that some opponents
objected to the park because they wanted the ESMA to serve as a museum of terror,
while others maintained that the park was too close to the ESMA or that these projects
would diminish “the active political struggle still being waged by the Mothers” (100).
Despite the local context of these debates, what is particularly striking about
memory sites in Argentina is the degree to which the Holocaust serves as a universal
backdrop. In fact, Parsons suggests that many of the tactics utilized by the military junta
in Argentina borrowed tactics from the SS, such as the “Night and Fog Decree.” While
Huyssen agrees that the Holocaust shadows the Argentinean context, he is reluctant to
compare it with the German situation. He insists that despite the long history of antiSemitism in Argentina, the disproportionately high number of Argentinean-Jews among
the disappeared, and the fact that Argentina was a refuge for known Nazi criminals, such
as Eichmann and Mengele, the most useful way to understand the relationship of the
Holocaust to memory struggles in Argentina is through the “productive inscription of
certain tropes and images, ethical and political evaluations” (98). In other words, the
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memory movement in Argentina draws strength from Holocaust discourse, which,
according to Huyssen operates as an “international prism that helps focus the local
discourse about the desaparecidos in both its legal and commemorative aspects.” (98).
Holocaust commemoration, in this sense, operates “like a motor energizing the discourse
of memory elsewhere” (98-99).
One particularly striking example of the global influence of Holocaust
commemoration is in the widespread deployment of the rhetoric of “never again,” which
Laurie Beth Clark argues has become a primary missive of memory sites since World
War II (Clark 71). It is not surprising that Nunca Mas (Never Again) is the name of the
first collection of official testimony regarding human rights violations in Argentina
(Huyssen 99). Clark argues that in this discourse the preventative value of the
preservation of the past is overdetermined and memory sites are established in full
awareness of its impending failure. Elaborating, she claims, “if World War I was
ubiquitously named ‘the war to end all wars,’ then post-World War II memorial culture
was built in full knowledge of the impossibility of the project of ‘never again’” (71).
Elizabeth Jelin makes a similar observation: In her analysis of the human rights
movement in Argentina, Jelin explains that the movement emerged during the
dictatorship at which time its mission was to “break the silence about the nature and
scope of the violations”; but after the institution of democracy in 1983 the tasks of the
movement were “extended to include the vindication of the historical and collective
memory struggling against oblivion” (39). Echoing Theodor Adorno’s argument in
“Education After Auschwitz,” the main idea behind the movement now is that “only
through remembering can avoidance of such violations be ensured—as if ‘never again’
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could only be guaranteed by the constant remembrance of the terror experienced during
the dictatorship” (39).
Questioning the political expediency of such rhetoric, Jelin asks pointedly: “Is
memory the key to deterrence?” (39). Perhaps more importantly, however, she poses the
question of the precise relationship between memory and politics: “Is it that, by their very
nature, the tasks of ‘not forgetting’ are incompatible with political rationality?” In
contrast to the discourse of “never again” from which the human rights movement
derives its imperative to remember, “the demands of politics…imply the prohibition of
recalling misfortunes and the promise (or the vow) not to remember them—a pledge to
‘forget not only the malice of others but also one’s own rage, so that the life-sustaining
bonds of the city can be reestablished’” (52). Many of the paradoxes and contradictions
facing the movement, argues Jelin, come from the fact that the trauma of Argentina has
not been adequately symbolized. There is a danger, she cautions, that those who have
suffered acquire a “monopoly” on meaning, which prevents the transmission of memory
to new generations. She flags to the “double danger” of such a monopoly: “oblivion and
void fostered by politics and its complement, ritualized repetition of the traumatic and
sinister story, of tragedy reappearing constantly without the chance for new subjectivities
to emerge” (53). Despite the fact that politics and memory appear at odds, both consign
the misfortunes of history to the past and leave little room for the genuinely new.
Arguing that the politics of memory continue to play out in a national framework
through which the “geographical boundaries of memory” (Boyarin 19) are produced and
maintained, Jonathan Boyarin argues that they can nevertheless “offer us new escape
routes from the treadmill of accumulation and control—not through the liberating force

64

of some putative self-directed “History,” but through different paradigms of identity and
relation that can overcome our fearful resistance to change” (13; emphasis in original).
Despite the fact that national memory is policed through the symbolic expulsion and the
“mneumonic marking” of non-conforming social identities and bodies (18-22), the
relationship between memory and materialism is reflected in our sense of time and space
as an “economics of memory” driven by profit (12).
Accordingly, one of the primary risks of this “memorial impulse” is the
production of a new industry Clark calls “trauma tourism”—that is, “the global practices
of visiting memory sites,” which are “sites so marked by trauma that they cannot be fully
recuperated for normal quotidian use” (65-66). For Boyarin, this commodification of
memory is facilitated through the “spreading [of] time out in space,” a reification of the
past that occurs through the production of “tourist landscapes” (19). He elaborates:
“when it is possible to contemplate the transformation of Hiroshima into a theme park of
amnesiac ‘peace’ for postmodern tourists, such lingering trust in the safe pastness of
death certainly must be shaken” (11). This shaking up of the pastness of the past, of the
death of space, argues Boyarin, is a fundamental aspect of the politics of memory,
through which “memory erupts into and shapes ‘public space’” (20). In her analysis of a
number of trauma sites around the globe—from concentration camps in Germany and
Poland and former slave forts in Ghana and Senegal to nuclear testing grounds in Japan
and former prisons in Cambodia and South Africa—Clark maintains that these sites
reflect two dimensions of the psychoanalytic concept of repetition compulsion: first, “the
return to the actual site of trauma by survivors of that particular atrocity in search of some
form of healing” and second, that “as a culture we will endlessly be drawn back, again
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and again, to the sites of trauma until the underlying [social/political] issue is resolved”
(66). What is particularly important to recognize in this case is that both dimensions of
repetition involve the potential for some form of historical recovery in the sense of both
(psychic) recuperation and (material) repossession.
In the case of ESMA, as with many other trauma sites, the fantasy of historical
recovery is articulated in terms of the reclamation of human rights through the practices
of memorialization. Despite the emphasis on rights, we should recognize that many of the
current struggles concerning national and historical memory are, at the same time,
struggles over public space. Parsons, for example, talks about the transformation of the
ESMA from a “symbol of state power” to a “public space” in terms of the “reclamation
of this contested space” (84). Comparing the creation of The Memory Park” in Argentina
to the Jewish Museum in Berlin, Huyssen argues: “Many of the most compelling projects
to nurture and secure public memory involve interventions in urban space” (101). In her
analysis of the work of Argentinean artist Marcelo Brodsky, Nerea Arruti follows
observations by Rowe and Schelling, identifying the erasures of memory that plague
post-dictatorial situations not with fear or lack of knowledge, but with a lack of place for
memory due to its elimination from the practices of everyday life. Beyond specific
references to the Argentinean situation, memory theorists such as Marianne Hirsch and
Alison Landsberg use spatial metaphors in their analyses of memory: Hirsch refers to
photographs as “spaces of projection” and Landsberg refers to contemporary sites of
memory such as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum as “transferential
spaces” or places in which “new symptoms, new ‘prosthetic’ memories, are incorporated
into the body” (82). The notion of public space also provides a foundation for Pierre
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Nora’s inaugural concept of “les lieux de memoire” and Mark Seltzer’s conceptualization
of “wound culture.” Crucially, these discourses of memory and public space are often
inflected with the language of recovery and reclamation: Nora refers to sites of memory
as the recovery of buried pasts (14) while Hirsch discusses the trope of the “lost mother
and the fantasy of her recovery” in Maus and Austerlitz (Hirsch 121; emphasis added)
and Landsberg reads Maus in terms of its capacity for “recollection” and “recounting”
(Landsberg 71). This drive for the recovery and repossession of the past indicates the
degree to which struggles over memory are inflected with the logic of property relations
in which (images of) the past assume the property form through metaphors of spatiality.45
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I have borrowed this phrase from David Harvey’s Cosmopolitanism and the Banalities

of Geographical Evil. In this essay, Harvey argues that the geographical dimension of
cosmopolitanism or world citizenship has been lost as a result of the domination of
historical and anthropological discourses, which privilege the temporality and
subjectivity (over spatiality and materiality) and transform the “banal problematics of
material geographies” into “metaphors of spatiality” (Harvey 120). Specifically, Harvey
demonstrates the fact that Kant’s geography, which is rife with geographical prejudice,
cannot be reconciled with his cosmopolitan vision, which is grounded in the moral
imperative of hospitality across borders. In fact, he suggests they are directly opposed:
the cosmopolitan ethos designed to mediate geographical conflict through the
establishment of a well-ordered cosmopolitan community in which all humans are
regarded as fellow citizens actually negates it. A close examination of Kant’s
cosmopolitan philosophy further reveals the deeply imperialist nature of the project in
which hospitable relations across borders would establish the conditions for freer
circulation and global trade through what Harvey refers to as the flattening out of
geographical difference. The resulting metaphors of spatiality reduce real geographical
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The situation of the ESMA illuminates a number of key points of contact between
memory politics and the logic of primitive accumulation. As I’ve suggested, it
demonstrates the ways in which the present drive to preserve memories of historical
violence takes shape through struggles over the production of public space. More
importantly, it links the production of memory itself (both national and cosmopolitan) to
the transformation of previous sites of primitive accumulation (concentration camps or
torture sites) into sites for processing the material remains of primitive accumulation
(heritage sites or memory museums). In other words, it reveals the ways in which
enclosures of memory as forms of both erasure and preservation are central to the
ongoing processes of primitive accumulation in which the repossession of the past has
become a primary site for expansion of capitalism.
The case of Robben Island helps us to more clearly outline the relationship
between memory and primitive accumulation. Since Dutch settlement in the 17th century,
the island (which is located approximately 12 km from Cape Town, the second largest
city in South Africa) has served mainly as a prison for political dissidents, though at
various times it has also served as a hospital for leprosy patients, an asylum for the
mentally ill and a training facility during the Second World War. It is particularly
notorious for its role in the detainment of anti-apartheid leaders in the latter half of the

struggles to symbolic modes of resistance. In this context, the cosmopolitan ideals of
global unity and world citizenship flatten out material sites of struggle through the
circulation of symbolic cultural forms, including memory.
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20th century. Following the closures of its last operational prison in 1996, the island has
become a major tourist attraction and was declared a World Heritage site by UNESCO in
1999. Prior to the opening of the Robben Island Museum in 1997, however, the fate of
the island was highly contested. According to Steven Hoelscher and Derek Alderman in
their introduction to a special issue of Social & Cultural Geography, during the 1970s
“resort planners sought to deflect growing criticism of the National Party government by
publicly remembering the island’s ‘natural’ environment, a remembering that allowed for
public forgetting of its political role” (347). Among others, proposals that sought to
transform Robben Island into a nature preserve were still on the table until at least 1994.
These particular debates draw our attention to a conservative impulse in which the
preservation of both natural and cultural heritage becomes the ground for a new set of
enclosures that transform memories of historical violence into cultural commodities by
recirculating the material remains of primitive accumulation as vehicles for both
individual and historical recovery. Nature preserves and memory museums alike belong
to this new wave of conservation practices that Alice B. Kelly identifies as a
contemporary form of primitive accumulation. Defining primitive accumulation broadly
as “the act of enclosure of a commons, whether that be the enclosure of land, bodies,
social structures, or ideas” (685), Kelly argues that the creation of protected natural areas
not only displaces local residents but also severs them from previous forms of sustenance
and forces them to sell their labour for the common good; in this case, the common good
of ecological preservation. The creation of these protected areas produces both new
markets such as ecotourism and new displaced populations. In contrast to the land
enclosures Marx determined as a precursor to private property, new enclosures in the
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form of protected natural areas, Kelly argues, produce so-called public spaces that are
“ostensibly for the public good rather than individual gain” (687).
As “storehouses of cultural heritage” (Crane 4), memory museums conform to
this same logic. Just as nature preserves create protected natural areas, memory museums
such as Robben Island and the ESMA create what we might call protected zones of
memory. The transformation of Robben Island into a memory museum returns the site of
extra-economic violence to the realm of productive labour while concealing its original
role in the expansion of capital by re-articulating the violence of primitive accumulation
in terms of historical recovery, which has the dual sense of both recuperating repressed
histories and working through or processing historical trauma. Both configurations of
historical recovery relegate the violence of primitive accumulation to the past, an effect
that covers over (literally, re-covers) what contemporary thinkers of primitive
accumulation such as Sandro Mezzadra, Jim Glassman, Massimiliano Tomba and Jason
Read have identified as its continuous nature. In his analysis of the time of globalization,
Tony C. Brown notes that for Marx this tendency to “stress a temporality of historical
violence that…seal[s] primitive accumulation off into the past” (578) is precisely why an
act of historical recovery in the sense of describing the “marks of capitalist accumulation
historically” is not enough. Thus, spaces of exile through which the violence of primitive
accumulation is rendered external to the smooth functioning of the capitalist economy are
transformed into newly productive spaces in which the remains of this historical violence
are directed toward the expansion of capital. Narratives of historical recovery in this
context complement those conservation practices that contribute to the new enclosures
that have been underway since the 1970s and rest on the recuperation of both natural and
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cultural spaces for the so-called common good. Historical memory in its property form
functions as a central site for the expansion of capitalism after globalization.

2.4 Conclusion
If the opening scenes place the new politics of memory within the history of conceptual
art and the logic of late capitalism, subsequent analysis attempts to reposition these
scenes within the broader dialectics of preservation and enclosure. While the heaps of
clothing, piles of rubble and mountains of shoes that seem to operate as storehouses for
traumatic memory surely resist, as Huyssen suggests, the cultures of obsolescence and
forgetting that characterize the era of global capitalism, they also embody the serial
composition and intensity of experience Rosalind Krauss attributes to the commodity
logic reflected in the late capitalist museum. And yet these analyses are limited in their
focus on one particular aspect of late capitalism: commodity logic. Memory museums, on
the other hand, register another dimension of capitalist logic that is not immediately
evident in Huyssen or Krauss’s observations: that is (as I’ve suggested) the logic of
primitive accumulation. Although Krauss’s analysis of the late capitalist museum aptly
demonstrates the ways in which minimalist practices reflect the serial logic of commodity
production that perpetuates capitalist accumulation, it doesn’t effectively capture the
fraught relationship the preservationist aesthetic of the memory museum and the material
enclosures such an aesthetic reinforces despite its agenda of resistance. The memory
museum registers the logic of primitive accumulation and anticipates the next moment in
the history of capital in which the new series of global enclosures repeats the transition
not by claiming by re-claiming, re-purposing, re-covering and re-cycling the cultural
remains of the first wave of enclosures.
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In the age of real subsumption, memory museums reflect a shift in the logic of
late capitalism. Recall Luxemburg’s argument: the exchange of commodities is not
enough to maintain the rapid growth of capitalism; for this we require the concomitant
processes of primitive accumulation through which the system is replenished with an
influx of raw material via the apprehension of new territories. However, as Mezzadra
points out “[w]hile in other phases of capitalist development real and formal subsumption
tended to be distributed in different spaces…today they exist in every area of capitalism”
(315). Thus, whereas earlier phases of capitalism were characterized by the enclosures of
land, which required simultaneous enclosures of memory, the current phase is
characterized by a reversal in this relation. The new enclosures require the production
rather than enclosure of memory, which not only “partake in the detemporalizing
processes that characterize a culture of consumption and obsolescence,” as Huyssen has
pointed out, but also partake in the new series of enclosures. In our current era, discourses
of preservation drive the global enclosures whose foundation is the image of the past.
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Chapter 3

3

Archives of Resistance: Memory Art and the Logic of
Capital

By high-lighting and foregrounding the ways in which the processes of capitalism can
be perceived to operate across time and space, these resistant archives act to reproduce
and disseminate the narrative of capitalist domination, which they seek to challenge.
—Nicolas Holm

War artists and photographers of the twentieth century such Kathe Kollowitz and
Margaret Bourke-White sought to represent the horrors of atrocity both accurately and
directly. By contrast, in contemporary art that deals with histories of state oppression
there is a tendency to withdraw images of direct violence, instead substituting more
intimate images and objects such as family photos and personal memorabilia. Christian
Boltanski’s No Man’s Land (2012), for example, contains no images of violence despite
the fact that its title is a well-known war term; instead, it is composed of a 9-metre-high
pile of used clothing onto which a giant crane continuously deposits additional articles.
Marcelo Brodsky’s Buena Memoria (1997) contains no images of violence despite the
fact that it documents the fate of Argentina’s desaparacidos; instead, it exhibits a
recovered photograph of the class of ’67, enlarged and installed in the front hall of the
Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires. Alfredo Jaar’s Lament of the Images (2002) contains
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no images of violence despite the fact that it documents the violence of Apartheid and
democratization; instead, it presents three back-lit panels narrating Nelson Mandela’s
release from Robben Island prison, the purchase of over 65 million historical photographs
by Bill Gates, and the United States Defense department’s purchase of exclusive rights to
satellite images of Afghanistan. These are just a few of the many installations
exemplifying a more general international trend which moves away from a documentary
tradition that confronts historical violence explicitly through direct representation—a
tradition that includes iconic images such as the one of Phan Thj Kim Phúc, a young girl
running naked down the street taken in 1972 by AP photographer Nick Ut during a
Napalm attack in Vietnam, or Margaret Bourke-White’s “survivors-at-the-wire” taken
after the liberation of Nazi concentration camps in 1945 and published by Life magazine.
The aforementioned contemporary artists belong to a new genre of installation
Andreas Huyssen calls “memory art”: defined as “an artistic practice that crosses
boundaries between installation, photography, monument and memorial,” which “draws
increasingly on the long-standing complex tradition of the art of memory itself—its
mixture of script and image, rhetoric and writing” (Huyssen 9-11). While Huyssen reads
this trend as an effect of economic globalization in which a culture of “obsolescence and
disappearance” characterizes the contemporary landscape of consumer capitalism, others
are more inclined to interpret it as the collective “working through of a painful past”
(Arruti 104). Drawing on theories of photography and traumatic repression, Nerea Arruti
suggests, for example, that Brodsky’s aim in projects like Good Memory and Nexus is to
represent the memory archives of contemporary Argentina using “the frozen
photographic image to unlock memories” (103), which in turn might operate as a mode of
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“political resistance against oblivion” (115). David William Foster argues similarly that
Brodsky’s work is “an exercise in the recovery of memory” that provides the ground for
political intervention in the form of historical recovery and preservation. In a similar
fashion, drawing on Jill Bennett’s concept of “sense-memory,” Silvia Tandeciarz argues
that the political potential of Brodsky’s work lies in its ability to expose the limitations of
historical memory through the staging of affective experience.
On the one hand, we might attribute the conspicuous absence of violent images in
the works of these artists to the long-standing indictment of such images for their
tendency to aestheticize violence or trivialize suffering. Such a position is epitomized by
Susan Sontag’s well-known claim that “images anesthetize” (Sontag 19). For Sontag,
photographs of violence not only cause a traumatic shock in the viewer but, in their
proximity to reality, can do little more than pander to the excesses of emotion or
unreason, ultimately foreclosing the possibility of producing any meaningful ethical or
political knowledge. On the other hand, we might interpret their absence as an effect of
traumatic repression, particularly for artists who suffered at the hands of oppressive
regimes. Since Freud, the consensus is that traumatic memory cannot be represented
directly; it necessarily takes the form of a screen memory or a composite image. Indeed,
for trauma theorists such as Cathy Caruth, who argue that trauma can only be represented
belatedly and that this belated representation is always indirect, this absence can be
thought of as a reflection of the unrepresentability of traumatic experience. For thinkers
of postmemory, the absence of violent images points to the possibility of recovery
through the intergenerational transmission of embodied memory (what Jill Bennett calls
“sense-memory”) as opposed to historical or national memory.
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Departing from the explicitly affective or psychic dimensions of memory art, this
chapter argues that far from being a mere reflection of traumatic experience memory art
indexes the commodity logic of global capitalism and anticipates the “next moment in the
history of capital” (Krauss 8). Just as minimalism anticipated the emergence of the
fragmented and disembodied subject of postmodernity in which the pure presence of
empty space would become the primary object of aesthetic contemplation, memory art
anticipated the emergence of the post-traumatic subject in which resistance takes shape
through collective witnessing and distant identification. According to Krauss, in resisting
the “serializing, stereotyping, and banalizing [logic] of commodity production,”
minimalism reproduced the alienating logic of capitalism in a purer form in which the
language and modes of industrialization saturated the social relations of artistic
production (Krauss 8).46 Similarly, through the cultural preservation of “survivor objects”
(Landsberg), memory art simultaneously resists the alienating logic of capitalism in
which the abstract narrative of history excludes forms of knowledge grounded in
experience, sensibility and affect, and at the same time reproduces the logic in which the
experience economy saturates the social relations of production. In its promise to recover
the past, memory art contributes to a fantasy of immediacy in which the mediating object
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In the previous chapter, drawing on Rosalind Krauss, I explained the ways in which

minimalism anticipated the next moment in the history of capital in which, under the
influence of the prior collapse between art and life, the museum itself becomes the object
of our aesthetic experience. The subject of this aesthetic experience is neither the
Cartesian nor the biographical subject, but a “radically contingent,” “derealized subject”
(Krauss 8) that anticipates the fragmented, disembodied subject of late capitalism—what
Zizek calls the post-traumatic subject.
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is effaced and direct experience is no longer limited to the present. Images of the past
collide with the aesthetics of presentness, the immediacy of experience.
In this chapter, I argue that installations by memory artists such as Boltanski,
Brodsky and Jaar operate as archives of primitive accumulation that illuminate three
primary aspects of the relationship between the politics of memory and the ongoing
enclosures of both knowledge and space required for the expansion and reproduction of
capitalism: the return of the aura, the reification of memory and the enclosure of images.
In the first section, through an examination of Boltanski’s work, I demonstrate how the
relationship between what Kerwin Lee Klein calls the “re-enchantment of memory” and
the revitalization of what Walter Benjamin refers to as the “aura of the work of art” is
conditioned by the forces of capitalism. In the second section, I take a critical look at
Marcelo Brodsky’s installations Buena Memoria (Good Memory) and Nexo (Nexus) in
order to show that the rebirth of the aura of the work of art is accompanied by the
objectification of memory or the reification of the social relations of witnessing in the
auratic object. In the final section, I conduct an analysis of Alfredo Jaar’s installations—
Lament of the Images, Real Pictures and The Sound of Silence—in order to illuminate
tensions between the social relations of witnessing and the production and circulation of
images. Ultimately, I argue that memory art’s attempts to negate the cultures of forgetting
and commodification that accompany contemporary capitalism (through the preservation
of memory and the reproduction of the auratic object) reverse the hierarchical relation
between history and memory without fundamentally changing the capitalist foundation of
such a historical movement. I conclude by suggesting that in their attempt to resist the
violent institutions of capitalist accumulation through the preservation of historical
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memory these “resistant archives” (Holm) of memory art register a shift in the
relationship between art and capital, one that is reflected in debates concerning the
ameliorative and fetishistic aspects of relational and object oriented aesthetics.47

3.1 The Auratic Returns of Christian Boltanski
The practices of memory artists descend from conceptual art and minimalist techniques
of the 1960s. Like earlier avant-garde movements, these artists use interactive multimedia
platforms and a montage of found objects, both autobiographical and ethnographic, in
order to critique the dominant institutions of art as well as the broader socio-political
context informing the practices of these institutions. In memory art, everyday objects are
used to recover memories of unprecedented historical violence. Using a combination of
found materials, from newspaper clippings and photographs to used clothing and biscuit
tins, the artists attempt to illuminate what Boltanski calls “small memory,” described in
his own words as “an emotional memory, an everyday knowledge, the contrary of
Memory with a capital M that is preserved in history books” (Boltanski). As a kind of
lived or immediate memory, small memory opposes dead or reified memory, the kind
preserved by cultural institutions. In the wake of May ’68, during which art institutions
became sites of struggle, the practices and sentiments exhibited by Boltanski, arguably
one of the first artists working explicitly with memory, “were heralded by critics as
making the museum more accessible and inclusive; by calling on viewers’ memories with
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For an understanding of the roots of object oriented movements see the collection of

essays in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, Eds. Levi Bryant,
Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, (UK: Re.Press, 2011). Print.
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such objects, critics argued, the work opened space in the museum for the uniqueness of
personal experience, providing new ways for viewers to access and identify with
previously unrepresented experiences, while making the museum a collective site of
identification” (DeRoo 221). In contrast to the general understanding of Boltanski’s work
as a vehicle for historical recovery that “allow[s] easy identification and opening space in
the museum for previously unrepresented histories” (237), DeRoo argues instead that it
“critiques the role of the museum as a reservoir of cultural memory by showing its
inability to preserve and communicate private memories” (236). His images, she claims,
even work against his own attempts to facilitate “universal identification” through the
telling of stories that are “common to all” (Boltanski qtd. in DeRoo 237). Despite the
ongoing critique of the institutions of art and politics among conceptual artists since
1968, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, museums continue to serve as a primary
site for collective identification, particularly in the context of historical violence.
In memory art, collective identification is accompanied by what Kerwin Lee
Klein calls the promise of auratic returns, a promise that derives from “its traditional
association with religious contexts and meanings” (Klein 129). Highly critical of the
memorial turn in historical discourse, Klein argues that the sudden rise of memory is at
least partially attributable to its promise to “let us have our essentialism and deconstruct
it, too” (144).48 Figuring memory as a “therapeutic alternative to historical discourse,” the
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Susannah Radstone makes a similar claim with reference to trauma theory. According

to Radstone, the promise of trauma theory lies in its capacity to navigate the murky
waters of post-structuralist epistemology. “To put things at their simplest,” she explains,
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historian maintains that memory as re-enchantment is the result of two intersecting
frameworks: therapy and the avant-garde, both of which laude memory for its
emancipatory potential. Authentic memory, in this context, is linked with “otherness”—
that is, with a traumatic exclusion from History as such. Its emancipatory potential takes
shape as a kind of return of the repressed. In this sense, according to Klein: “First, the
sudden appearance of memory in academic and popular discourse is to be understood in
metahistorical terms as a return of the repressed: Memory is the belated response to the
great trauma of modernity, the Shoah. Second, ‘trauma’ provides a criterion of
authenticity for both the Real and its postmodern negation” (139). (Certainly, it is no
coincidence that sites of memory are almost always sites of trauma as well.) Memory’s
promise of re-enchantment is founded in part on the idea “that its traditional religious
contexts and meanings [are] so much older and heavier than the comparatively recent
effort of the early professional historians to define memorial practice as a vestigial
prehistory” (129-130). Linking the rise of memory discourses with the deconstructive
turn that fashioned contemporary identity politics, Klein argues further that “the new
memory work displaces the old hermeneutics of suspicion with a therapeutic discourse
whose quasi-religious gestures link it with memory’s deep semantic past” (141-2). He

“trauma theory appears to help the Humanities move beyond the impasses and crises in
knowledge posed by these [poststructuralist] theories, without abandoning their insights”
(11). In short, trauma theory allows us to reconstruct a universal subject without
abandoning the insights of poststructuralism. Diverging from the desiring subject of
psychoanalytic theory, this sovereign subject of trauma theory is what Catherine Malabou
calls the autistic subject.
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concludes: “the clustering of quasi-religious terms around memory suggests some
conclusions about the effects of our new key word. […] Memory can come to the fore in
an age of historiographic crisis precisely because it figures as a therapeutic alternative to
historical discourse” (Klein 145; emphasis added). In short, as a discourse of
emancipation, memory deconstructs the modern narrative of history that underwrites the
rise of Fascism while preserving the structures of authenticity that that have always
granted History its narrative authority.
Klein’s observations concerning “auratic returns” in historical discourse can be
extended to the field of contemporary art, particularly those concerning the quasireligious elements of memory’s re-enchantment. Boltanski’s work provides an apt
example. The artist’s early work can be understood as a form of deconstruction, of both
individual identity and historical truth—the complementary arms of post-modern
ideology. However, sometime around 1984, Boltanski’s self-conscious deconstruction of
historical truth and identity turns away from auto-ethnographic meditations introduced by
installations like Ten Photographic Portraits of Christian Boltanski in which the artist
falsely claims to document his own development over a period of 18 years (only one of
the photos is of Boltanski himself). At this point, his work takes on decidedly mystical
overtones. His surrealist-inspired shadow theatre installations invoke traces of haunting
childhood fables. His eerie shrine-like arrangements of found images and objects adorned
with electrical cords and halos of light bear an overtly ritualistic or ceremonial quality.
Departing from the purely deconstructive methodology of Ten Photographic Portraits,
installations like Altar to the Chases High School instead contain religious elements that
appear to conceal an underlying trauma. For instance, in one version of this installation
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seven images of students from the graduating class of 1931 are extracted from a class
photo taken at a Jewish high school in Vienna. Six of the enlarged portraits are arranged
in candelabra formation around an even larger central photo. Each smiling, slightly out of
focus subject is set above its own pedestal created by two stacked biscuit tins. The entire
arrangement is undergirded by a horizontal mantle similarly constructed using twelve of
the same tins. Each smiling image is illuminated by a single lamp placed forebodingly in
the center of the subject’s forehead, which, as one reviewer suggests, looks from a
distance like bullet holes. Wires suspended from each lamp converge below the mantle
and give the installation a vaguely clinical feel. The effect is both comforting and
unsettling, as the initial deconstructive impulse seems to give way to a return of the
repressed.
The artist uses similar techniques in his installation series The Dead Swiss. In
1989, this installation appears as a wall of photographs taken from the obituary section of
a Swiss newspaper, enlarged, and separated by a fissure leading to an inlaid memorial
structure. In 1991, it takes the form of vertical archives in which pillars composed of
single tins stacked one on top of the other, each adorned with a lone photo, are arranged
like a forest of commemorative obelisks. In 1995, 585 of the same tins tucked into a
recess in the wall resemble a uniform cabinet of files. As Catherine Grenier observes in
her contribution to the exhibition catalog, in these later works “two distinctive traits come
through: one is a religious dimension wedded to the idea of the celebration of the human,
while the other is the question of death and of commemoration, which very quickly will
be accompanied by the memory of the Shoah” (55). These two dimensions—the
celebration of the human and questions of death and commemoration—are key aspects of
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contemporary memory movements, which, as Klein’s observations suggest, respond to
the “great trauma of modernity,” a crisis in both historicity and representation that
soothes itself with the promise of auratic returns.
A reading of Boltanski’s work from the perspective of trauma theory, which was
birthed around the same time as the Dead Swiss, in which traumatic experience reemerges as repressed memory, seems to affirm Klein’s observations regarding the role of
the Shoah in the re-enchantment of memory—that “[m]emory is the belated response to
the great trauma of modernity” and that such a trauma provides the measure of
“authentic” memory. Certainly, this would be the consensus among memory theorists and
critics of second generation art, such as Marianne Hirsch and Alison Landsberg, who
privilege the so-called embodied or affective knowledge of memory in contrast to the
abstract or objective knowledge of history. Indeed, like Boltanski’s “small memory,”
Hirsch’s “postmemory” and Landsberg’s “prosthetic memory” offer embodied, emotional
or living memory as a more authentic alternative to historical memory. Landsberg argues
that, faced with a dwindling survivor population and the waning impact of Holocaust
memory, in the age of mass culture new “technologies of memory” allow for the
production of new modes of living memory and experiential knowledge. Authentic
memory becomes the purview of the marginalized, the excluded, the other.
Both Hirsch and Landsberg turn to Art Spieglman’s Maus to support their claims
regarding the authenticity of living memory. Reading it alongside Austerlitz, Hirsch
argues that Maus uses the “trope of the lost mother” as a mode of resistance against the
imperative to forget. Specifically, she argues that this trope is one of what Aby Warburg
calls “pre-established forms” through which “gender becomes a powerful idiom of
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remembrance in the face of detachment and forgetting” (Hirsch 124). Not surprisingly,
the mother is associated with the emotional and the other, which makes it a particularly
useful trope for resisting the objective and alienating narrative of official history. In a
similar comparison between Maus and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
Landsberg emphasizes the importance of indirect or prosthetic memory, which wields an
affective force that renders inherited memories an alternative form of knowledge that
resists the culture of forgetting (Landsberg 65). Landsberg takes two primary examples
from Maus that emphasize the protagonist’s propensity for trash collecting and his
“relationship to the mundane objects of everyday life” (70). In the first example,
Landsberg recounts a moment in the narrative in which Vladek, a Holocaust survivor,
retrieves a section of old wire during a walk with his son Artie. Incensed by his
scavenging, Artie admonishes his father and questions his resistance to buying new wire,
to which Vladek responds by explaining that the little wires are useful and hard to find.
The second example recalls a scene in which Artie interrupts Vladek’s pill counting,
resulting in a mass of spilled pills accompanied by a frantic re-counting. Artie offers
assistance but Vladek chastises him, saying “you don’t KNOW counting pills” (qtd. in
Landsberg 70). Landsberg suggests the first scene demonstrates the ways in which the
text itself functions as an allegory of the recirculation of Holocaust memory in which
waste is recycled for “productive ends” (68). Drawing a connection between the two
meanings of “recount,” Landsberg argues the second scene reveals the ways in which
Holocaust memory is mediated by everyday objects. These interpretations contribute to a
framework in which the production of second-generation art is understood as a form of
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traumatic repetition in which repressed memories can be both retrieved and transmitted to
the next generation.
In his response to Landsberg’s prescription for a “radical politics of empathy,”
which is based on a reversal of the Freudian paradigm, Marco Abel emphasizes its covert
relationship to the capitalist mode of production. Specifically, he argues that her theory of
prosthetic memory, in which the symptoms of traumatic repression are actively produced
in non-traumatized subjects, may in fact be nothing more than a “key symptom of the
very problem she addresses” (Abel 380); that is, her theory itself repeats the very logic by
which capitalism is maintained and reproduced by covering over the relationship between
historical violence and the capitalist mode of production. From this perspective, Vladek’s
trash collecting and recounting of pills should be understood not only (or even primarily)
in terms of the transmission of Holocaust memory, but as the reproduction of a particular
mode of knowledge production that masquerades as an alternative to the existing mode.
Vladek’s behaviours are not only repetitions of a previous trauma, they illuminate the
ways in which traumatic repetition intersects with the impulse to archive, recycle and
preserve the everyday, making it inseparable from the reproduction of capital. The
conjunction of the everyday, the archive and capital is noted by Nicolas Holm, who
claims that “not only can the everyday now be considered an ever-present archive of
capitalism, but that those actual archives which seek to catalogue the everyday for
political or artistic purposes can be considered as extension of this process” (6).
Boltanski’s incorporation and reincorporation of cultural waste can be viewed similarly.
On a purely representational level, Boltanski’s piles clothing, which are said to recall the
iconic Holocaust image of piled corpses, also reflect the mass poverty of ghettoized
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communities or the immense collections of waste that accompany industrial
globalization; his biscuit tins, which recall the boxes in which survivors might have
buried evidence of the massacre, also serve as material reminders of a bygone era in
which these empty containers for factory-born confections recall the nostalgia of
bourgeois hospitality and suburban expansion; and his anonymous portraits, which
represent the unknown dead, affirm the centrality of photographic rituals, such as the
photo album and the obituary notice, to the reproduction of the family, one of
capitalism’s most treasured institutions.
Artworks such as Boltanski’s and theories such as Landsberg’s (in which
embodied memory is offered as an alternative to historical discourse) reflect a larger
cultural movement toward the re-valuing of repressed or forgotten histories; they
simultaneously tend to overlook the ways in which this movement simply shifts the terms
of evaluation from one site of cultural production to another. As Diedrich Diedrichsen
explains in his analysis of the movement of intensity and experience from the margins to
the center in the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism:
[t]hese diagnoses rarely account for how such transformations are framed in the
experiences of those they concern, which are also the diagnoses these people use
to make sense of these experiences. And in fact, these diagnoses often reveal how
the structural transformations they describe have not truly entailed a migration of
the old subversive lifestyles from the margins and the bottom of society to its
center and to the top; rather, they often describe cases in which intensity and
experience are at stake in name only, in which the values have actually been
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shifted only from one place to another—in order not to preserve them but to
betray them, to use them as pure decoration. (20)
In this sense, theories of memory—which accompany the transition from the modern to
the so-called postmodern—are used to expose the tyranny of history while at the same
time using the tyranny of history to explain the experiences of repression that lead to
what Klein calls memory’s re-enchantment. Despite this necessary critique of the
memorial response to the so-called crisis of history, what a Kleinian position alone fails
to recognize is not only the specifically capitalist context of memory’s “auratic returns”
but also the ways in which these memory movements may, in fact, reproduce the logic of
capital in a purer form through the very terms they use to resist it.

3.2 Marcelo Brodsky and the Contradictions of Material
Remains
A second artist working in the Argentinean context uses many of the same techniques as
Boltanski in his work to confront the lasting effects of the military dictatorship that
spanned the late 70s and early 80s. Marcelo Brodsky is a self-identified human rights
activist who lived twenty-two years in exile and a descendent of Jewish immigrants to
Argentina. His brother Fernando was one of the more 30 000 Argentinean citizens
disappeared by the state during the prolonged period of state terrorism that overthrew
Peron and headed the infamous Dirty War. Brodsky has given public talks on human
rights violations alongside similar artists, including Boltanski and Jaar. Many of his
installations take the form of commemorative ceremonies whose aim is to create a sense
of connectedness and unity across generations and between cultures. Most of his projects,
the later ones in particular, use Holocaust references as a backdrop against which the
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historical memories of state terror in Argentina emerge in relief. It is Brodsky’s work in
particular that lead Andreas Huyssen to coin the phrase “memory art” to describe the
general movement within contemporary art that conceives an emancipatory politics
through the collective reconciliation of the past. Art critics and theorists routinely read
Brodsky’s work from the perspectives of psychoanalysis and trauma theory: for the most
part it is understood as the subjective working through of a painful past. Latin American
scholars such as David William Foster and Nerea Arruti in particular concur that the aim
of this working through is twofold: to recover lost memories and to restore the individual
subjectivity of the victims.
The multi-media installation Good Memory was Brodsky’s first project upon
returning to Argentina after his lengthy exile in Spain. Like Boltanski’s Ten
Photographic Images, Good Memory was a self-professed attempt by the artist to renegotiate his identity; and like Boltanski’s Chases, the project is constructed around a
single document: an old class photograph, which also served as the centerpiece for a class
reunion arranged by Brodsky to gather and photograph the surviving members of his
grade 8 class. The photo, which was taken in 1967 at the Colegio Nacional de Buenos
Aires, one of Argentina’s most prestigious educational institutions, was later enlarged to
six times its original size and installed in the front hall of the school where, along with
portraits of surviving classmates, it was meant to serve as a “bridge” (in Brodsky’s
words) between two generations of Argentinean students. Adorned with grease-pencil
hieroglyphics and fragments of text, this class photo documents the effects of state
terrorism in Argentina by identifying members of the class who less than ten years later
would become members of the desaparacidos along with thousands of other so-called
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subversives and undesirables. Initially appearing as a public installation, this piece was
later transformed into an art exhibition and a book-length photo essay. The class photo
served as a backdrop for a series of portraits of surviving members taken by Brodsky,
which were exhibited alongside the original in the hallway of the Colegio.

Figure 3: Class photograph from Good Memory (1997)

Unlike the anonymous portraits in the Dead Swiss, Brodsky’s subjects are clearly
identified. Countenances ranging from smiling to pensive are accompanied by
explanatory text that strongly situates them within the contemporary discourse of trauma:
“Jorge says that madness is the strongest form of suffering”; “Carlos is guarded and
reserved, but when the time comes, he tells all”; “[Gustavo] lives with his cat”; “El Colo
(Red) was a political prisoner”; [Ana] is concerned about Israeli politics…Argentine
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politics, on the other hand, do not interest her.” Many of these statements seem out of
sync with the mood of the photograph; rather, their dissonance seems to express a
potential return of the repressed. Unlike Boltanski, however, Brodsky makes explicit
reference to the Holocaust, which, operating as an “international prism” (Huyssen 98),
provides a backdrop for his condemnation of state violence in Argentina. If, however,
Boltanski seeks to obfuscate historical truth by blurring the distinction between fact and
fiction, Brodsky seeks to uncover historical truth by subjecting national memory to
relentless archival excavation.
Brodsky’s second series of installations, Nexo (Nexus), was created shortly
following Good Memory. Consolidating photographs taken between the years of 1978
and 2001, this project departs from an earlier focus on personal memories and
implements a less intimate tone. According to Nerea Arruti, as with Good Memory, the
overall aim with Nexus, “is to bond, unite and offer bridges between fragmented realities”
(Arruti 110). Despite this attribution of unity, Nexus demonstrates a much more explicit
tension between subjective experience and material history than Good Memory. For
example, in the series of installations titled Ex, the experience of exile is depicted in eight
stark images of architectural fragments; connecting distinct geographical and historical
situations, The Camps II, a temporary memorial installed in front of the former Navy
school in Argentina, echoes The Camps I, a permanent monument in Berlin listing the
camps in operation during the Holocaust; Remains preserves the remnants produced by
the bombing of the AMIA, a Jewish community center in Argentina, which were
repurposed as landfill for the site that would eventually become the controversial
prisoners were routinely discarded; recalling book-burnings in Nazi Germany, The
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Condemned of the Earth presents a series of photographs documenting the excavation of
The Memory Park connecting the ESMA49 and Rio de la Plata into which the bodies of
dead black-listed books (such as Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth), which were
burned and buried by a previous generation. Each of these installations favours material
remains over subjective experience. Overall, the installations in Nexus seek to preserve
not only the memory of historical violence but also its historical remains and to set these
two aspects of preservation in the service of political resistance.

Figure 4: Celluloid Serpent, photograph of rubble following the bombing of the
AMIA (2002)

49

I conduct a more detailed discussion of the transformation of the ESMA into a museum

of memory in chapter one, which Brodsky documents in his book-length photo essay
Memory Under Construction (2008). For a more detailed discussion of the development
of the Memory Park and its relationship to the ESMA, see Andreas Huyssen’s Present
Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (2003).
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Memory art like Brodsky’s transforms political engagement into an act of
recovery, both individual and historical. As we discovered, for Hirsch and Landsberg
photography plays a central role in this regard. For Arruti, the photographs in Brodsky’s
work enable a release of memories, which can serve a mode of “political resistance
against oblivion” (115). Silvia Tandeciarz compares Brodsky’s use of photographs to that
of the Mothers of the Disappeared, and suggests that their political potential lies in the
ability to stage affective experience. Resisting the reduction of history to the past, the
photographs function as a present “spectacle of mourning” (Tandeciarz 136).50 Indeed,
for Tandeciarz memory art does not simply analyze the symptom represented by the
photograph or theorize the link between traumatic memory and originary memory; rather,
in registering affective experience memory art foregrounds the limitations of narrative or
historical representation. In both cases, the photographs serve as a bridge between past,
present and future as well as a medium of political resistance and historical recovery.
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While Tandeciarz is using the notion of spectacle in the colloquial sense of a striking

visual display, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the relationship between this
“spectacle of mourning” and Guy Debord’s notion of the spectacle, which is an inversion
of life itself that assumes the commodity form. In Society of the Spectacle, Debord
emphasizes the “spectacle is not a collection of images” but rather “a social relationship
between people that is mediated by images” (Debord 1). From this perspective, a
spectacle of mourning is a social relationship between people mediated by the image of
the past. Referencing Marc Auge, in his manifesto on the revolutionary act of forgetting
Nicolas Holm claims that “the present [is] a site overloaded with history and historical
consciousness” (3).
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David William Foster conceives Brodsky’s project in general as an exercise in the
recovery of memory.
All three critics not only emphasize the therapeutic dimension of Brodsky’s art
but also the ways in which historical objects in this work attempt to substitute for a lost or
missing social relation. For instance, Foster draws attention to what he considers to be the
restoration of “social subjectivity” to the disappeared, avoiding their “double
disappearance” (95) in the form of both material and symbolic erasure.51 Arruti and
Tandeciarz make similar claims about the restoration of identity and personhood
respectively. Despite differences in terminology, all three advocate the restoration of
some form of humanity to the disappeared. This impossible re-humanization is sought
through a series of substitutions centered on the photograph: it is a substitute for the
absent referent for which it retains a material trace; it is a substitute for the missing body
of the disappeared whose image is preserved in the solution of silver salts; and it is also a
substitution for and a reification of lost memory. The image of the past reified in the
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Jacques Lacan’s division between symbolic and material deaths is relevant here. In The

Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan describes Antigone’s fate as being suspended between
two deaths, her symbolic death (which occurs with her incarceration within the sepulchre
in which she will eventually starve to death) and her actual death (which will forever
remain invisible and for which there will be no material remains). Antigone’s symbolic
death denies her an actual material death. She will never be properly mourned or buried.
She will forever remain an image of sublime beauty. Paradoxically, this is her desire
made manifest.
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photograph substitutes for and attempts to recuperate the social bond severed by state
violence.
Immediately, this reified aspect of the photographic should conjure notions of
fetishization in both Freudian and Marxian senses. In Freudian terms, the photograph-asfetish replaces the missing body; in Marxian terms, the photograph-as-fetish transforms
the social relations of historical violence into the object of memory, which mediates the
social relations of witnessing. In his comparative analysis of Marxian and Freudian
fetishism via Benjamin and Adorno, Donovan Mioyasaki argues that in either case “false
relations substitute for authentic ones” (Mioyasaki 430). The fetishistic quality of the
photograph can be explained in relation to Benjamin’s aura.52 Drawing a connection
between the aura and the Freudian fetish, Mioyasaki claims that the aura of the work of
art “corresponds to the substitute social relation of the fetish, and not to Marxian
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Benjamin’s conceptualization of the aura remains somewhat inconsistent, sometimes

referring to the authenticity of the work of art, which is linked to ritual tradition, and
other times referring to the experience of time and space it invokes; at the same time, he
also uses it to refer to the presence of the live actor. Despite his various
conceptualizations, what becomes clear is the ways in which the aura is related to an
unmediated experience of presence that recalls Freud’s “oceanic” feeling and the later
“turnpike” experiences of Minimalist art. Anticipating Minimalist claims, he grants the
decay of the aura a revolutionary potential related to the serial capacities of photography
and film. While the concept of “aura” is most recognizable in relation to “The Work of
Art” essay, he began conceptualizing it in an earlier essay titled “The Little History of
Photography” (1931) in Selected Writings 2, ed. Michael W. Jennings et al, (Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 507-530.
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commodity alienation” (430-1). For Mioyasaki, the aura is defined by its capacity to
replace the subject in the social relation, its ability to restore the broken social bond,
which is one of the aims of memory projects such as Brodsky’s and Boltanski’s as well as
the cultural analysis they inspire.
Walter Benjamin famously described the aura as a strange tissue of time and
space determined by its social and historical context, particularly its embeddedness in
ritual tradition (Benjamin “Work of Art” 24). As a metonym for authenticity, the aura
resembles a kind of ideological phantasm that generates what Benjamin names “cult
value” (25). Under the siege of new technologies of mass production, which tipped the
scales in favour of exhibition value, the aura finds its last refuge (according to Benjamin)
in the photographic portrait, which shores up the now ubiquitous “cult of remembrance”
(27). Famously, the German critic attributed the decay of the aura to the rise of
mechanical reproduction exemplified by photography (and film) whose “transitoriness
and repeatability” along with the capacity to “‘get closer’ to things” (23) destroyed the
permanence and duration tied to auratic art, whose forms are generally static. This
process of demystification initiated by the formal particularities of photography is tied to
the opening of the “optical unconscious” through which we encounter the previously
“hidden details of familiar objects” (37).53 The photograph in this sense operates as a
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Influenced by developments in psychoanalysis and deconstruction, Rosalind Krauss

borrows this phrase in the title of her book by the same name in order to talk about the
“unconscious” of the modernist vision, represented by the disruptions caused by the
emergence of “anti-form” in the 1920s. One of the primary differences between Krauss’s
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prosthetic eye, revealing these hidden details through the dual processes of slowing down
and getting closer, which contributed to the production of a new mode of thought we
might call a photographic consciousness.
Historicizing Benjamin’s notion of the aura, Andreas Huyssen suggests that it is a
particular effect of modernization. He argues that the aura comes into being as an effect
of industrial advances upon which it is contingent despite the fact that industrialization
simultaneously initiates its decay. In other words, the attribution of aura to a work of art
is necessarily retrospective and can only emerge in relation to shifts in the mode of
production. In the current era of mass digitization, for example, we witness a reversal in
the relationship between the photograph and the aura; the aura is revived in the context of
photography. Huyssen uses Bill Gates’ purchase of the largest collection of original
photographs to explain this revival.54 He states:

and Benjamin’s use of the phrase is that she wants to emphasize the non-visual aspects of
modernist art, its desirous underbelly, wheres her predecessor is concerned precisely with
the visual, particularly the ways in which new visual technologies like photography can
reveal a kind of material truth. While Krauss acknowledges Benjamin as the inaugural
theorist of the optical unconscious, as her reviewer Terry Smith notes, she fails to further
“explore Benjamin’s political purposes.” Instead she uses the concept to frame her
critique of modernist art, namely its “pure opticality” and overemphasis on the visual.
54

Interestingly, this connection to Bill Gates’s purchase resurfaces in Alfredo Jaar’s

installation Lament of the Images, which is discussed below.
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In the move from the photograph to its digital recycling, Walter Benjamin’s art of
mechanical reproduction (photography) has regained an aura of originality. Which
goes to show that Benjamin’s famous argument about the loss or decay of the aura
in modernity was always only half the story; it forgot that modernization itself
created the auratic effect to begin with. Today, digitization makes the ‘original’
photograph auratic. (Huyssen 20)
In other words, in the age of digital technology the material photograph is invested with
the auratic essence once reserved for pre-modern forms of art such as the painting and the
monument.55 As new technologies emerge, old technologies are invested with an aura of
authenticity that is retrospectively attributed to the object in its original context. Thus,
whereas the religious fetish or ritual art attained an aura that became visible only in
relation to technologies of industrialization like photography and film, in the age of
digitization film photography becomes an auratic fetish. Bill Gates’ purchase reflects the
auratic quality of the material photograph—namely, its newfound originality as a material
object—in the age of digitization.
In Mioyasaki’s account, both the fetish and the aura create distance between
individuals while disguising this distance as “the unique presence and authenticity of the
object” (Mioyasaki 431). At the same time, the subject “in the presence of auratic artwork
believes she has entered into a relation with lost social human experience” (431). This is
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Recalling Marshall McLuhan’s claim that the old medium becomes the content of the

new, it appears here that the material photograph (the old medium) becomes the content
of the archive (the new medium) in the era of serialization.
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precisely the experience Landsberg describes in entering the room of “survivor shoes” at
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. In Prosthetic Memory, she relays the
affective experience of this encounter. Following her transportation on one of the
infamous boxcars used to transport Jews, the spectator enters “the world of the death
camps” in which she is bombarded with “piles of personal belongings,” including a
“jumbled sea” of “survivor shoes” (Landsberg 79). Turning to Fredric Jameson’s
comparison of Van Gogh’s peasant shoes with Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes,
Landsberg argues that the survivor shoes resist the logic of the commodity and instead
invoke a politics of empathy. Via Jameson, Landsberg explains that Warhol’s
postmodern Diamond Dust shoes “embody the logic of the commodity,” whereas Van
Gogh’s modernist shoes (like the survivor shoes at the Holocaust museum) retain a sense
of “lived individuality” (80); each shoe “bears a trace of the absent body” that inhabited
it, the aura of its owner. While Warhol’s shoes are as “shorn of their earlier life world as
the pile of shoes left over from Auschwtiz,” she maintains, Van Gogh’s shoes recreate the
“whole missing object world” (79-80). Landsberg draws the conclusion that for this
reason Van Gogh’s shoes speak and Warhol’s shoes do not.
Similarly, Brodsky’s “survivor objects”—including photographs of the
disappeared, fragments of the AMIA and unearthed books—seem to retain an aura of
their missing referent that allows them to serve as substitutes for the subject in the social
relation. And yet, they do much more than invoke a politics of empathy, which, as Marco
Abel claims, is nothing but a symptom of the broader structure rather than its undoing.
Rather, this fetishistic aspect of Brodsky’s installations highlight productive tensions
between the cosmopolitan ideal of universal human rights and the material archives of
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historical violence by demonstrating how the recovery of material history remains out of
sync with the so-called politics of empathy.
Overall, Brodsky’s work illuminates the ways in which the social relations of
witnessing that accompany globally pervasive rights discourses are reified in the remains
of historical violence whose archivization reflects the convergence of commodity logic
and memory politics.

3.3 Alfredo Jaar and the Dialectics of Witnessing
Like the work of Boltanski and Brodsky, Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar’s installations
contain no images of violence. However, unlike his contemporaries, his work emphasizes
the structural rather than subjective dimensions of historical violence and its relationship
to the political economy of representation using news media as his primary focus.
Relying on a set of conceptual practices similar to the previous two artists, Jaar
incorporates photography and archival techniques to pose questions about the relationship
between collective memory, historical violence and mediation. In Jaar’s work, black
photo archive boxes remind us of Boltanski’s rusted biscuit tins; postcards and magazine
covers recall Brodsky’s family snapshots and personal portraits; piles of clothing become
piles of slides; halogen lamps become light boxes. Despite these similarities, Jaar’s
installations do not compel us to begin with the notion of trauma. Rather, they approach
the problem from the side of the mediating structure, encouraging the critical reception of
the ways in which the repression of images in contemporary media exemplifies a
particular mode of enclosures based on a new optic specific to new cultures of memory,
an optic whose “gaze [h]as increasingly turned to the victim” (Winter 30). As we
discovered with Brodsky and Boltanski, within the framework of this new optic the
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viewer of the work of art becomes a spectator-witness. In this section, I argue that Jaar’s
emphasis on the absence of images of violence and suffering in mainstream news media
illuminates tensions between the political economy of representation and the aesthetic
economy of memory cultures; in other words, between enclosures of the image and the
recovery of repressed memory.
Jaar’s installations do not seek to preserve and transmit memories of violence.
Instead, they expose what Jacques Rancière calls a “massive phenomenon of removal”
(Rancière 8). Elaborating, Rancière argues that we are not deceived or blinded by the
Master’s barrage of images; rather, the power of images is exercised not through
inundation but by withholding. He claims further that, contrary to popular belief, we
encounter very few images of violence in the news; “what we see mainly are the faces of
those who ‘make’ the news, the authorized speakers” (9). For Jaar, he concludes, “it is
not a question of getting rid of the excess of images, but of drawing attention to their
absence, the absence of certain images in the selection of what those in charge of the
distribution of images consider to be interesting to show” (8). In other words, the aim in
concealing images is to give material presence to their public absence.
Two installations are particularly compelling in this regard. Lament of the Images
(2002) does away with images altogether and instead presents three backlit panels
narrating three seeming unrelated news stories. The first panel narrates the release of
Nelson Mandela from Robben Island prison in 1990. According to the panel, news
coverage of the event reveals “a man squinting into the light as if blinded.” What this
coverage does not show is the blinding effect of the sun reflecting on the eyes of
prisoners like Mandela, who were not only forced to labour in the lime quarry but were
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consistently denied the protection of sunglasses despite repeated requests. In his
commentary, Jaar remarks further on the absence of any photographs of Mandela
weeping at his release. He attributes this lack not to the fact that such images do not exist
but to Mandela’s physical incapacity to produce tears: “there is no picture of Mandela
weeping with joy at his liberation, because after being subjected to twenty-seven years of
forced labor in quarries, his eyes could no longer shed tears” (Rancière 7). The second
panel documents the preservation of millions of photographs purchased by Bill Gates
from historical archives, including the Bettmann and the United International Press, to be
buried in an old limestone mine: “it will take more than 400 years for them all to be
restored to the public in digital form” (8). The final panel recounts the purchase of
exclusive rights to all satellite images of Afghanistan and the surrounding area by the
U.S. Defence department following the post-9/11 invasion in 2001.
The absence of images in this triptych indexes the ways in which the same forces
of violent separation and erasure that accompany primitive accumulation operate within a
political economy of representation. The repression of images in the work of art reflects a
series of epistemic enclosures in the broader situation that contribute to the ongoing
privitization of the commons. Each of the panels registers a particular set of material
contradictions inherent in the economy of images. The first panel illustrates
contradictions between the image economy in which images of violence are missing or
repressed and the political economy in which political dissidents such as Nelson Mandela
are not only excluded from participation in normative social relations but transformed
into slave labourers whose uncompensated labour provides a foundation for the
expansion of capital, a ground for primitive accumulation. This panel indicates the ways
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in which the material remains of primitive accumulation become grounds for the new
enclosures. Nelson Mandela’s invisible tears, for example, the result of forced labour in
exile, cannot appear in the public images of his re-assimilation into the dominant
relations of production. The second panel demonstrates the ways in which the ruins of
capital—in this case, the limestone mine—are reincorporated into the capitalist
marketplace through their utility as sites of enclosure where public images become
private property. The mine—once the raw material for the production of capital, now the
remains of historical violence—becomes repurposed a site of enclosure in which original
photographs are amassed. Publicly circulated images are now enclosed within the
previous space of exploitation in which primitive accumulation took the form of the
separation of the worker from the means of production, a generalized dimension of
capitalism that becomes most pronounced in the context of imprisonment and forced
labour. Similarly, the final panel highlights the centrality of the photograph to new
enclosures by the state. Together, the individual panels reflect the ways in which the
image itself has become a symbolic foundation for the ongoing forces of primitive
accumulation. In this way, the triptych functions as an allegory of enclosure.
Another series of installations, Real Pictures (1995), exhibits none of Jaar’s
photographs of the Rwandan genocide, which were taken by the artist himself over a sixyear period. One of the twenty-one installations in this series is a selection of covers from
Newsweek magazine, which show none of the violence in Rwanda, accompanied by
unrelated statements that read like news flashes describing the horrific events Newsweek
failed to report. In one version, a cover bearing the face of Jackie Onassis is accompanied
by the statement “May 26, 1994: Deployment of the mainly African UN force is delayed
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due to a dispute over who will provide equipment and cover the cost for the operation.
400,000 deaths.” Another cover depicting OJ Simpson’s vacant gaze alongside his
graven-looking lawyer is accompanied by the news flash “July 8, 1994: As the Rwandan
Patriotic Front advances westward, the influx of displaced persons into the so-called ‘safe
zone’ increases from 500,000 to 1 million within a few days. 900,000 deaths,” while the
actual headlines read “The Case Against O.J. How strong?” and in smaller print above
the header “Bill Gates: Why the tech king worries.” The contrast is striking. Real
Pictures reveals that the lack of images and headlines referring to the Rwandan genocide
has less to do with the unrepresentability of trauma and more to do with the ways in
which the circulation and management of information operates within a climate of social
and political exploitation.
In another version of Real Pictures, one hundred black photo storage boxes are
stacked in various configurations. Each conceals a single image of the genocide. Each is
embossed with white text describing the photograph within. None of the photographs are
visible at any point in time. In his analysis, Rancière argues that the enclosure of the
photographs requires that we first acknowledge the names and stories of the victims,
whose silent bodies must speak: it is no longer a “question of removal, but of
redistributing the way we count” (Rancière 11). In Real Pictures, Jaar devises way of
counting that not only conceals those images already not visible in mainstream media but
also draws attention to this absence. This is why, as Abigail Solomon-Godeau claims,
that the purpose of the work is not to provide evidence of the massacres, “but to spark in
the viewer a personal interrogation of one’s place in relation to the genocide of which we
had knowledge” (Solomon-Godeau 40; emphasis in original). Indeed, the point is not to
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expose the violence of which we already had knowledge, but to expose its enclosure
within the material structures through which information and knowledge circulate. Thus,
for neither Rancière nor Solomon-Godeau is the aim of the work to provide evidence.
However, it is also not to simply spark a personal interrogation. The point, rather, is to
amplify the contradiction between the social relations of witnessing which demand the
production and dissemination of photographs of violence and the material conditions
under which such images are produced and circulated, or not. Jaar’s installations expose
the broader social structures in which the knowledge of the genocide is reduced to
something that happened over there. They point to the ways in which, unlike the
consumer of news media, the spectator of art is not a witness to the horrors of mass
violence but to the mass phenomenon of removal that constitutes the new enclosures.
Witnessing in this sense is not meant simply to motivate outrage toward the obvious
violations of human rights, but to make visible the epistemic enclosures that underlie
these violations.
While Lament of the Images and Real Pictures situate photographs within the
context of the new enclosures that have been underway since the 1970s, The Sound of
Silence reconsiders more forcefully the antagonistic relationship between the production
of images and the social relations of witnessing. This powerful installation is both a
memorial for South African journalist Kevin Carter whose photograph of a starving
Sudanese girl was publicly condemned and an allegory of primitive accumulation in
which the role of photography in the production of universal human rights is both
paradoxical and ambivalent.
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The Sound of Silence takes place in a small cubic room illuminated with
fluorescent lights, in an atmosphere that has been described as vaguely penal. A short 8minute film narrates Carter’s story through a series of visual fragments punctuated by a
blinding flash of light and the split-second appearance of Carter’s prize-winning
photograph, a small girl with a distended belly crawling toward a feeding station as
vulture lurks in the background. The negative reception of this image likened Carter to
the vulture in his photograph and condemned him for failing to intervene: “Why didn’t he
help the little girl, they asked.” As we discovered with Brodsky’s work, there is a
metaphoric logic of substitution at work here: first, the image of Kevin Carter substitutes
for both the witness and the production of capital through which material structures of
inequality are personified; second, as with Brodsky’s photographs the image stands in the
place of the absent victim. The indictment of the photographer-witness in this case is
leveled on the basis of a failed recognition of and identification with the other’s
humanity. Rather than intervene, the photographer captured on camera the grounds for
his own indictment—on a material level, his own failed intervention.56 In the words of
David Levi Strauss: “We put him in front of that starving child, and then accused him of
moral detachment for making the image we wanted him to make” (Levi Strauss 16.). The
photographer, in this sense, is a foil or straw man that allows for the creation of an ethical
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In her book-length polemic, On Photography, Susan Sontag points to the moral and

political dilemmas arising from photography’s dual aspects of aestheticization and
anesthetization, from the violation of individuals and the invasion of their worlds to the
promotion of non-intervention and the incitement to remain at a distance.
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subject whose morality is based on the production and circulation of images. We demand
the image but condemn the image-maker.
This particular situation demonstrates the continuously fraught relationship
between photography and witnessing. Historically, witnessing was primarily a juridical
category deriving from the Latin root wit, meaning to know. While witnessing in the
modern world has combined the direct possession of knowledge with the performative act
of testifying, French researcher Andrea Frisch argues that in pre-modern times the role of
the witness was not to provide evidence but to profess a specific kind of belief.
Testimony was based on faith rather than knowledge: that is, on an ethic of solidarity
rather than authority. The shift to a notion of witnessing based on first-hand experiential
knowledge began what Frisch calls the “epistemic paradigm of witnessing,” initiated by
the invention of the Cartesian subject. Michal Givoni extends these observations into the
current era, arguing that in the postmodern age witnessing no longer takes place primarily
in real time as the witnessing of an event. Rather, it requires a reconstruction of the past;
it is necessarily retrospective. According to Givoni, this new form of “humanitarian
witnessing,” which highlights the importance of psychological rather than empirical fact,
has become the predominant form of witnessing in the age of globalization (Givoni 162).
In her book Human Rights in Camera, Sharon Sliwinski places photography at the
center of this new global consciousness of witnessing. Locating the historical roots of
universal human rights in the “picture trail” rather than the “paper trail,” she traces their
inception back to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 (as opposed to the American Declaration
of 1776 or the French Declaration of 1789). Images of the quake, she argues, had a
“startling effect”: not only did they “initiate a lively, international debate about the nature
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of the human subject and its place in the world, but they also brought into consciousness
a global empathy with the sufferings of distant strangers, a kind of tele-pathos derived in
large part from the aesthetic encounter with the catastrophic event” (Sliwinski 19). This
aesthetic encounter of tele-pathos is one grounded in a distant social relation mediated by
the image. In this sense, the early mass circulation of images of disaster encouraged the
development of a new consciousness grounded in empathic identification, a new optic
whose gaze was directed toward the victim and a corresponding global subject we might
call the spectator-witness or the post-traumatic subject.
Within this new paradigm the role of the witness is no longer to simply provide
first-hand knowledge but to acknowledge and empathize with second-hand accounts.
However, in her critique of postmemory, Elke Heckner points out that the risk of
empathic identification is the appropriation of experience and the substitution of the
spectator for the victim. According to Olivier Chow, Jaar avoids these “banal trappings of
empathy” by trapping the viewer within the “historical nature of the ‘document’” (3-4),
where the document is defined by the “contextualization and integration of image and
event beyond and against the politics of global information’” (1). The politics of empathy
contrasts with the historicity of the document. The evidence provided by the historical
document in Jaar’s re-presentation is not that there is a child starving in Sudan, or that
masses are being murdered in Rwanda. The evidence provided by Jaar’s installation is of
a different order: it is that social injustice and the production of photographs are
structured by the same capitalist social relations. The photograph effaces its own material
existence by presenting itself as a direct reflection of unequal social relations; as a result,
it conceals its conditions of production and instead transforms them into the social
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relations of witnessing for which it acts as a window. In other words, images of violence
and suffering hide their own participation in the violence they claim to transparently
represent. In more concrete terms, Kevin Carter’s photograph of the young girl starving
in Sudan effaces its own participation in the process of primitive accumulation within
which both the starving child and her image appear to be external to logic of capitalist
expansion. Photography, however, registers the forces of primitive accumulation.
Through photography, these forces are converted from a material relation concerning
property into a scopic relation between distant individuals named “witness” and “victim,”
who occupy vastly uneven subject positions within the temporal and spatial coordinates
of the capitalist landscape.
In the context of memory politics, Jaar’s work extends the impulse of his
contemporaries by demonstrating the ways in which traditional hierarchical relations
(between history and memory, for example) are not simply reversed, but also register
through this reversal a shift in the logic of primitive accumulation. Whereas both Brodsky
and Boltanski create archives of this reversal through the recovery of historical memory,
Jaar exposes the ways in which this movement of memory from the margins to the center
necessarily participates in the very logic it resists. By drawing our attention to the image
as both a reflection of the social relations of exploitation and a product of these same
relations, Jaar forces us to acknowledge the ways in which the exploitative relations of
the capitalist and the worker are re-presented in the image economy as an ethical relation
between victim and witness. Recalling Diedrichsen, the “migration of the old subversive
[terms] from the margins and the bottom of society to its center and to the top” (20)
simply reflects a shifting of values from one locus of signification to another rather than
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an overturning of the logic that enabled such a shift. Jaar forces the viewer to confront the
contradiction between the photographer’s position as a labourer in the information
economy and the photographer’s position as a witness to the effects of capitalist
exploitation, which are historically simply placed under the sign of catastrophe or atrocity
or disaster.
Ultimately, Jaar’s work demonstrates that those attempts to negate cultures of
forgetting through the reification of historical memory not only potentially elevate the
objects of memory to the status of fetishes but also inevitably participate expansion of
capital.

3.4 Conclusion
Memory art is generally understood by art critics and cultural theorists in one of two
ways: on the one hand, it is conceived as a means for collectively working through
historical traumas; on the other hand, it is understood as a response to the cultures of
obsolescence and disappearance that characterize global capitalism. In both cases,
memory art appears to serve as a mode of resistance to the cultures of forgetting that
maintain hierarchies between those who possess knowledge and power and those who do
not. On the contrary, I have argued that the installations of memory artists Christian
Boltanski, Marcelo Brodsky and Alfredo Jaar are archives of primitive accumulation that
expose the ways in which memory art is complicit with the logic of capital. Put
differently, these resistant archives, the words of Nicolas Holm, “[are] conceived of as a
means to retrieve the lost histories of capitalism and exploitation” (6) while, at the same
time, they “act to reproduce and disseminate the narratives of capitalist domination,
which they seek to challenge” (7). I have used the work of each of these three artists in
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order to illuminate the ways in which, in resisting the globalized culture of forgetting and
obsolescence, memory archives work to reproduce and disseminate the narrative of
historical recovery, which is both a response to and a reproduction of the so-called crisis
of capitalism. Through their work I have illuminated three aspects of this dynamic: the
rebirth of the auratic fetish, the reification of lost memory and the enclosure of images in
mass culture.
Boltanski’s installations most readily illuminate the ways in which the
revitalization of the aura accompanies the preservation of authentic or everyday memory
and the deconstruction of historical truth and its institutions. Brodsky’s installations serve
the socio-therapeutic function of restoring the social bond while, at the same time,
resisting the repressive and alienating narratives of national history. However, his work
also begins to complicate the straightforward relationship between the abstract ideals of
human rights and the material remains of historical violence. The shift in focus between
Good Memory and Nexus toward a more explicit materiality further highlights tensions
between the role of photography as a fetishistic substitute for missing social relations and
as the material remains of historical violence. For both artists, the revitalization of the
aura—which takes shape through the deconstruction of history and the reification of lost
memory, respectively—is partly an effect of the incorporation of old technologies and
modes of production into the content of the work, and partly an effect of the metaphoric
logic of photography through which it serves as a substitute for the lost social relation.
Of the three, Jaar’s installations are the most inherently dialectical, enacting
tensions between the production, circulation and enclosure of images and the emergence
of the new subject position of the spectator-witness who has become the paradigmatic
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subject of global capitalism.57 Jaar’s withholding of images of violence in installations
like Lament of the Images and Real Pictures echo the absence of these kinds of images in
mainstream news media and popular culture, while his exhibition of Kevin Carter’s
controversial photograph illuminates the paradoxical position of the photographer in the
often opposing roles of labourer and witness. In his work the original is transformed into
its opposite: the enclosure of images becomes an exposure of their absence; the
exhibition of suffering becomes a critique of the discourse of witnessing. In doing so,
Jaar demonstrates the ways in which the absence of images of violence and suffering in
contemporary culture accompanied by the collapse of spectatorship (a relationship
between object and subject) with the social relations of witnessing (a relationship
between subjects mediated by objects) reflects a shift in the logic of capitalist
accumulation in which the image becomes the ground for the new enclosures.
In memory art, the aura is renewed through the dual processes of reification and
identification. Spectators of memory art are absorbed by the work, which has the
fetishistic quality of becoming human.58 The result is that the remains of historical
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In some ways, this “spectator-witness” is the progeny of the “citizen of the world” that

emerged in the mid-18th century, also a detached observer in a foreign world.
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Michael Fried anticipates this in his critique of minimalism, a movement he associates

with objecthood, or the new theatricality of the object. For Fried, objecthood is from the
beginning in conflict with the nature of art. Valorizing the condition of non-art, “the
literalist [Minimalist] espousal of objecthood amounts to nothing more than a plea for a
new genre of theater; and theater is now the negation of art.” Opposing the structure of
painting, whose part-by-part construction undermines its potential for wholeness,

111

violence (the remnants of primitive accumulation) that stand in the place of the missing
victims are mistaken for the social relation. At the same time, the spectator assumes the
position of Benjamin’s expert and, through the discourse of witnessing, comes to manage
the “shock effects” of primitive accumulation in a state of distraction that obscures the
“fetishistic substitutes” by which shock is domesticated. As a result, memory art contains
an internal contradiction that repeats the contradictions of capital. Its contribution to the
re-enchantment of memory, which merges the intensity of experience with the return of
the repressed, conflicts with its participation in a culture of auratic fetishism whose
decline, which Benjamin associated with advancements in commodity production, has
produced an “authentically Marxian form of alienation” (Mioyasaki 432). Ultimately, in
resisting the fetishization, aestheticization and trivialization of historical violence,
memory art participates in the reproduction of capitalist alienation in a purer form in
which the logic of speculation59 (which comes from the Latin root specula, literally,

Minimalism sought a new object whose immense scale (shape as such) would saturate the
spectator’s field of sensation. In this sense, the new theatricality of the object, associated
with the quest for presence and duration signified by the experience of the turnpike
(discussed by both Fried and Krauss), had precisely the opposite effect. Instead of
achieving the purity of objecthood, Minimalist art’s theatricality (and anthropomorphic
tendencies) effaced the object of the work of art altogether (which Krauss links to the
“intensity of experience” characterizing minimalist art).
59

This is not only the logic of finance capitalism, but also new movements in philosophy
like speculative realism.
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“watchtower,” or specere, meaning “to look”) has saturated the entire realm of social
relations.
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Chapter 4

4

The Image in Crisis: The Controversial Case of Four
Photographs from Auschwitz

Four photographs included in the Paris exhibition Memoire des camps in 2001 became
the site of sudden controversy amongst a handful of French intellectuals. Taken by the
Jewish Sonderkommando—prisoners employed by the SS to assist with extermination—
the four photographs in question transmit a rare insider’s perspective on the excessive
violence of the camps. The controversy was sparked by French art historian Georges
Didi-Huberman’s contribution to the exhibition catalogue in which he comments
extensively on the remarkable existence of these images “in spite of all.” His commentary
provoked immediate, negative responses from Gerard Wajcman and Elizabeth Pagnoux
whose scathing critiques were published shortly thereafter in Les temps modernes,60 a
prominent French journal founded by Jean-Paul Sartre and currently edited by Claude
Lanzmann, the producer of the monumental 9-hour film Shoah that documents
testimonies of Holocaust survivors. This particular debate between Wajcman and
Pagnoux and Didi-Huberman is part of a longer standing debate on the so-called
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croyance photographique” and “Reporter photographe à Auschwitz.”

114

unrepresentability of the Holocaust;61 Moreover, as Didi-Huberman suggests, it also tells
us something significant about the “thought of images today,” which he argues “comes to
a great extent from the political field itself” (Didi-Huberman 57; emphasis in original).
While the specificity of phrases like “thought of images” and “political field” is left
conspicuously undetermined, Didi-Huberman’s statement nevertheless provides a point
of departure for considering the iconoclastic impulse of critics such as Wajcman and
Pagnoux as the effect of a particular structure in which atrocities such as the Holocaust
are rendered unrepresentable. Departing from the discourse of the unrepresentable as the
ineffable or unspeakable, in this chapter, I offer a treatment of the debate that reads the
repression of images as a mode of enclosure that registers the ongoing process of
primitive accumulation. Reversing Didi-Huberman’s observation, I argue that the thought
of politics today comes to a great extent from the visual field. In doing so, I maintain that
the iconoclastic gesture of Didi-Huberman’s critics (and their predecessors) both negates
and reproduces the logic of enclosure at the heart of capitalism in which the four
photographs are embedded from the outset.
Following a brief summary of the debate, I reconsider Didi-Huberman’s claim
that these famous photographs are a “symptom of psychic resistance” (64) by exploring
the historical relationship between the photograph and the symptom. The concept of the
symptom, I argue, which has come to feature prominently in contemporary discourses on
both politics and trauma, is inextricable from the development of a new mode of thought

61

For a good overview of this debate, see Sylvie Lindeperg’s essay “Night and Fog:
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corresponding roughly with (yet ultimately preceding) the invention of photography. This
photographic mode of thought or consciousness, characterized by notions of rupture and
exposure, underlies the birth of trauma theory and the current social relations of
witnessing that characterize contemporary memory movements. In the next section, I
discuss the modern museum as a site for processing the remains of historical violence, a
fact supported by the emergence of what Susan Sontag calls “atrocity exhibition” (Sontag
19), in which documents of horror are introduced into the space of art. Finally, I turn to
Tony C. Brown’s discussion of the time of globalization in order to think through the
ways in which the photographic image operates as both a metaphor of enclosure and an
allegory of primitive accumulation. Brown describes the two models of presentation
found in Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation: entombment and prefigural.
Associating the four photographs with the second model and the iconoclastic impulse
with the first, I argue that as the residue of primitive accumulation the four photographs
function allegorically to rupture or expose the logic of entombment represented by the
broader institution of the museum exhibition and enforced by the iconoclastic gesture of
Didi-Huberman’s critics. Ultimately, I argue that the photographs’ inherent violence calls
attention to the paradoxical existence of photographs as both historical documents and
aesthetic objects, a consequence of what Svetlana Alpers names “the museum effect”—
that is, a way of seeing according to which cultural artifacts are transformed into works of
art. Accordingly, I suggest that the photographs’ dialectical intervention (which DidiHuberman attempts to elucidate in the second half of his book) is constituted by the
contradictions they illuminate between opposing modes and spaces of representation. In
this context both the fetishization and the prohibition of the four photographs reflect a
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contradiction internal to a structure in which repressive and reifying impulses are effects
of the structure, which is itself unnamable in its entirety and so assumes the name of the
unrepresentable.

4.1 The Debate
The photographic sequence that appeared in Memoire des camps amid the now-iconic
photographs of concentration camps taken both during and after the liberation by wellknown photographers such as Lee Miller and Margaret Bourke-White is composed of two
distinct pairings: one depicting the scene just prior to the moment of gassing and another
depicting the scene immediately following.62 The first pairing begins with a slightly
blurred image of the incineration pits at Auschwitz crematorium V (figure 14), which was
shot from the protective cover of the gas chamber, the paradoxical darkroom (DidiHuberman 11). Through what appears to be a door or a window, we encounter masses of
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In a chapter entitled “Archive-Image or Appearance-Image,” Didi-Huberman

problematizes this apparently straightforward chronology of the sequence, where he
refers to a “margin of indetermination” contained by the fact that the remains of one
image (the stand of birches with the convoy of women) can be detected along the edge of
another image (the first shot of the incineration pits). These remains suggest that the
sequence of the images must be reversed. However, Didi-Huberman points out that their
rearrangement would contest the chronology presented in the testimony of David
Szmulewski. Maintaining Szmulewski’s chronology he suggests that the “original”
document (a contact sheet for which the negatives were lost) may already be a reversal, in
which case the chronology of the photographs would match the narrative of Szmulewski
simply by reversing the images themselves and not their sequential arrangement. In this
article, I maintain the sequential mapping assumed by Didi-Huberman, which was the
same mapping presented in the exhibition Mémoire des camps.
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bodies, piled high, being systematically transferred by the Sonderkommando from
chamber to pit. A plume of whitish-grey smoke rises in the background and a stand of
trees is visible in the distance. The second image (figure 15) is similar to the first, only it
is slightly closer and somewhat clearer: “[e]mboldened, [the photographer] changes
direction and advances” (12). Through the opening we see the gravelly texture of the path
leading once more to the incineration pits, we witness the “everyday work” of the
Sonderkommando, the familiar “gestures of the living” which relate the weight of the
dead (13-14). The first image in the second pairing captures a stand of birch (figure 16).
At first glance, the convoy of women is barely noticeable in the bottom left-hand corner.
Upon closer inspection, however, we see the harried caravan at the base of the immense
stand, “already undressed, ready to enter the gas chamber” (16). The fourth and final
image (figure 17) is somewhat abstract, shot upward, gazing into the silhouetted branches
of a birch “dazzled by the sun” (16).
The ensuing controversy, which would become the basis for Didi-Huberman’s
book Images in Spite of All, centers on his reference to the photographs as “survivors”
(46). Incensed by this claim, Wajcman and Pagnoux charge Didi-Huberman with
simultaneously fetishizing and deifying the images—in short, the perverse worship of
false idols. According to his critics, he not only commits the crime of “elevat[ing]…the
image to the status of a relic” (52), but in referring to the images as survivors he both
overrides and trivializes the verbal testimonies of the true (human) survivors. DidiHuberman’s response to these charges establishes a compelling link between two forms
of resistance. As I indicated at the outset, he claims that while the production of these
photographs in late summer of 1944 was clearly “an act of political resistance,” the
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Figure 5: Sonderkommando Photo #1

Figure 6: Sonderkommando Photo #2
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Figure 7: Sonderkommando Photo #3

Figure 8: Sonderkommando Photo #4
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hostile reception of these images more than fifty years later is surely “a symptom of
psychic resistance” (64; emphasis in original). This angle begs us to consider the ways in
which the historical violence depicted by the photographic image articulates with and
produces the language of traumatic experience. Indeed, it forces us to confront the modes
by which the field of political resistance is conditioned by the production of violent
images that help to establish the grammar of trauma.
Didi-Huberman opens his initial treatise with an appeal: “Let us not invoke the
unimaginable” (3). His central theoretical axiom is this: we must imagine and images
help us do this. In the case of these particular images, Didi-Huberman argues that we
must recognize four vital facts: 1) against all odds, the images appeared; 2) their
appearance is a refutation of the Nazi program of total annihilation; 3) the images
embody a dialectical space of contradiction; 4) they are “survivors” in the sense that they
maintain the image of humanity by invoking the “similar, the fellow human” (27;
emphasis in original). Didi-Huberman issues the imperative to imagine as a direct
critique of the discourse of the unimaginable or the unrepresentable, which re-inscribes
the fact that the “forgetting of the extermination is part of the extermination” (22). The
iconoclastic impulse of his critics reinforces this forgetting, he argues, through two
polarized modes of historical engagement: through an aestheticism that “fails to
recognize history in its concrete singularities” and through a historicism that “fails to
recognize the image in its formal specificities” (26). Accordingly, he argues that the
production of these photographs in spite of the absolute ban on photography that would
ensure the forgetting of the extermination not only resists the program of total
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annihilation but also, echoing one of the axioms of contemporary trauma theory,
demonstrates the ways in which images appear where words seem to fail.
There can be no doubt about Didi-Huberman’s fetishization of the images. His
description of them as survivors invoking the fellow human assumes that the formal
qualities of the image approximate the human form in such a way that the presence of the
image, which carries traces of its lost reference, the fellow human, captures something
essential about humanity. The image of the fellow human incites the imagination, which
counteracts the inevitable tendency to forget. For Didi-Huberman, imagining is the
dialectical companion to forgetting, where forgetting reinforces the abstraction of history,
its relegation to the past, and eclipses the formal properties of the image, subordinating it
to historical content. For Didi-Huberman’s critics, the image must correspond to the
totality of the situation; however, it is a less than adequate representation that fails to
represent the totality.
Reversing his detractors’ charges of fetishism, Didi-Huberman argues that their
totalizing position exemplified by the statement “There are no images of the Shoah”
operates as a “discursive fetish” (103). His critics’ assertion echoes the earlier position of
Claude Lanzmann who, in his debate with avant-garde filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard said:
“if I had found an existing film…made by an SS that showed how three thousand
Jews…died together in a gas chamber…I would have destroyed it” (qtd in Didi-
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Huberman 95).63 In response, Didi-Huberman remarks: “It is significant that the film strip
imagined by Lanzmann in order to establish the authority of his own work…seems like
an abstract link, a phantasm that has been tossed between the two photographic sequences
of August 1944, that is, between the images of the ‘before’ (the women being led to the
gas chamber) and those of the ‘after’ (the incineration pits)” (97). This imaginary
fragment enacts a double substitution. On the one hand, it claims to represent the
unrepresentable moment of death, standing in for the millions of Jews that died
anonymously in the gas chamber. On the other hand, as a representation of the absent
moment of death—the missed encounter—it stands in for all images of the Shoah, the
missing Image, and thus for its total and utter unimaginability. Operating both
metaphorically (as an image of the dead) and metonymically (as an image of the Shoah),
Lanzmann’s snippet of film signifies a fetishization of the “all-image” achieved through
the absolute negation of images in general. The phantasm, a negative presence, stands for
the missing dead, the anonymous collective, the impossible totality. The negative
presence stands in for the all-image; and yet the totality of missing images is always out
of sync with the totality of missing bodies.
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This statement was originally published in the French daily newspaper Le Monde on

March 3, 1944. In her book Haunted Images: Film, Ethics, Testimony and the Holocaust,
Libby Saxton relates the full quotation in English: “If I had found an existing film—a
secret film because it was strictly prohibited—shot by an SS man showing how 3,000
Jews, men, women, and children, died together, asphyxiated in the gas chamber of
Crematorium II at Auschwitz; if I had found that, not only would I have not shown it, I
would have destroyed it. I am not capable of saying why. It goes without saying” (Saxton
128).

123

The debate regarding the four photographs taken by the Sonderkommando is
framed by the notion of the unrepresentable, which contains an implicit assumption: that
certain events or experiences fall outside of traditional modes of representation. This
assumption takes the event or experience itself as a starting point for imagining possible
modes of ethical and political engagement. As a result, the position taken by DidiHuberman’s critics, which is framed by the rhetoric of authenticity, adheres to a notion of
unrepresentability that preserves narrative as the only mode of representation appropriate
to the degree of historical violence exemplified by the Holocaust, as the only form of
mediation that can approximate the unrepresentable elements of the situation. Together,
the discourse of the unrepresentable and the fantasy of historical recovery advocated by
Lanzmann, Wajcman and Pagnoux is based on a faulty commitment to an older logic that
corresponds with a previous mode of production and a prior mode of social organization
in which the (spoken) word reflects experience more directly, more immediately than the
image.

4.2 The Symptom
In his analysis of the “violence of the controversy,” Didi-Huberman presents the four
photographs as symptoms, writing: “they are a historical symptom capable of disrupting,
and reconfiguring, the relation habitually maintained by the historian of images with his
or her own objects of study” and “a theoretical symptom, which precisely because
disputed, clearly shows that it has shaken all of us throughout our common history” (57;
emphasis in original). As a historical symptom the photographs disrupt the usual
relationship between the subjects and objects of History; as a theoretical symptom the
photographs produce a contradiction between the abstract body of historical knowledge
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and the material remainders of this abstraction at its most fundamental and destructive
level. While Didi-Huberman considers the appearance of these particular images as both
theoretical and historical symptoms, historically, the photograph played an instrumental
role in the conceptualization of the psychic symptom. Within contemporary trauma
theory the symptom and the photograph share a common genealogy that informs classical
psychoanalysis. Freud’s early work on hysteria led him to draw explicit parallels between
the (dream) image and the (hysterical) symptom. Both, he discovered, are the result of
repression: of a latent desire or wish in the case of dreaming and a pathogenic idea in the
case of hysteria.64 Since Freud, the idea that images point toward the latent content of a
repressed memory has become a founding principle of trauma theory. From this
perspective, as a theoretical and historical symptom, the (four) photograph(s) would seem
to emerge as a metaphorical “return of the repressed”65 in which repressed memories (of
historical violence) stored in the collective unconscious enter social consciousness in
distorted form. As symptoms, the four photographs are distortions, or lie-images (in DidiHuberman’s words) that necessarily lead us astray (according to Wajcman and Pagnoux),
confusing and perverting our understanding of the gravity of the violence that took place.
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These observations are illuminated in two of Freud’s primary texts: Interpreting

Dreams (1899) and Studies in Hysteria (1895).
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In Freudian terms, the return of the repressed refers to the ways in which repressed

sexual impulses return in the form of jokes, slips of the tongue (famously known as
Freudian slips) and dream images.
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In Unclaimed Experience, trauma theorist Cathy Caruth interprets the symptom,
which in classical psychoanalysis takes the form of a dream image, as an attempt to
master what was not consciously experienced at the moment of impact (Caruth 62).
Adapting Freud’s concept of traumatic repetition to the study of literature, Caruth
illuminates a rupture in consciousness that characterizes the overwhelming experience of
trauma. In psychoanalytic terms, she explains, consciousness is conceived as “a barrier of
sensation and knowledge that protects the organism by placing stimulation within an
ordered system of time” (61). Accordingly, “what causes trauma is a shock that appears
to work very much like a bodily threat but is in fact a break in the mind’s experience of
time” (61). The symptom is that particular sign which points toward the traumatic
experience that remains as yet latent, brewing beneath the surface, spoken by the body in
the form of tics, slips and jokes. Transferring the language of psychic experience (in
which the symptom is inscribed on the body as text) to narrative representation, Caruth
argues that what I will call the “trauma text” constitutes a symptom of belated
experience. The trauma text in this form is “the story of a wound that cries out, that
addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available,” a
wound that “is experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, to be fully known” (4).
Highlighting the disjuncture between sight and knowledge, she argues that, as a
consequence, the “most direct seeing” of historical violence necessarily produces an
“absolute inability to know it,” which “paradoxically [must] take the form of
belatedness” (92). Here, trauma appears as transhistorical, existing equally at all times
and places in the very same way, as fundamental aspect of the human psyche.
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Drawing on Caruth’s theory of belatedness, cultural theorist Ulrich Baer
announces trauma as a “disorder of memory and time” (Baer 9). A disruption of the
proper ordering of experience according to the hegemony of linear time, the traumatic
symptom did indeed appear at the very moment when time itself was being standardized.
Baer further identifies explicit structural homologies between photography and trauma;
most significantly, both register a disjuncture between seeing and knowing that arises
from the incapacity for an event to be immediately or adequately integrated into a
“coherent mental, textual, or historical context” (10). In contrast to the commonly held
idea that photographs forever preserve a “frozen moment” from the past (2), Baer insists,
rather, that they resemble what Walter Benjamin conceives as a sudden shock or rupture.
While the preservationist vision of the photograph, argues Baer, is based on the historicist
or “Heraclitean” model of “history-as-narrative” (2), “the countermodel of the explosive
event,” which he terms the “Democritean” model, is grounded in a “notion of history that
imagines time, in a striking image, as an invisible event” (4; emphasis in original). (This
Democritean model falls within an epistemology of rupture that characterizes not only
psychoanalytic but political discourse as well.) Not surprisingly, “[t]he emergence of this
countermodel of the ‘sudden event’,” he argues, “can be traced back to a particular
moment in modernity that roughly coincides with the invention of photography” (4). In
this sense, photographs not only have the capacity to “capture the shrapnel of traumatic
time” but, in contrast to Barthes’ claim that photographs block memory (Barthes 91),
Baer argues that they can actually “provide special access to experiences that have
remained unremembered yet cannot be forgotten” (Baer 7).
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Baer argues that the temporal link between photography and trauma is what led
Freud to (however briefly) employ the “metaphor of the camera [which he eventually
dismissed] to explain the unconscious as the place where bits of memory are stored until
they are developed, like prints from black-and white negatives, into consciously
accessible recollections” (Baer 9). Despite Freud’s ultimate dissatisfaction with the
camera metaphor, Baer argues that it nevertheless points to important structural parallels
between trauma and photography that involve not only the disruption of historical time,
but also the blocked transformation of an event or experience into a memory (9). Freud’s
use of the camera metaphor reflects the development of a particular consciousness
expressed in terms of psychic experience that corresponds with certain technological
advancements in visual culture. Thus, while the language of fetishism and the symptom
undoubtedly invite us to interpret the iconoclastic gesture of Didi-Huberman’s critics as a
symptom of psychic resistance, this reduction of the structures of repression to the
individual psyche wields the unfortunate potential to overlook the important ways in
which our understanding of the psyche has itself been conditioned by changes in the
modes and forces of production. Resisting, as it were, the urge to read the disavowal of
the image exclusively in terms of the psychic response of individual actors, we must
instead consider the ways in which this new mode of thought implicit in concepts like
Walter Benjamin’s optical unconscious and Jacques Rancière’s aesthetic unconscious,
illuminates the historical specificity of the iconoclastic impulse of our current era.66 For
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The idea of iconoclasm is not new; however, my argument here is that it does take on a

new significance after the Holocaust. Historically, iconoclasm has referred to the

128

this reason, we must recognize the production of the symptom as a historical rather than
ontological fact.
The development of what Benjamin calls the optical unconscious, which
coincided roughly with the invention of photography, transposed the language of
psychoanalysis into the realm of aesthetics and politics. In “The Work of Art in the Age
of Its Technological Reproducibility,” Benjamin links the production of the optical
unconscious to the decay of the aura of the work of art.67 Whereas the optical
unconscious is an effect of photography’s capacity to get closer to things and to slow
things down, the aura of the work of art, he argues, is a “strange tissue of space and time”

destruction from within of religious images, symbols and doctrines. It is often linked to
extreme resistance and conservative impulses, which accompany periods of drastic social
change. The conservative impulse during and after the Holocaust has taken the form of an
absolute prohibition of all images within the context of violence and suffering. This
secularized rendition of the iconoclasm is in many senses consistent with Benjamin’s
observations regarding the decay of the aura, which reflects the movement of the art
object from the sphere of ritual tradition or the religious to the sphere of mass
reproduction or the political.
67

Benjamin’s conceptualization of the aura, which he first introduced in an earlier essay

by the name of “The Little History of Photography” (1931), is somewhat elusive and
inconsistent. At times, it refers directly to the work of art and its historical embeddedness
within the realm of ritual tradition; at other times, it refers to the particular presence of
the live actor in the age of mass mediation. Despite his various conceptualizations, what
becomes clear throughout his articulations is the ways in which the aura is related to an
unmediated experience of presence that recalls Freud’s “oceanic” feeling.
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(Benjamin “Work of Art” 23) determined by the artwork’s social and historical context.
In other words, the aura in art is produced by its “embeddedness in the context of
tradition” in which its “auratic mode of existence” is an effect of its “ritual function”
(24). Echoing the Marxian categories of use and exchange value, Benjamin suggests that
the aura of the work of art is analogous to “cult value,” while its decay is the aesthetic
equivalent of a newly prominent “exhibition value” connected to the mass reproducibility
of the photographic image. Accordingly, the uniqueness and permanence of traditional art
is replaced by the ephemeral and transitory nature of mass art. As a result, “technological
reproducibility emancipates the work of art from its parasitic subservience to ritual” and
grants it a potentially political existence (24). Accordingly, Benjamin conceives the
“politicization of art” to be a response to the fascist “aestheticization of politics,” which
is exemplified by the nostalgic return to classical art launched by the Nazis along with
their corresponding condemnation of so-called progressive or degenerate art.68 Despite
the looming threat of capitalist exploitation and commodity fetishism, which Adorno
deemed intrinsic to “the culture industry,” for Benjamin the capacity for the new
technologies of photography and film to bring to masses closer to the work of art, to
reveal the hidden details of everyday life through the democratization of the optical
unconscious, harboured immense revolutionary potential.

68

Degenerate art was a term applied by the Nazi regime to most modernist art, including

the artworks of Picasso and Matisse. It was also the name of an exhibition held in Munich
in 1937 designed to denounce art that did not represent the ideals of German purity
exalted by the phrase “blood and soil.” Artists whose work was labeled degenerate were
harshly persecuted and often exiled.
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While the revolutionary potential of Benjamin’s optical unconscious appears to be
the progeny of the psychic unconscious—“the camera introduces to us unconscious
optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses” (Benjamin 37)—Jacques
Rancière argues for a historical reversal. He insists that the Freudian unconscious was, in
fact, only made possible through a prior revolution in the realm of aesthetics, which is
“the revolution that moves the domain of the arts from the reign of poetics to that of
aesthetics” (Rancière 7) and marks “the end of an ordered set of relations between what
can be seen and what can be said, knowledge and action, activity and passivity” (21).
This aesthetic revolution is based on the notion that there is “thought that does not think,”
which Rancière refers to as “mute speech” (31). The Freudian unconscious, argues
Rancière, corresponds to one particular form of mute speech, “the model of the trace that
is made to speak, in which the sedimented inscription of a history can be read” (62). The
second form (which Rancière alleges Freud wanted nothing to do with) is carried on by
art historians such as Didi-Huberman (who Rancière identifies as exemplary in this
regard) and presents a “model, which no longer sees the ‘insignificant’ detail as a trace
that allows a process to be reconstituted, but as the direct mark of an inarticulatable truth
whose imprint on the surface of the work undoes the logic of a well-arranged story and a
rational composition of elements” (63; emphasis added). This second model is, of course,
the model informing Benjamin’s dialectical image, which Didi-Huberman deploys in
defense of his original claim when he maintains that the image is both truth and
obscurity, icon and document, fact and fetish, the “dialectic stirring together [of] the veil
with its rip” (Didi-Huberman 80; emphasis in original)—or, perhaps, the aura with its
image.
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As I suggested at the outset, we can reverse Didi-Huberman’s claim that “the
thought of images today comes to a great extent from the political field itself” to read: the
thought of politics today comes to a great extent from the visual field itself. This reversal
emphasizes the ways in which the production of a new photographic consciousness
arising from changes in the forces and conditions of production illuminates
corresponding shifts in the field of social and political struggle. Indeed, it is consistent
with Benjamin’s observation: “Just as the entire mode of existence of human collectives
changes over long historical periods, so too does their mode of perception. The way in
which human perception is organized—the medium in which it occurs—is conditioned
not only by nature but by history” (Benjamin 23; emphasis in original). In this sense, the
current social relations of witnessing so prevalent within the contemporary landscape of
aesthetics and politics cannot be thought apart from the development of this mode of
thought within which the notion of the unconscious has played a central role. In any case,
Didi-Huberman’s constitution of the image-as-symptom creates a necessary isomorphism
between the political and the psychic that hinges on a conception of rupture, an aesthetic
form grounded in the structural homologies Baer discovers in photography and trauma.
What the discourse of rupture demonstrates in the context of the four photographs
is the ways in which the symptom is itself organized by the new photographic zeitgeist
that emphasizes the sudden exposure of that which was previously hidden to which the
repression of the image provides an immediate response. Accordingly, we might argue
that the discourse of the unrepresentable and the corresponding iconoclastic impulse are
the concrete effects of a photographic logic through which historical violence is rearticulated as a grammar of the unconscious that structures the fields of trauma studies
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and memory politics today. In this sense, the debate between Didi-Huberman and his
critics highlights the ways in which the social relations of witnessing made possible by
the new photographic consciousness play out in the political economy of representation
as a conflict between the mediated and the immediate.

4.3 Exhibiting Primitive Accumulation
The museum exhibition is a space in which the material remains of cultural and historical
knowledge are preserved. However, in the wake of avant-garde critiques, the space of this
modern institution has (in the last fifty years or so) become a supremely ambivalent one.
At least since the Holocaust, the place of the photograph within traditional spaces of
exhibition has become equally fraught. Questions concerning the institutional authority
and ideological function of the exhibition surfaced explicitly within the art world in the
early part of the twentieth century through avant-garde movements such as Dadaism and
Surrealism. Marcel Duchamp’s introduction of everyday objects or “readymades” into
the space of the exhibition, for example, was meant to challenge the authority of the
museum in determining which objects are eligible for inclusion in the exhibition space
and which objects ultimately become classified as works of art.69 This institutional
critique was reinvigorated following the protests of May ‘68, when conceptual artists
such as Christian Boltanski and Annette Messager used personal and everyday objects in
order to expose the museum’s continued failure to adequately address activist concerns
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Duchamp’s readymades anticipated the widespread movement toward the collapse of

art and life that would become the hallmark of the avant-garde and, eventually,
“postmodern” art forms, such as performance, installation, etc.
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regarding the elitism of this modern institution (DeRoo). These critiques have historically
been directly related to broader critiques of social and political inequality, particularly in
terms of division of labour and access to education. Under pressure from artists and
activists alike, “[s]ince the 1980s,” Rebecca DeRoo argues, “international museums have
felt challenged to be politically engaged” (3). The controversial debate surrounding the
four photographs is inextricable from these broader cultural politics of the museum that
continue to bubble beneath the surface of contemporary social and political movements.
While artists like Boltanski appear, for some, to have provided a commendable solution
to the problem of the unrepresentable, the controversy surrounding the Sonderkommando
photos suggests that the problem of the unrepresentable, which implicates the space of
exhibition, appears to be alive and well.
Despite Benjamin’s lauding of photography’s revolutionary potential, its
inclusion in the contemporary museum remains fraught. The modern exhibition, which in
fact preceded the invention of photography, is the original medium proper to the new
photographic consciousness. While Benjamin associates the shift from cult value to
exhibition value with the advent of technological reproducibility, it is important to
recognize that mass reproduction did not create but rather exposed the material conditions
of this shift. The exhibition itself not only played an important role in the tipping of the
scales in favour of exhibition value, but it in fact anticipated the modern museum as one
of the primary sites for processing the violence of primitive accumulation. It is certainly
no coincidence that the cultural practices of exhibition, from the birth of the salon in 17th
century France to the institution of the modern museum in 17th century England, emerged
alongside the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The space of exhibition was
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implicitly, from the outset, a mechanism for processing social and political contradiction,
but its institutionalization within the space of the modern museum established the role it
would come to play in processing the material remains of historical violence, from the
cultural relics of colonized populations to photographs of atrocity. In this sense, the
inclusion of the four photographs in the space of exhibition exposes the museum as a
technology for processing the residue of primitive accumulation and foreshadows the
proliferation of what are now called “memory museums” in the late twentieth century.
The name of the exhibition—Memoire des camps—suggests that we should
understand the controversy regarding the four photographs in relation to the new field of
memory politics to which the figure of the photograph remains central.70 Closely related
to the economies of trauma and testimony, memory politics are driven not only by claims
for universal human rights but also by the desire “to save the dead from oblivion” (Beiner
431; cf. Arruti).71 Within the field of memory politics, photographs often serves as a
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concerning memory. One particularly notable example is the public protests staged by the
Madres de Plaza de Mayo (the Mothers of the Disappeared) in Argentina.
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In his analysis of Benjamin’s philosophy of history Ronald Beiner asserts: “To the

question ‘Why does a revolutionary write history?’ Benjamin is able, on the basis of the
‘Theses,’ to answer: ‘To save the dead from oblivion’” (431). We hear echoes of this in
Sontag’s passionate assertion that “[m]emory is, achingly, the only relation we can have
with the dead,” (115), Nerea Arruti’s intimation that photographs enact a “political
resistance against oblivion” (115), David William Foster’s claim that images in
comtemporary art seek to “restore [the victims’] social subjectivity” (97).
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metaphors of enclosure whose subsequent censorship reproduces the enclosures of
memory (as common knowledge) that coincide with enclosures of common land—which,
of course, for Marx established the ground of primitive accumulation. Historically,
enclosures of memory required the absolute destruction of cultural knowledge, including
the knowledge of ritual tradition condemned by Benjamin, through the violent
annihilation of persecuted social groups. Italian autonomist Silvia Federici illuminates
this primary or immediate mode of enclosure in her discussion of the European witchhunts as a form of primitive accumulation. She demonstrates the ways in which the mass
murder of vast numbers of women, midwives and widows in particular, destroyed a body
of reproductive knowledge whose eventual institutionalization by the state ensured the
control of women’s bodies for the reproduction of the labour force. Enclosures of
memory through the destruction of traditional bodies of knowledge, a type of knowledge
Michael Taussig calls “implicit social knowledge” (87), create a disenfranchised
population whose social alienation is accompanied by their separation from the means of
production through the enclosures of common land.
The entry of photography into the space of exhibition has produced a series of
contradictions that arise from a profound tension between the photograph’s documentary
and aesthetic functions. This is particularly pronounced with photographs of atrocity,
which document the history of enclosure by exposing scenes of state violence; at the
same time, these photographs appear as the material remains of this violence that
represent, directly or not, the absence of the bodies of the dead. In contrast to the
immediate enclosures of cultural memory through “conquest, enslavement, robbery,
murder” (Marx 874), disavowals of the photographic image operate as a secondary or
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mediated mode of enclosure whereby the memory of destruction is enclosed through the
privitization or eradication of material remains.
Responses to these forms of enclosure constitute the new field of postmemory,
which Marianne Hirsch defines as “a structure of inter- and trans-generational
transmission of traumatic knowledge and experience” (106). Not surprisingly,
photography is an instrumental vehicle for postmemorial transmission: “Photography’s
promise to offer an access to the event itself, and its easy assumption of iconic and
symbolic power, makes it a uniquely powerful medium for the transmission of events that
remain unimaginable” (108). Hirsch’s language echoes Didi-Huberman’s as well as some
of the central ideas in trauma theory regarding the belated representation of the
unimaginable. For Hirsch, photographs assist in the production of postmemorial forms
through their capacity to reembody distant social relations. The new practices of
postmemory, which often assume a ritual archival form, register the violent enclosures of
memory through the return to embodied, if archaic, modes of knowledge transmission
that reflect a previous mode of production in which memory was not primarily an image
of the past but a set of practices that resonated in the forms of social relationality that
structured everyday life.
As we will discover, in their existence as remnants of enclosure, the four
photographs possess a figural content that depicts scenes of unprecedented violence
whose materiality or pre-figural content is preserved in the silver halides transformed by
exposure into the residue of primitive accumulation. In absolute defiance of the ban on
photography, the photographs appeared as the matter of historical violence and the
substance of political resistance. The materiality of the images is transformed into
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symbolic value as they enter the political economy of representation, even as their
material existence persists. Contradictions between the materiality of the photographs,
their literal quality of being exposed, and their figurative dimension, their so-called
capacity to expose, become particularly visible within the space of exhibition.

4.4 Formal Contradictions
In order to more fully explicate the contradictions between the mediated and the
immediate in the context of memory politics, I turn briefly to Tony C. Brown’s
discussion of the time of globalization, which emphasizes the relationship between the
contradictory temporalities of primitive accumulation and the totalizing image of
globalization, an image that (like Wajcman and Pagnoux’s “all-image”) ultimately
“obscures the specific force of global capitalism’s violence” (Brown 572). Brown begins
with the assertion that the idea of globalization is misleading. He argues that, despite the
fact that the concept of globalization highlights what Paul de Man called a “temporal
predicament,” it problematically advances a totalizing image or gestalt—the globe—as
the ground for its unfolding. Paradoxically, the image of the globe72 which characterizes
globalization as an ever-increasing mode of “spatial completion” (573) is simultaneously
foreclosed by the fact that the process of globalization, like capitalism, is constituted by
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The image of the globe is, not surprisingly, also the foundation of Kant’s

cosmopolitanism, which provided aspects of the concept of universal human rights. For a
full discussion of the relationship between the idea of a fully saturated globe and the
development of cosmopolitan hospitality, see Seyla Benhabib’s discussion of “Perpetual
Peace” (1795) and “The Metaphysics of Morals” (1797) in her essay “On Hospitality:
rereading Kant’s cosmopolitan right” (2004).
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its “own necessary incompletion” (574). Accordingly, drawing on Marx’s theory of
primitive accumulation, Brown explains that “Marx addresses a repression of time much
like that which orients the notion of globalization-as-already-global: the positing of a
circular condition that obscures the constitutive violence of capitalism’s self-extension
and hence happening of time” (576).
Emphasizing the continuous violence of the separations and enclosures at the
heart of primitive accumulation, Brown states that, as with globalization, “one ought not
think that the violence entailed in these ‘previous’ acts ends with capitalism’s full
flowering” (577). Accordingly, he continues:
For Marx it becomes the task of capitalism’s critic to track down and decipher in
the present the violent marks of primitive accumulation—the marks of history one
must suppose here and now. But if the marks of capitalism exist as they do,
though a capitalist ideology wants to obscure them, why not simply describe them
historically? Why is an act of historical recovery simply not enough, or even
appropriate for Marx? (Brown 578; emphasis added).
For Brown the answer is simple: because Marx proffers a dialectical understanding of
primitive accumulation, one that “stress[es] a certain temporality of historical violence
that does not seal primitive accumulation off into the past” (578). One, in other words,
that does not narrate the enclosures of memory as an historical condition but exposes
their persistent repetition within the current state of global capitalism. While Brown’s
discussion of primitive accumulation focuses on the politics of time inherent to the
processes of globalization, his discussion of the spatial image of the globe as a totalizing
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force that constitutes the “missing time of globalization” (573) can be used to illuminate
the role the “all-image” in the enclosures of memory that constitute the “missing time” of
traumatic experience.
Brown presents “two models of presentation” he discovers in Marx’s attempt to
account for the residue of primitive accumulation that further reveal the relationship
between representation and historical violence: the entombment model and the prefigural
model. The first model corresponds to what I call the time of representation, which
comprises the historicist element of Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation by which
the violence of capitalism is sealed off into the past. In this model, argues Brown,
capitalism’s exploitative drive “‘grows on the…tomb’ of the producer’s own labour”
(Marx qtd in Brown 580). Here the tomb, which “becomes the vehicle that at once names
its tenor (the violence that results in the remains of primitive accumulation) and hides it
on the way to producing meaning (in this case capitalist accumulation)” (581), is a
“substitute for the remains themselves” (580). This model indicates the ways in which
enclosures of historical memory are structured by the time of representation in which the
violence of capitalism is re-articulated as the story of an unrepresentable experience
belonging to the past.
In the context of the four photographs, the entombment model illuminates the
ways in which the photographs are conceived as substitutes for the remains of historical
violence, the bodies of the dead themselves. The photograph is in this sense a
metaphorical tomb that both contains the images of the dead and operates as a substitute
in their absence. This metaphoric aspect of the photographic image as both the container
and the surrogate is highlighted on both sides of the debate, in Didi-Huberman’s
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allegedly fetishistic substitution of the photographs for the survivors as much as in
Wajcman and Pagnoux’s rejection of the photographs based on this substitution. The four
photographs are dismissed according to the idea of the original; that is, that they are
identified as inauthentic representatives or substitutes for a more authentic original event
or experience. Their rejection not only resists but actually affirms the metaphoric logic of
entombment not only by sealing the violence itself into the past, but also by concealing
the memory of this violence through the repression of its material remains.
The second model illuminated by Brown corresponds to the time of terror and
Marx’s well-known claim that the history of class struggle is “written in the annals of
mankind in letters of blood and fire” (Marx qtd. in Brown 581). Brown refers to this
model as the “non- or pre-figural model” in which the residue of primitive accumulation
is “the matter of violence itself” (581). Revealing its dialectical dimension, the author
explains that this model “highlights how capitalism can cognize its origins only by
recourse to a figural [representational] language that obscures the material violence of
those origins” (581). Noting the difficulty Marx had in finding the appropriate
“conceptual tools” to “acknowledge the material [prefigural]” (581), Brown uses Marx’s
“optical analogy” (in which Marx analogizes the objectification of social relations with
the objectification of the “subjective excitation of the optic nerve”)73 to demonstrate how
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Marx deploys this analogy in the fourth section of Chapter One of Capital, entitled

“The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof” in order to illuminate the ways
in which the value of commodities is perceived as an objective quality of the product of
labour rather than a social relation between labourers. The optical analogy demonstrates
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the prefigural is articulated through the figural in such a way that it draws attention to its
“figural condition” while preserving its material dimension. The hieroglyph, argues
Brown, is the form of representation proper to the prefigural. Referencing Marx, he
states: “While for Marx a hieroglyph is figurative and obscure and thus something whose
supposed meaning always demands deciphering, it is also a written mark that presents
itself as a material impression on something as well as on the eye” (582). The residue of
primitive accumulation (or the matter of historical violence) as “that which both enables
and exceeds capitalism—becomes a principle of disarticulation through its articulation
of capitalism with what it (capitalism) cannot take fully into (its own) account” (580;
emphasis added). The residue of primitive accumulation becomes, in other words, a point
of contradiction or rupture in the otherwise smooth functioning of global capitalism.
Brown’s discussion of the time of globalization, then, provides an alternative
framework for analyzing the debate concerning the four photographs, one that
emphasizes the ways in which both the debate and the existing frameworks of
interpretation (psychoanalysis, trauma theory, memory politics) are themselves structured

the ways in which the light emanating from an object, which excites the optic nerve, is
perceived as an objective quality of the object rather than a mediator of the relation
between the object and the eye. Ultimately, Marx finds the optical analogy inadequate,
however, because in the production of commodities the direct relation between physical
things is not present in the same way as with the excitation of the optic nerve. There is no
relation, says Marx, between the “physical properties” of commodities and their “material
effects.” For this reason, Marx seeks a more apt analogy, which he finds in the concept of
religious fetishism.
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by the logic of capitalism. Within Brown’s reading of primitive accumulation, the four
photographs can be understood as social hieroglyphs, which have both figurative and
material dimensions. Indeed, they posses a representational content that depicts scenes of
unprecedented violence whose materiality is preserved in a suspension of silver that
materializes the abstract forces of primitive accumulation. In this sense, the four
photographs are literally the “matter of violence itself.” It is this prefigural condition of
the photograph (which, for Brown, wields the potential to “derail” signification) that
establishes its symptomatic constitution. The iconoclastic response adheres to the logic of
enclosure that reduces the photographic image to its figural content and reflects the
“ideological detachments that separate the working classes from any sense of historical
causality” (576).
From this perspective Wajcman and Pagnoux’s resistance to the four photographs
extends the metaphorical logic of entombment through which the violence of primitive
accumulation is sealed off into the past. The material remains of this violence—namely,
the four photographs—are replaced by what Didi-Huberman calls the “all-image,” the
absent image of the Shoah that metonymically stands for its totality, which attempts to
conceal the relations of production that constitute the memory of capitalism’s violence.
Didi-Huberman’s alleged fetishization of the four photographs is no less reflective of the
logic of enclosure; his anthropomorphic gesture in which he refers to the photographs as
survivors equally conceals the social relations of production. However, unlike Wajcman
and Pagnoux’s absolute negation, Didi-Huberman’s fetishization does not reduce them to
their symbolic content but rather points to their material condition as the residue of
historical violence. In his reference to their simultaneously figural and prefigural
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dimensions, Didi-Huberman emphasizes their dialectical nature, their constitution as
social hieroglyphs, or allegories of primitive accumulation, which mediate the current
social relations of witnessing.

4.5 Conclusion
While the debate between Didi-Huberman and his critics is couched in the rhetoric of the
unrepresentable, the persistence of the debate itself points to a more fundamental problem
I call the problem of articulation, which has less to do with the idea that certain
experiences exceed the possibility of representation and more to do with the apparent
incompatibility of intersecting modes or spaces of representation as old logics articulate
with new ones. The problem of articulation is broached in Brown’s analysis of
globalization when he argues that the dialectics of primitive accumulation proceed from
“the articulation of line and circle,” where the circle represents the figurative logic of
enclosure and the line represents line represents the prefigural mark of exposure. Thus,
the “tangential articulation that Marx isolates also proves a force of disarticulation. It
holds off the attainment of unification in sublation or metaphor” (Brown 582). Primitive
accumulation is the point at which the line and the circle meet, producing a rupture or a
“disarticulating articulation,” which Brown refers to as the production of time itself.
From the perspective of a disarticulating articulation, the four photographs
highlight the clash of opposing modes of representation in two primary ways: as
historical documents appearing in the traditional space of the art exhibition, and as
eyewitness photos appearing alongside images produced by secondary witnesses. As a
consequence of the museum effect, the four photographs are transformed from historical
documents depicting scenes of extreme violence into objects of an aesthetic gaze.
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Famously, Sontag cautions us to gaze warily upon photographs of atrocity such as these,
which not only “anesthetize” but “transform history into spectacle” (Sontag 110). Indeed,
the spectator’s gaze does nothing to reveal the ways in which the residue of primitive
accumulation, the matter of historical violence itself, is converted within the space of
exhibition into a spectacle in Debord’s sense of the term, where the “spectacle is not a
collection of images” but a “social relationship between people that is mediated by
images” (Debord 1).
At the same time that it encourages the social relations of witnessing, the space of
exhibition diminishes important differences concerning the conditions of production of
individual images. From this perspective, the sensuous products of human labour attain
an abstract exhibition value in much the same way that commodities attain an abstract
exchange value in the space of the marketplace: “It is only by being exchanged that the
products of labour acquire a socially uniform objectivity as values, which is distinct from
their sensuously varied objectivity as articles of utility” (Marx 166). Disparate objects
with varying social and historical contexts assume a universal value as aesthetic objects,
which is distinct from their original value as historical documents. Photographs of
violence snatched in the most harrowing of circumstances are displayed in the same
sanitized space as early court paintings commissioned by noblemen, elaborate
Elizabethan costumes preserved behind glass, aboriginal hunting tools both plundered
and excavated and Duchamp’s readymade Bicycle Wheel. What remains invisible in this
context is not the original experience of suffering, but the social relations of production
whose invisibility is articulated as and articulates with the overwhelming experience of
individual trauma.
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Didi-Huberman attempts to capture the material significance of the four
photographs in his imaginative re-constitution of their conditions of production. Drawing
on both archival material and survivor testimony (rejecting the either-or position
advocated by Pagnoux and Wajcman), he describes how a group of Sonderkommando
produced the photographs under conditions of extreme duress; how the camera with
which the photos were taken was likely smuggled into the camp in the bottom of a soup
pot; how it “probably contained only a small piece of blank film” (Didi-Huberman 11);
how the deliberately damaged roof of Crematorium V provided a way for one member of
the group to keep watch under the auspices of productive labour while another snapped
photos from the protective cover of the gas chamber; how the precious strip of film
escaped from the camp “in a tube of toothpaste,” finally falling into the hands of the
Polish resistance via the code name Tell (16). What this carefully reconstructive vision
establishes is not an accurate historical picture of their production but rather what Walter
Benjamin might call the “social fact” of their political existence (Benjamin, “The Little
History” 520). Not only does their very existence violate the ban on photography, but it
also reveals a particular set of social relations that characterizes a form of historical
violence constituted by the particular conditions of primitive accumulation in the context
of so-called globalization.
In the staging of a contradiction between their figurative and material dimensions,
the four photographs disclose the problem of articulating historical violence through the
exhibition, which reproduces the images as equivalent forms. However, the four
photographs also operate as “social hieroglyphs” (Marx 167) whose material conditions
are not only preserved in the exposed and transformed silver salts but in the everyday
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gestures of the Sonderkommando that constitute the “material relations between persons”
(166) that underlies the images’ fetishization and subsequent exhibition value. Efforts to
repress the images through discourses of the unrepresentable reveal a disjuncture between
old modes of representation and new relations of production characterized by a social
economy of witnessing. The iconoclastic impulse, in this sense, corresponds to an
outdated logic that frames the images’ violent content in terms of unrepresentability, a
gesture that ignores the prefigural dimension of the photographs whose material existence
reflects the particular relations of production in which the photographic image is itself the
material residue of primitive accumulation.
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Chapter 5

5

Trauma in the Time of Capital: Allegories of Primitive
Accumulation in the Literature of W.G. Sebald

It takes just one awful second, I often think, and an entire epoch passes.
—W.G. Sebald
W.G Sebald concludes the first of a series of conversations between the
protagonist and the narrator of his final novel Austerlitz with a striking metaphor. Tracing
the history of Antwerp’s fortifications, from Floriana to Breendonk—the latter of which
was eventually transformed, says the narrator, into a “reception and penal camp” only to
later become a “national memorial and museum of Belgian resistance following the
Second World War—Austerlitz explains:
as architectural plans for fortifications became increasingly complex, the
time it took to build them increased as well, and with it the probability that
as soon as they were finished, if not before, they would have been overtaken
by further developments, both in artillery and in strategic planning, which
took account of the growing realization that everything was decided in
movement, not in a state of rest (16).
From a certain angle, the metaphor of fortification echoes the operations of psychic
defence. In a parallel metaphor, Freud famously articulated the operations of psyche in
terms of defence mechanisms, or modes of neural fortification, and he conceived the
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repressive apparatus as one such mechanism that protects the psyche from an
overwhelming shock; but, of course, in Freud’s account, repressed memory inevitably
returns in the guise of a symptom which forms the basis of traumatic repetition.74 It
seems the logic of fortification is itself overwhelmed by the return of the repressed,
haunted as it is by the threat of traumatic memory. However, assuming an anamorphic
glance, the fortification becomes, perhaps more aptly, a metaphor not for psychic defence
but for the irresolvable tensions between the enthusiasm of historical progress and the
violence of capital accumulation, a reading supported by Austerlitz’s claim that
“somehow we know by instinct that outsize buildings cast the shadow of their own
destruction before them, and are designed from the first with an eye to their later
existence as ruins” (19). We recall that in the dialectic of history, capitalism, as Marx
allegedly prophesied, contains the seeds of its own destruction. The duality of the
metaphor, which marks the transition to a new master narrative—in which the rational
institution of capital replaces the old institutions based on superstition and divine
providence—and situates traumatic subjectivity squarely in the context of a new mode of
production. Accordingly, we might read the metaphor of fortification as an articulation of
the “blind violence” (Sebald 21) (of primitive accumulation) incarnate in our “mightiest
projects” (14) (of capitalist production). I make a simple claim: Sebald’s metaphor of
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Repression, for Freud, is one of the central defence mechanisms by which the psyche

prevents pathological desires from entering conscious thought and forces traumatic
memories back into the unconscious. The repressive impulse is linked to what Freud calls
the reality principle, which modifies the pleasure principle in the service of selfpreservation. See Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
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fortification urges us to depart from a notion of trauma grounded in the a-histories of
traumatic repetition by relocating the production of traumatic memory within the broader
history of capitalist accumulation.
At least since the early 80s, the notion of trauma as an overwhelming experience
of violence that exceeds all forms of representation has become axiomatic. Beginning
with Cathy Caruth’s inaugural study of trauma in Unclaimed Experience (1996) and
Shoshana Felman’s equally seminal work on testimony and witnessing, literary theorists
have since conceptualized trauma nearly unanimously as a temporal rupture or “missed
encounter” (Caruth 6) whose belated return assumes the form of a symptom, psychic or
otherwise. However, as Susannah Radstone notes disapprovingly, in this perversion of
the Freudian paradigm, traumatic experience is wholly identified with the so-called
unrepresentable as opposed to an unconscious desire or fantasy and accordingly comes to
serve (however erroneously) as a “general theory of representation” (Radstone 12).
Through the effacement of trauma’s pathological dimension—those fantastical
associations through which the subject interprets the traumatic event—the former’s
historical dimension is lost. Trauma (capital-T) becomes a kind of “master signifier”
through which the violence of history is articulated as a representation of subjective
experience whose legitimate expression must adopt one of two poetic forms: testimony or
allegory. Despite the realist and surrealist affinities, both constitute trauma as a historical
rupture that leads to the relativistic insertion of opposing perspectives, in literal and
figurative sense—literally, through its so-called belated representation in the testimonial
form, and figuratively, through its pronounced reification (or personification) in the
allegorical form. Often, in the trauma text, these distinct forms are entwined.
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In the current paradigm of trauma, temporal rupture (belatedness or repetition) is
a central aspect of traumatic experience. The temporality of trauma was already present
in Freud, who granted the concept a psychic dimension. Deriving from the Greek for
“wound,” trauma under the Freudian gaze was both revived and transformed into the
symptomatic expression of repressed memory, which assumes the shape of traumatic
repetition (whose homologous relation to the seriality of commodity production is most
certainly not incidental). This new understanding of trauma was, in part, made possible
by advances in modern technology; it is well known that Freud’s theories of the psyche
were highly influenced by technological advances of the time, such as photography and
railway travel, which would inform his theories of condensation and displacement.75

75

Lacan makes the equation of condensation and displacement with metaphor and

metonymy explicit in “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since
Freud.” This transposition of terms corresponds to his reformulation of the unconscious
in terms of language. Influenced by Saussure, Lacan generalizes the unconscious in this
lecture by claiming that it is structured like a language. Under this new formulation, the
particular psychic processes of condensation and displacement are transformed into their
linguistic analogons; metaphor, with its property of substitution, corresponds to
condensation, and metonymy, with its tendency for slippage, corresponds to
displacement. In Lacan and the Political, Yannis Stavrakakis explains that “[Lacan’s]
argument is that what Freud describes as formations of the unconscious…are produced
through these mechanisms [metonymy and metaphor]” (Stavrakakis 58). The stakes of
this transposition are specifically political. Stavrakakis answers the question “What is the
relevance of metaphoric and metonymic production of meaning for the analysis of
political reality?” by turning to Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy
“where the construction of political spaces is revealed as governed by the principles of
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Nearly a century later, under the influence of deconstruction, the concept underwent a
further transmutation. Building on Freud’s theory of traumatic repetition, Cathy Caruth, a
pioneer in the field of what would eventually become trauma studies, defined trauma as
“an overwhelming experience of sudden or catastrophic events in which the response to
the event occurs in the often delayed, uncontrolled repetitive appearance of hallucinations
and other intrusive phenomena” (Caruth 11). Trauma now is the effect of a temporal
disruption that derives from the ultimate failure of representation, a rupture in the
experience of time. Ulrich Baer attributes this temporal rupture to the lack of a “coherent
mental, textual, or historical context” (Baer 10)—reflecting the sense, perhaps, of
conceptual or mental displacement that gives rise to a feeling of anxiety. The initial
temporal rupture is followed by a belated representation that appears in the visual register
as a traumatic memory. It is for this reason photography and not railway travel has
remained the contemporary exemplar of the temporality of traumatic experience, despite
the devastating effects of high-speed collisions.
The main problem with the idea of trauma as belated representation and historical
rupture is that it relies on a model of history in which the temporality of trauma

equivalence and difference” (76). Metaphor is equated with logic of equivalence, which
results in the “simplification of political spaces” (76) by reducing political struggle to the
opposition of inverse terms that Laclau and Mouffe call the paradigmatic pole.
Metonymy, on the other hand, corresponds to the logic of difference, which entails the
“expansion of the syntagmatic pole of meaning, of the number of positions entering into a
relation of combination” (77).
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corresponds precisely to the unfolding of history, a model that Walter Benjamin (among
others) has criticized for its association with a strictly ahistorical, “homogenous, empty
time” (Benjamin 261). In this model, the traumatic rupture produces a break in time that
is ultimately sutured by the belated process of working through, or re-presenting.
Historical time is redeemed; the progression of history is restored through the recovery of
missing experience. In this model, history is the point of departure. The excess produced
by the violence of history returns in the form of a traumatic or ghostly repetition whose
disruptive potential is neutralized through narratives of closure and healing, or historical
recovery. Social equilibrium is reinstated and the progression of history resumes,
unaffected. Underlying material inequalities remain intact.
Here the recovery of memory is imagined as an antidote to traumatic repetition,
on both subjective and historical scales. We encounter the current obsession with
memory in all walks of cultural production, from site-specific museums to literature and
art. On the side of the historical, this recovery of (collective) memory serves as a site of
political resistance; on the side of the subjective, this recovery of (individual) memory is
form of psychic healing. In both cases, the potential for recovery is placed under the sign
of the therapeutic, collective or otherwise. Not surprisingly, literary representations of
trauma are often read as catalysts for the recovery of memory, both social and psychic;
but this language of recovery should point us, from the outset, to the relationship between
historical memory and the property form. In the age of global capitalism, history has
itself become an object of possession and repossession, revealing its capitalist recoding as
both a form of property and an image of the social relations that constitute its property
form. In other words, history has been commodified such that historical memory now
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represents an authentic representation of the past. By recognizing history in the
contemporary era as inseparable from the same capitalist mode of production that created
the institution of private property, we can see history—or the specialized knowledge of
the past—as a complicit with the logic of enclosure that separates or divorces the subject
of historical violence from the violent structures of history.
We turn for a moment to Toni Morrison’s Beloved, a novel that bears all the
markings of a trauma text, from the historical violence of slavery to the symptomatic
expressions of individual characters. Through the language of trauma and historical
recovery, it has been variously described as a “trope for recovered history” (Spargo
2002), the “ghostly return” of memory (Bhabha 1994), an invitation for ethical
engagement (Brogan 1998), and a “truth claim” regarding the nature of historical
violence (LaCapra 2001). Each of these descriptions assumes a revelatory logic in which
the hidden meaning of traumatic experience is unearthed through the patient excavation
of history and its narrative reproductions against which the ethical injunction of
postmemory operates. However, in subscribing to this methodology of excavationrevelation, these interpretations maintain a mistaken fidelity to the emancipatory promise
of historical recovery. The recovery of historical memory seems to hold a possibility for
emancipation in the rendering of a universal truth obscured by traumatic repression,
where the psychic operations of traumatic repression are mapped onto the social body in
such a way that history is fully identified with the subjective experience. 76

76

In her remarks on Cathy Caruth’s analysis, Shoshana Felman suggests that Freud was

responsible for the transformation of all history into trauma: “In an exemplary analysis of
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English literature and Latin American scholar Dean Franco provides an
alternative reading of Beloved that situates it in direct relation to capitalism. His
interpretation transcends the paradigm of historical recovery and reconstitutes trauma as
an expression of the loss of property rights, in which property is precisely “where trauma
and material possession meet” (Franco 425). Providing examples from the narrative, like
the theft of Sethe’s milk, which overshadows the trauma of her preceding beating, Franco
argues that the “relationship between bodily trauma and the body as property, mediated
by the language of ‘rights’ and ‘claiming,’ points out the flexibility of concepts like
injury and redress that constitute the broader field within which trauma occurs” (426). In
other words, the language of property mediates a tension between embodied or lived
experiences of violence and the rational structures within which this violent and

Freud’s as yet uncharted legacy of trauma in his last work Moses and Monotheism,
Caruth remarkably, paradigmatically, shows how the book itself—Freud’s testament on
history as trauma—is the site of an inscription of a historical trauma: that of Freud’s
dramatic departure from Vienna, then invaded and annexed by Hitler’s Germany”
(Felman 174). Indeed, though Caruth doesn’t pen this phrase exactly (history as trauma),
in her reading of Freud she asks: “What does it mean, precisely, for history to be the
history of a trauma?” (Caruth 15). Her answer to this question is: “For history to be a
history of trauma means that it is referential precisely to he extent that it is not fully
perceived as it occurs; or to put it somewhat differently, that a history can be grasped
only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence” (18). She concludes with the claim that
“history, like trauma, is never simply one’s own, that history is precisely the way we are
implicated in each other’s traumas” (24). History, in Caruth’s analysis undergoes an
essential transformation; the history of trauma in particular is transformed into history as
trauma in general.
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alienating experience takes place. Trauma becomes a placeholder for the experience of
expropriation.
In Morrison’s novel the relationship between capitalism and trauma is a product
of the history of slavery, which is, not incidentally, deeply entwined with the history of
capitalist expansion. In fact, in Marx’s account of the birth of capitalism slavery is one of
the five forms of extra-economic violence through which the processes of primitive
accumulation take place, the others being conquest, robbery, murder and land enclosure
(Marx 874). While the last provides an exemplary model for Marx’s account of primitive
accumulation, all five are essential to the production of private property and the transition
to capitalism. From this perspective, Beloved can be read as an allegory of primitive
accumulation in which the characters are personifications of the process itself and
traumatic ruptures betray the colonial violence of capitalist accumulation. The privileging
of property relations over psychic experience allows Franco to pose a fundamental
question that remains otherwise buried: “is a psychoanalytically conceived effort of
working-through adequate to the task when the experience of loss is mediated by the
discourse of property?” (Franco 427). Understanding historical violence and its so-called
traumatic effects as the products of a capitalist logic we might reformulate the question
more generally, asking: how does narrative closure in the form of historical recovery, or
as the repossession of an image of the past, endorse the very logic of enclosure upon
which the capitalist mode of production is founded?
Following these observations, this chapter conducts readings of Austerlitz (2001)
and The Rings of Saturn (1995), which place the politics of memory in the context of
capitalist expansion and reproduction. The first section identifies two common
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approaches to Sebald’s work, which I call the affective and the poetic; the former derives
from the perspectives of trauma theory and postmemory and their relationship to
photography and time, and the latter considers the formal elements of the text and their
relationship to world systems and natural history. The second section provides readings
of Austerlitz and The Rings of Saturn that elucidate the dialectic between what I call
telescopic and topographic modes of perception and their relationship to both capitalist
expansion and the natural history of destruction. Specifically, through the dialectic of the
telescopic (a “zooming out” that highlights the abstract space in which time accelerates)
and the topographic (a “zooming in” that highlights the sensuous experience of built
space in which time decelerates), these novels reframe the trauma text as an allegory of
primitive accumulation in which the experience of alienation is reified in material sites of
memory. Instead of serving as a form of “resistance against oblivion” (Arruti 115),
memory in Sebald’s work serves as a poetic medium that registers the generalized
experience of alienation intrinsic to modern capitalism. I argue that Austerlitz in
particular positions the rise of trauma (and its theorization) within a particular history of
perception that is inseparable from the technological developments and forms of
production that accompany the transition to capitalism. I conclude with a reading of
Sebald’s photographs in relation to this new allegorical framework, arguing that the
photographs are not primarily signifiers of rupture but rather serve to further reify the
profound sense of alienation that the recovery of lost memory is meant to redress.

5.1 The Critics’ Perspectives
W.G. Sebald’s writing has spawned an abundance of secondary literature. Stylistically
very similar, his four novels seem to compose a single narrative. In each case, the story is
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relayed by an unnamed narrator whose travels abroad invoke impressions of Goldsmith’s
“citizen of the world” and Baudelaire’s famous “flaneur”;77 in each case, the text is
interspersed with unlabeled black-and-white photographs and contains explicit references
to time and memory. According to Mary Cosgrove, “Sebald is often described as a writer
who endorses the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a historical event.” However, signaling
a mischaracterization, she notes that the despite this attribution the “Holocaust is notably
absent from the account of history’s atrocities in the book” (Cosgrove 110).78 Despite this
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The trope of the itinerant world citizen contained in these historical figures of the

modern cosmopolitan subject is, as Marx pointed out, deeply entwined with the
production of bourgeois capitalism. While the siren call of communism “workers of the
world, unite!” appears to have a specifically cosmopolitan character, in The Communist
Manifesto Marx and Engels claim that “[t]he bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of
the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every
country” (6). Cosmopolitanism, for Marx and Engels, is decidedly dialectical, associated
on the one hand with the rise of bourgeois capitalism, and on the other hand with the
transition to full communism.
78

This observation echoes interpretations of Christian Boltanski’s installation art. In a

footnote in her chapter, “Museums as Political Centers,” she documents two interviews in
which Boltanski claims that his art is not about the Holocaust. In an interview with
Georgia Marsh in 1997, Boltanski states: “My work is really not about the Holocaust, it’s
about death in general, about all of our deaths”; in an interview with Tamar Garb that
same year, he reiterates: “My work is about the fact of dying, but it’s not about the
Holocaust itself…I don’t think [my work] is about Jewish history. I often get this kind of
misunderstanding with my work” (qtd in DeRoo, 219; fn. 17). In her introduction to a
print collection on Boltanski, Catherine Grenier claims that his work will nevertheless
“very quickly be accompanied by the memory of the Shoah” (55). Marianne Hirsch

158

absence, the spectre of the Holocaust looms large in Sebald’s work, as it does in many
memory-related struggles.
Critics generally approach the author’s work from one two perspectives. Informed
by developments in the relatively new field of trauma studies, the first uses concepts like
postmemory and traumatic rupture to consider the ways in which Sebald’s novels
contribute to the study of collective memory and witnessing. As thinkers such as Ulrich
Baer have demonstrated,79 the history of photography intersects sharply with the history
of trauma, and many critics have emphasized this intersection in Sebald’s work. Both
Maya Barzilai and Samuel Pane, for example, associate the photographs in his work with
traumatic rupture. The former argues that not only do they “prompt the retrieval of
memory or verify certain recollections” (206) but they also function as analogons of
traumatic memory that allow “readers to gain, experientially, a sense of the disruptive
effect of the belated return of the past” (207), while the latter argues simply “Sebaldian
photographs disturb” and thus serve as a “locus of trauma” (Pane 38). This disruptive
capacity of the photograph is a common theme in trauma theory. Such claims inevitably
lead us to read the photograph as a symptom whose deciphering will reveal some
transcendental truth. Marianne Hirsch uses Austerlitz to exemplify her concept

would argue that this spectre of the Holocaust in second generation art and literature has
to do with the ways in which it pervades the collective unconscious.
79

I conducted a more in-depth discussion of Ulrich Baer’s observations regarding the

trauma of photography in chapter three, “The Image in Crisis.”
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postmemory, for which photography is a fundamental medium of transmission through
which traumatic knowledge is inherited by the second generation. Concerned with the
appropriation of victims’ memories, Richard Crownshaw uses Sebald’s photographs to
amend rather than extend this concept of postmemory. For him, the mode of
identification endemic to postmemory contains a “colonizing impulse” (Crownshaw 238).
Accordingly, he argues unconvincingly that the photographs in Austerlitz should be read
not as an “ethical relation to the oppressed or persecuted” but rather as an “ethical
intervention in the work of postmemory” that reframes the photographs as “bequeathed”
rather than appropriated. In either case, the photographs maintain their property form.
M.G. Wilson and J.J. Long have separately rejected the photographs’ postmemorial
function outright, arguing that Sebald’s images exceed both the “rhetoric of trauma”
(Wilson 50) and the “question of memory” (Long 5). Wilson goes so far as to suggest
that this rhetoric of “temporal shock” which emphasizes the photographs’ “mnemonic
properties” actually trivializes Sebald’s “radical reconfiguring of time” (Wilson 50).
What are Sebald’s photographs doing if not reflecting the logic of traumatic
rupture? In the previous chapter, I argued that photographs operate both metaphorically
(as a substitute for the lost object) and allegorically (as a reification of the logic of
enclosure), functions that become particularly visible in relation to histories of violence.
Their metaphorical dimension is what compels us to imagine them as mirroring the logic
of trauma. Such an understanding fails to recognize the historical specificity of both the
invention of photography and the generation of trauma. In other words, it is largely
ahistorical. The allegorical dimension is what allows us to read the photograph
dialectically, not by simply reversing the metaphorical aspect but by recognizing its dual

160

nature. In reading the photograph as an allegory of primitive accumulation rather than a
metaphor of traumatic rupture, though, it would be too easy to simply replace the
repressed memory of trauma with the repressed memory of an original accumulation,
however tempting it might be to substitute the lost mother with the forgotten origins of
capitalism. Rather, such a reconceptualization requires us to read the logic of trauma in
relation to the logic of enclosure—or rather, as dialectical reversal of this logic. In both
cases, the photograph is necessarily organized by the principle of the missing original.
Reading photographs as traumatic analogies presents the notion of temporal rupture as
ahistorical—the compulsion to recall and recognize repressed trauma is naturalized; but
reading the photograph allegorically links the production of traumatic experience to the
particular historical epoch in which the violence of enclosure prevails. In either case, the
idea of the original is, as Rebecca Comay argues, a fetish.
The presence of photographs in Sebald’s novels compels a traumatic reading that
is enhanced by the novels’ melancholic tendencies. Freud understood melancholia—that
generalized affect of detachment and indifference—as a pathological form of mourning.
While mourning involves a conscious attempt to assimilate the lost object, for the
melancholic the loss is unconscious (Freud 127). The melancholic responds to the
unknown loss by attempting to repossess the missing object that was never hers to begin
with. Photography intersects with the processes of mourning in its capacity to represent
the lost object. For political dissidents like the Mothers of the Disappeared in Argentina,
this capacity of photography has served as a powerful tool for transforming individual
mourning into collective political resistance. For subsequent generations, however,
photography represents a lost object belonging to another time and place. The transfer of

161

historical grief to the second generation through photography and conceptual art
contributes to a generalized disposition of melancholia that serves as a foundation for
recent theories of postmemory and traumatic inheritance. What such an observation
reveals is the degree to which this melancholic disposition represents an even more
generalized sense of dispossession that emerges at the intersection of the histories of
photography and capitalist expansion. In this vein, Comay refers to melancholia as “a
way of staging a dispossession of that which was never one’s own to lose in the first
place — and thus, precisely by occluding structural lack as determinate loss, would
exemplify the strictly perverse effort to assert a relation with the non-relational” (89;
emphasis added). In the case of historical violence this staging often refers to the
dispossessions of history and memory. However, we could equally argue for its
application to the history of dispossession itself in which the image of dispossession takes
the form of traumatic experience.
The second approach not only focuses more closely on the formal elements of the
text but also recuperates its dialectical constitution. The unrepresentable singularity of
trauma is replaced with the dialectics of natural history. Mary Cosgrove, for example,
argues that Sebald’s prose illuminates the “natural history of capitalism” through
melancholic images, which transcend individual subjectivity and instead present a picture
of “world history as a spatio-temporal whole” (Cosgrove 96). She provides a compelling
analysis of the writer’s penultimate novel, The Rings of Saturn, in which melancholia is
not an individual characteristic but a “basic problem of knowledge and understanding”
(94), “a psychological theory founded on epistemology” (108). Despite the fact that
melancholia appears as an individual characteristic, the narrator—himself one a number
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of “melancholic intellectuals” (94)—attempts to “weave together an epistemological
framework that would somehow capture the interconnectedness of persons, regions and
events across space and time that would explain — more profoundly and truthfully than
chronological historical narrative — the place of mankind in the late twentieth century”
(94). Departing from the traditional perspectives of trauma theory in which melancholia
is linked to “history as repeated catastrophe” (92), Cosgrove argues:
Melancholia in his work is not just a matter for the belatedly born, postmemorial leftover of the second generation. On the contrary, it exceeds the
downbeat mindset of his various narrative figures, transcending the individual
subject to represent a historically informed and challenging discussion on
topics as varied, contemporary and interconnected as global capitalism, the
planet’s weather systems and also genocide. (92)
In The Rings of Saturn, melancholia is thus part of what Cosgrove calls “the new ethical
epistemology” in which the relationship between the natural environment (expressed
through the pulsing of global weather patterns) and the history of war sets the “political
struggle for more land, territory, Lebensraum…hand in hand with the perpetration of
genocide” (110).
Max Pensky also employs the concept of “natural history” in his analysis of
Austerlitz, which to his mind presents a “version of the natural history of ruin” that
disrupts the “stability of the distinction between memory and forgetting” (Pensky 83).
Paraphrasing Adorno, Pensky elaborates the idea of natural history as
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a construction of concepts which like a chemical elective affinity become
volatile in one another’s presence and can, under suitable theoretical
conditions, reverse polarity, such that nature, developed to the point of its
most extreme significance, appears as the saturation of time—that is, as fully
timely, hence historical being—where humanity as a historical phenomenon
in turn appears under the sign of the historical repetition of catastrophe, and
therefore as mythically recursive and static, that is, as nature. (Pensky 66)80
Like Cosgrove, through Sebald Pensky elaborates a spatio-temporal whole in which the
antimony between nature and history is both amplified and subdued. This natural history
performs a “reverse alchemy” by returning the product of capitalism to its primitive
origins.
Neither account directly considers the role of photography in this dialectical
transformation of natural history. And yet, Sebald’s mobilization of the image seems far
from incidental. Jessica Dubow’s comparative study of the “case form” in the works of
W.G. Sebald and Walter Benjamin lends some insight. Departing from the notion of
photography as a “locus of trauma,” she considers how Sebald’s images might contribute
to a “different understanding of historical and temporal process” (Dubow 822). Like
Benjamin’s case studies of the Arcades, Sebald’s case studies of people (the Ashbury’s,
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Note the similarity between Pensky’s reference to the “historical repetition of

catastrophe” and Cosgrove’s “history as repeated catastrophe.” For Jacques Ranciere, this
idea of history and/as catastrophe is profoundly anti-political. For his critique, see
Aesthetics and its Discontents (2007) and The Future of the Image (2009).

164

Casement and Conrad, FitzGerald) and places (Lowen) operate as dialectical images
which drive the “the lure of empathic identification…out of the center of any form”
(825). By “breach[ing] the temporal conditions for remembrance,” she argues, they
demonstrate the “immediate co-presence of politics and time” (833). In “The Sickness of
Tradition: Between Melancholia and Fetishism,” Comay revisits Benjamin’s notion of
the dialectical image, which echoes the traumatic antithesis between loss and restitution
and anticipates the “entwined destinies of melancholia and fetishism” (92) that inform
time’s “peculiar shattering” (95). The dialectical image, says Comay, “betrays utopia
precisely by anticipating or imagining it, and in this flagrant violation of the theological
ban on graven images would fetishistically disavow the alterity it would thereby
acknowledge” (97). The image of totality that ends in redemption obscures the possibility
for a patient excavation of the actual totality that the former obscures. Comay calls this
the “commitment to imaginary unities — the phantasm of the revolutionary collective, of
the golden age, of history itself as the site of specular condensation” (98). The dialectical
image falls short of a natural history in that it necessarily succumbs to the illusion of a
totality that reduces the totalizing system to a condensation of images amalgamated by a
telescopic vision in which the details of the present are reduced to an always already and
a perpetual not-yet—a past on the brink of arrival and a future that has not yet arrived.
This, Comay maintains, accounts for the “peculiar temporality of Benjamin’s
messianism” (101), a messianism that transforms the baser violence of history into the
spectacular image of historical violence.
Benjamin’s dialectical image is a critique of both Hegelian dialectics, in which
the unfolding of Spirit as the progression of historical time is reduced under the

165

conditions of capitalism to the spectacular image of mythic time, and the photographic
image, in which historical time is reified; “the dialectical image [is] a radically new
method for the conduct of a new mode of critical materialist historiography, on the one
hand, and the dialectical image as a part of the description of a radically alternative
conception of time and of historical experience, on the other” (Pensky 179). Benjamin’s
invention of the dialectical image is closely related to his study of allegory. In The
Origins of German Tragic Drama Benjamin argues that allegory in seventeenth century
baroque aesthetics was wrongly equated with the symbol. Transforming the synchronic
nature of the symbol into the dialectical temporality of allegory, he states: “Whereas in
the symbol, with the transformation of the deceased the transfigured face of nature is
fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption, in allegory the facies hippocratica of
history lies before the eyes of the observer as a stiffened, primal landscape. Everything
about history that, from the very beginning, has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful,
is expressed as a face—or rather in a death’s head” (Benjamin, Origins 166). Reifications
of the symbolic become dynamically animate in the allegory, which responds to the very
liquidation of tradition that initiates the decline of the aura in the era of commodity
production. As novelty in the nineteenth century replaces allegory in the canon of
dialectical images (Arcades 11), the commodity takes the place of “the allegorical mode
of apprehension” (Selected 188). The commodity inverts allegory, reduces dialectics to
the symbolic, mythologizes historical time.

5.2 The Dialectics of Time and Space
A number of critics have noted the significance of time in Sebald’s narratives and its
relationship to textual poetics. Ben Hutchinson describes Sebald’s prose as a “poetics of
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slowing down” (Hutchinson qtd. in Simine 26), which Amir Eshel identifies as the
“poetic deceleration” that structures Sebald’s “polemic against time” (Eshel 94). Sebald’s
work is remarkable, Eshel claims, precisely “because of the ways in which the narrative
organizes and reconceives temporality” (90). While the question of time is broached in
each of Sebald’s novels, it is addressed most explicitly in the author’s final novel. Thus,
we begin with an analysis of the dialectic of time in Austerlitz (2001), which is, in many
ways, the most explicit and perfected version of what Jens Brockmeier calls the author’s
“modernist experimentation with memory and time” (347). Distinguishing between
“story time” and “discourse time” (357), Brockmeier identifies Sebald’s treatment of time
as one of the three reasons Austerlitz perplexes: “It not only rejects the ideas that our
minds can reliably distinguish what is past and what is present…It also defies notions of
chronology, sequentiality, and linearity…[and] dissolves the Newtonian idea of time
altogether” (348). For Dubow, the interruptions of ordinary—one might say, historical—
time allow for the illumination of what she calls the “materialities of history” (824).
Austerlitz is the haunting and enchanting tale of Jacques Austerlitz as told by an
anonymous narrator who befriends the architectural scholar and fellow ambler over a
number of years through a series of chance encounters abroad. The story begins with the
narrator’s account of his visits to Belgium during which he first encounters Austerlitz in
Antwerp Centraal Station clad in “heavy walking boots and workman’s trousers” but set
apart from other travellers in his preoccupation with “making notes and sketches” (Sebald
7). Already, Austerlitz portrays a non-synchronous temporality with respect to the
mindless bustle of the train station. Curious, our narrator approaches with a query about
the historian’s interest in the building, and Austerlitz answers (we are told) “without
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hesitation” (8). This would be the first in their series of “Antwerp conversations,” which
continue to articulate the topographic temporality of what Lefebvre (among others) has
termed “the everyday” with the telescopic logic of historical time. The scene illuminates
the conflicting temporalities of concrete and abstract time. A woman “whose peroxideblond hair was piled high into a sort of bird’s nest” and whom Austerlitz refers to as the
“goddess of time past,” passes beneath a “mighty clock” (8), the station beacon, which, as
Austerlitz explains, represents the standardized time that assumed its throne in the midnineteenth century and to whose demands weary travellers continue to oblige. At the
same time, our narrator remarks on the eternal time experienced in the intermittent
silences of their conversation, which contrasts starkly with the rapidly condensed
temporality of Antwerp station’s history as relayed by Austerlitz—its relation to
Belgium’s colonial expansion under King Leopold, the Roman inspiration of its image as
a “cathedral consecrated to traffic and trade” (10), and its capitalist symbolism, whose
apex is “the heraldic motif of the beehive,” a symbol standing not for the socialist ideals
of a serviceable nature, or labour as social good, but for the very “principle of capital
accumulation” (12). This initial scene encapsulates the ensuing tensions between
(historical) progression and (capital) accumulation that constitute the structure of the
remaining narrative.
Beyond Austerlitz’s initial allusions to the standardization of time in nineteenthcentury railway travel, specific points are often set in relation to the technologies of
observation. One reference stands out in particular: as narrator and protagonist gaze
through telescopes atop the Royal Observatory in Greenwich Park, Austerlitz initiates an
extended meditation on the nature of time, which begins:
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Time . . . was by far the most artificial of all our inventions, and in being
bound to the planet turning on its own axis was no less arbitrary than would,
say, a calculation based on the growth of trees, or the duration required for a
piece of limestone to disintegrate, quite apart from the fact that the solar day
which we take as our guideline does not provide any precise measurement, so
that in order to reckon time we have to devise an imaginary, average sun
which has an invariable speed of movement and does not incline towards the
equator in its orbit. (Sebald 100)
In this passage, Austerlitz reveals even the cyclical time of nature is contrived,
supposedly grounded in an immaterial invention anchored in the most abstract elements
of mathematics and astronomy. The new capacity to create precise measurements of the
passage of time was in many senses an effect of the telescopic vision of time that had
been “spreading out over everything” since the invention of the telescope in the early
1600s. Austerlitz points out the potential fallaciousness of this view of time, asking:
“[c]ould we not claim . . . that time itself has been nonconcurrent over the centuries and
millennia?” (100). Remarking on the continued unevenness of historical time in the age
of global capital, he queries further: “Is not human life in many parts of the earth
governed to this day less by time than by the weather, and thus by an unquantifiable
dimension which disregards linear regularity, does not progress constantly forward but
moves in eddies, is marked by episodes of congestion and irruption, recurs in everchanging form, and evolves in no one knows what direction?” (100-01)
Cosgrove’s reading of The Rings of Saturn points toward a tension between the
telescopic and the topographic. In her analysis, she argues that “historical understanding
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is also continually presented as a problem of visual perspective” (Cosgrove 107). To be
sure, the problem of perspective looms large in this novel. We begin with a famous
painting by Durer: The Anatomy Lesson, accompanied by an image of the narrator’s
memory of Janine, a fellow melancholic, amidst her piles of disorderly papers. Janine, he
recalls, “resembled the angel of Durer’s Melancholia, steadfast among the instruments of
destruction” (Sebald RS 9). Janine, we are told, had introduced him to Sir Thomas
Browne, a 17th century doctor “who saw our world as a shadow image of another one far
beyond” who looked on things with “the eye of an outsider” (18). Born the son of a silk
merchant in 1605, Browne was present alongside Rene Descartes at this dissection of a
petty thief, “which Rembrandt depicted in his painting of the Guild of Surgeons” (12).
This anatomy lesson has a literal twist. As our narrator observes, the incised arm, which
he calls “the offending hand,” is “anatomically the wrong way round” (16). This is not
the mistake of an amateur; rather, “what we are faced with is a transposition taken from
the anatomical atlas, evidently without further reflection, that turns this otherwise true-tolife painting (if one may so express it) into a crass misrepresentation at the exact center
point of its meaning, where the incisions are made” (16-7). We are faced with a
“deliberate flaw” that reveals the painter’s identification with the victim. Cosgrove reconceives this “empathy with the criminal” (as it is conveyed by Sebald) rather as a
defiance of Cartesian rationality—as a problem of the relationship between seeing and
knowing.81
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This problem of the relationship of seeing and knowing is central to trauma theory as

well. For both Caruth and Baer, the failure to see in time corresponds with a belated
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The antagonism between vision and knowledge intensifies in his penultimate
novel. The Rings of Saturn begins with a view from the hospital window, a perspective
from which the “familiar city” becomes an “utterly alien place,” “as if I were looking
down [remarks the narrator] from a cliff upon a sea of stone or a field of rubble (Sebald
RS 5). Later, compelled by the fate of the sand martins, who seem to vanish beneath his
feet, our narrator follows their descent to the edge a cliff from which vantage point he
encounters a disturbing vision: below him a naked couple appears from a distance to be
“some great [misshapen] mollusc washed ashore…a many-limbed, two-headed monster
that had drifted in from far out at sea” (68). At another point, observing Ruisdael’s
paintings, he remarks, “[t]he truth is of course that Ruisdael did not take up a position on
the dunes in order to paint; his vantage point was an imaginary position some distance
above the earth” (83). As in Austerlitz, these heightened vantage points are often
accompanied by a number of blind spots that seem to follow from a history of
destruction—the account of his view from the hospital, for example, is preceded by the
description of a “single, blind, insensate spot” that follows a “confront[ation] with the
traces of destruction, reaching far back into the past” (3); the German-born writer
Michael Hamburger’s reflections on his lost homeland as a “darkened background with a
grey smudge in it” are interpreted by our travelling narrator as a “blind spot…a vestigial
of the ruins through which [he] wandered in 1947 when [he] returned to [his] native city

representation or knowledge of the traumatic event. In Caruth’s words, “the most direct
seeing” produces an “absolute inability to know” which must paradoxically “take the
form of belatedness” (Caruth 92).
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for the first time to search for traces of the life [he] had lost” (178). Condensing the
anxiety of these blind spots, the narrator concludes with a mediation on flight, stating that
from the air we can see the things we have made but not the people who made and inhabit
them (91): “If we view ourselves from a great height, it is frightening to realize how little
we know about our species” (92).
Cosgrove elaborates Sebald’s skillful rendering of the “particular temporal quality
of capitalism,” the ways in which “‘capitalist time’ operates in terms of trends and cycles
which ebb and flow, contract and expand” (Cosgrove 103). For this reason, she argues,
Sebald’s descriptions of the ruins of nineteenth-century capitalism, “while melancholy in
tone, should be read as an informed, if poetically rendered critique of the capitalist world
system, not just as it was in the past, but as it continues in the present” (103). Time, in
this context, is represented as “a natural history of capitalism which has its roots in the
early sixteenth century and which continues to expand in the present” (103). Such claims
are resonant with contemporary theories of primitive accumulation,82 which emphasize
the continuous nature of what Karl Marx defined as the particular mode of extraeconomic violence that separates the worker from the means of production through
genocidal and annihilating actions. Despite the fact that primitive accumulation is, for
Marx, a historical event that identifies the “original” accumulation necessary to establish
the capitalist mode of production, Marxist theorists at least since Rosa Luxemburg have
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referred to its qualities of permanence and repetition. Marx himself alludes to the
perpetual nature of primitive accumulation when he states that the capitalist relation “not
only maintains this [initial] separation [of the worker and the means of production], but
reproduces it on a constantly extending scale” (Marx 874). The initial separation of the
worker from the means of production is maintained through the invention of standardized
time through which the time of production that characterizes abstract historical time is
divorced from the time of survival, which is dictated by the natural rhythms and cycles of
everyday existence.
We are reminded here of Guy Debord’s analysis of the time of capitalism in
Society of the Spectacle. “With the development of capitalism,” he argues, “irreversible
time has become globally unified.” The production of historical time, says Debord, is the
“victory of the bourgeoisie,” whose liberation of labour time from the cyclical time of the
agrarian mode of production contributed to a new form of historical life in which
“irreversible time”—that is, the time of those who rule—was transformed into the neverending pursuit of knowledge. Historical time has become the universalized form assumed
by irreversible time within the capitalist mode of production. This marked the end of the
old order in which knowledge was “carried on only by the living” and the death of the
ritual practices and living traditions associated with cyclical time. The hegemony of
historical time eliminates lived time through the production of spectacular time: the time
spent consuming images (television) and the image of the consumption of time (tourism).
In the Situationist model, “Cyclical time was the really lived time of unchanging
illusions. Spectacular time is the illusory lived time of a constantly changing reality”
(Debord 51). Here the commodity form of the spectacle—the inversion of life itself—
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merges with the reign of historical time in which “life is presented as an immense
accumulation of spectacles” (1). The realm of social relations becomes indistinguishable
from the realm of appearances.
In Debord’s account, the transformation of time enjoys a specific relation to the
life of the image. In Austerlitz this relationship is depicted as a traumatic turn. During this
second unexpected encounter in 1996, in which the first signs of trauma begin to surface,
questions of sight and blindness are inlaid within the historical progression of time.
Shortly following the narrator’s brief encounter with chorioretinopathy—in which a
“bubble suffused by clear liquid formed on the macula” causing a “gray area” that
partially obscured the field of vision, leaving only the periphery in focus, a condition he
initially mistook for “merely hysterical weakness”—he rediscovers Austerlitz at “the
edge of an agitated crowd” of gold miners at the Great Eastern Hotel on Liverpool Street
(Sebald A 35-38). Despite a twenty-year hiatus, the conversation resumes as if no time
had passed; Austerlitz continues where he left off, the narrator tells us, “without wasting
any words on the coincidence of our meeting again after all this time” (41). For the next
85 pages or so, visual motifs articulate lengthy taxonomic descriptions of the contents of
various architectural landmarks: the Great Eastern Hotel with its “cool labyrinth for the
storage of Rhine wines” and elaborate “fish section, where perch, pike, plaice, sole, and
eels lay heaped on black slate slabs” (43); Stower Grange private school for boys with its
“curious collection of oddities, most of them over sixty or suffering from some affliction”
(59); and Andromeda Lodge, whose transformation “into a kind of natural history
museum had begun in 1869, when Gerald’s parrot-collecting ancestor made the
acquaintance of Charles Darwin” (83). Meanwhile, questions of the visual arise in the
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story of Evan the cobbler who had a “reputation for seeing ghosts” (53), old photographs
which resemble “shadows of reality” that emerge “as memories do in the middle of the
night” (77), and a tale concerning the main resident of Iver Grove estate, “who suffered
from insomnia and withdrew into the observatory he had built at the top of the house to
devote himself to various astronomical studies” (Cosgrove 104). Even The Rings of
Saturn harbours a number of “blind spots” (108).
At this point, we encounter a shift in the narrative, both conceptual and temporal.
If the first half elaborates the protagonist’s accumulation of architectural knowledge, the
second is marked by the return of traumatic memory. Like the “philanthropic
entrepreneurs,” whose “vision of model towns for workers . . . had inadvertently changed
into the practice of accommodating them in barracks,” Austerlitz’s “best-laid plans . . .
turn into the exact opposite when they are put into practice” (Sebald A 28). Taxonomic
descriptions are replaced with photographic observations. Rational observation is
displaced by “nocturnal apparition” (165). His initially pedantic tone attains a more
harried and anxious quality. Linking the onset of his decline to the accidental death of a
close schoolmate named Gerald, whose passion for flying led him not only to study
astronomy but to perish in an unfortunate but not altogether surprising plane crash,
Austerlitz begins to convey more personal details of his past in his telling of the search
for his lost origins. Before this point, he explains, it had “never occurred to [him] to
wonder about [his] true origins” (125), despite the fact that as a young student he had
discovered his birth name was not Dafydd Elias but Jacques Austerlitz. The recovery of
lost memory becomes an obsession replacing the perpetual accumulation of architectural
knowledge, which, he explains, “served as a substitute for compensatory memory” (140).
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At first glance, this turn to traumatic memory seems to endorse the disruptive
temporality of trauma that marks ours as a culture of catastrophe and crisis. However,
despite the fact that Austerlitz has all the markings of a traditional trauma text, including
photographic interruptions, railway symbolism and ghostly returns, it departs from
contemporary theories of trauma that conceptualize it primarily in terms of temporal
rupture. Rather, traumatic memory in Austerlitz serves as a poetic device that signals a
shift in the field of modern subjectivity from the melancholic subject of the modern era to
the traumatized subject of so-called postmodern times. Accordingly, Sebald presents an
image of historical progress that is out of sync with the material forces of capitalism
which yield historical atrocity; he exposes a tension between the uneven temporality of
capitalist accumulation and the abstract progression of history, a tension represented by
the contrast between the technologies of observation responsible for the compression of
space and extension of time, and technologies of transportation responsible for the
extension of space and the compression of time. These opposing branches of
technological advancement represent the opposing axes of capitalist accumulation—
which I am calling the telescopic and the topographic—whose disarticulation further
represents the alienating experience reflected in the temporal ruptures and visual aporias
that characterize the contemporary landscape of trauma.
Austerlitz’s eventual breakdown in 1992 is preceded by the loss of his capacity
for language, a common symptom of traumatic repression. Austerlitz explains: “But now
I found writing such hard going that it often took me a whole day to compose a single
sentence” (Sebald A 122), which in the end only comes to resemble a city whose
confusing urban sprawl disorients returning travellers (124). In a Lacanian sense, the
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withdrawal from language signals a retreat from the discourse of mastery. However, the
retreat from language is accompanied by a new impulse, the recovery of the mother.
Not surprisingly, Marianne Hirsch interprets Austerlitz’s search for his mother’s
image through the lens of traumatic memory, arguing that the fantasy of the mother’s
recovery operates as a screen memory that highlights the roles of photography and family
in postmemorial work. These two mediums converge in the figure of the lost mother.
This image serves a “space of projection” that draws on a storehouse of what Aby
Warburg has called “pre-established forms,” which resonate in the popular imagination.
For Hirsch, the figure of the lost mother is one such pre-established form through which
“gender becomes a powerful idiom of remembrance in the face of detachment and
forgetting” (124). In this model, the image of the lost mother becomes a screen for the
remembrance of historical trauma, and familial images act as protective covers that
“reinforce the living connection between past and present” (125). These claims rest on a
number of assumptions implicit in Hirsch’s argument. First, the desire to maintain a
“sense of living connection” is taken for granted and thus not critically interrogated;
second, Hirsch assumes that the recovery of traumatic memory is what is covered over by
the search for the lost mother, which fails to address the broader structures driving the
recovery of memory in general.
The notion of the screen memory itself remains within the field of the imaginary
with one image ostensibly substituting for another more accurate image. If we remind
ourselves, however, that Marx identified genocidal violence with the processes of
primitive accumulation, then we must immediately acknowledge the fact that our current
obsession with the recovery of memory has something to with the capitalist mode of
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production. Austerlitz recounts his history instructor’s assertion that “[o]ur concern with
history . . . is a concern with preformed images already imprinted on our brains, images at
which we keep staring while the truth lies elsewhere, away from it all, as yet
undiscovered” (Sebald A 72). Read along this claim, the image of the mother and the
trope of recovered memory equally operate as “preformed images” that correspond to the
historical time of capital. From this perspective, the image of the mother must be
interpreted as a mode of reification that conceals, not a truer or more authentic memory,
but the forces of alienation that correspond to the historical time of primitive
accumulation. This becomes particularly explicit when we consider the role of time in
Austerlitz’s search for his mother’s image. Austerlitz commissions a slow-motion copy of
a film fragment in which he hopes to discover his mother (246), while, at the same time,
he experiences the “current of time slowing down in the gravitational field of oblivion”
(257) during his nocturnal wanderings. This new experience of time, and not the recovery
of lost memory, is what Austerlitz discovers in the search for his mother’s image. The
recovery of memory itself does little to change the violent material forces that contributed
to Austerlitz’s sense of alienation, which is placed under the sign of traumatic memory.
Indeed, he states:
It was obviously of little use that I had discovered the sources of my distress
and, looking back over all the past years, could now see myself with the
utmost clarity as that child suddenly cast out of his familiar surroundings:
reason was powerless against the sense of rejection and annihilation which I
had always suppressed, and which was now breaking through the walls of its
confinement. (228)
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A feeling of alienation underlies Austerlitz’s distress and threatens, but does not quite
succeed, in rupturing his erudite exterior.
The Antwerp conversations in Austerlitz, we might say, expose or make visible a
specific historical period we might call the epoch of trauma. Indeed, it is not insignificant
that our narrator first encounters Austerlitz in Antwerp Central Station in 1967, the very
same year Michel Fried issued his critique of Minimalism, Roland Barthes proclaimed
the “death of the author,” and Guy Debord published his manifesto Society of the
Spectacle. It is equally significant that these conversations end in 1996, the same year
Cathy Caruth published Unclaimed Experience. This period, from 1967 to 1996,
corresponds precisely to the time that elapsed between the emergence of two types of
subject. The first, emerging in 1967, is the Minimalist subject of art, which Rosalind
Krauss argues anticipates the disembodied, fragmented, postmodern subject. The second,
emerging in 1996, is the traumatized subject of the aesthetic turn, which, according to
Radstone, attempts to reclaim the autonomy of the subject that was dissolved by
poststructuralism by reasserting what Ruth Leys calls the “sovereign, if passive” subject
(Radstone 14).
Recall the initial conversation in 1967, which takes us on a swift journey through
the sweeping history of Antwerp station, situating it within the crumbling façades of
nineteenth-century architecture, with Austerlitz moving deftly between broad historical
contexts, general architectural trends and particular biographical details (Sebald A 7-12).
The narrator comments on the astuteness of Austerlitz’s communications, marveling at
his ability to form “perfectly balanced sentences out of whatever occurred to him, so to
speak, and the way in which, in his mind, the passing on of his knowledge seemed to
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become a gradual approach to a kind of historical metaphysic, bringing remembered
events back to life” (13). In this informal architectural lecture, Austerlitz not only speaks
of the relationship between capitalist accumulation and the standardization of time, but of
the “marks of pain which…trace countless fine lines through history” (14). Crownshaw
argues: “In 1967, [Austerlitz’s] sense of history replicates the very monumentalism (or
forgetfulness) of the buildings he studies” (Crownshaw, n. pag.). Already, the Antwerp
conversations draw an implicit connection between the fantasy of historical progress and
the emergent subject of trauma. The Austerlitz of 1967 is a mouthpiece for historical
progress and accumulated knowledge. From the perspective of trauma theory, his
architectural knowledge is a screen that covers over or represses the memory of a
historical trauma that he will eventually discover as the source of his discontent.
However, from the perspective of capitalist accumulation, Austerlitz’s historical
knowledge represents the utopian image of a complete historical archive that drives the
narrative of historical progress made possible with the invention of standardized time.
From this perspective, Austerlitz’s eventual breakdown and the ensuing search for his
own origins allegorize the experience of alienation particular to the temporality of
capitalist accumulation.
Beginning with the fact of global capitalism, Austerlitz provides a vehicle for reconceptualizing trauma as the reification of alienation under the sign of historical time.
Such a reading reconfigures the trauma text as an allegory of primitive accumulation
through which the most extreme forms of alienation take shape in dialectic between the
telescopic and the topographic, the linear and the cyclic, the metaphoric and the
metonymic, the allegory and the narrative. In retreating from the common conception of
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trauma as primarily a rupture in time that reveals the hegemony of “homogenous, empty
time” and drives the quest for the search for lost origins and the recovery of memory, the
view provided by Austerlitz captures the ways in which trauma is a normative element of
capitalist subjectivity that cannot be consigned to the past, but which must be
continuously reproduced in the present moment on an ever-expanding scale. In this sense,
traumatic memory is not only a reflection of historical trauma (primitive accumulation as
historical event) but also, more importantly, a permanent aspect of the forces of capitalist
production (primitive accumulation as permanent process). In “Historical Temporalities
of Capital,” Massimiliano Tomba argues: “To understand the permanence of primitive
accumulation we need a kind of ‘historiography of the present’ that would allow us to
understand the current combination of temporalities in the attempt to synchronize them
through the intervention of extra-economic violence” (Tomba 56). Austerlitz responds to
just such a call.

5.3 Conclusion
In his novels, Sebald presents the ongoing violence of capitalist accumulation as a
problem of perspective. In doing so, he traces the inception of a new order in which the
relics of a previous order become the raw material for capital’s ongoing engulfment of
new territory. This tension is already present in the metaphor of fortification, which
depicts the disjuncture between a certain vision of progress and its material execution.
Telescopic vision is overdetermined; and yet, bird’s-eye-views abound. The content
always outruns its form. The problem of perspective is emphasized not only through the
failures of fortification, however, or the uncomfortable encounter with Durer’s offending
hand, but also through a series of Archimedean perspectives that might have been
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impossible without the invention of the telescope, and eventually flight. Paradoxically,
the obverse of this heightened vision is a contracted knowledge. Hannah Arendt
recognized this when she granted extraordinary weight to the invention of the telescope,
which accompanied the discovery of America and the Reformation in ushering in the
modern age yet went largely unrecognized in the series of “great events” (Arendt 248-9);
however, if we could measure the momentum of history as we measure natural
processes, we might find that what originally had the least noticeable impact,
man’s first tentative steps toward the discovery of the universe, has constantly
increased in momentousness as well as speed until it has eclipsed not only the
enlargement of the earth’s surface, which found its final limitation only in the
limitations of the globe itself, but also the still apparently limitless economic
accumulation process. (250)
Not only did it usher in a prolonged era of Cartesian doubt established by the
internalization of the Archimedean point (284), it singlehandedly “set the stage for an
entirely new world and determined the course of other events” (258), not the least of
which was the ensuing series of expropriations that “did not simply result in new property
or lead to a new redistribution of wealth, but were fed back into the process to generate
further expropriations, greater productivity, and more appropriation” (255). Despite her
materialist account of historical change—“It was not reason but a man-made instrument,
the telescope, which actually changed the physical world view” (274)—Arendt was
compelled to claim (however problematically) that this is why “[w]orld-alienation, and
not self-alienation as Marx thought, has been the hallmark of the modern age” (254).
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What becomes increasingly clear at this point is the degree to which the
phenomenon of distance induced by the technological discovery of an actually existing
Archimedean point (anticipated by the invention of linear perspective that allowed for the
painter’s “imaginary position some distance above the earth” almost two centuries prior)
contributes to the paradoxical enclosures of knowledge that accompany its very
expansion. It is well known that Benjamin named this phenomenon of sublime distance
“the aura,” and linked it to the invention of photography whose combined qualities of
scope and seriality anticipated the very “shrinkage [of the earth] which comes about
through the surveying capacity of the human mind, whose use of numbers, symbols, and
models can condense and scale earthly physical distance down to the size of the human
body’s natural sense and understanding…was the consequence of the invention of the
airplane, that is, [of the capacity to leave] the surface of the earth altogether” (Arendt
251). However, while the invention of the telescope had the effect of concretizing the
previously imaginary Archimedean point by inserting a vision of the universe into
individual subjects, photography was responsible for its mobilization and transformation
into the cosmopolitan ideal of empathic identification. Through the illusion of
transparency, the photograph masquerades as the authentic image of a new order, one that
claims to escape the painterly desire to misrepresent the offending hand by representing
things as they “actually were.” This photographic fallacy is what leads to its
misrepresentation as a harbinger of traumatic rupture. It is also precisely what hides the
fact that the decline of the aura is not only an effect of its production but is linked to the
false perception that the problem of distance (both geographical and temporal) that
structures traumatic loss can be overcome by photographic circulation of memory, which
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carries an ethical potential to overcome our conditions of alienation by re-establishing the
broken social bond.
Photographs in Sebald’s work should be read not as signifiers of traumatic rupture
or repressed memory but as material extensions of the text’s allegorical frame. In his
analysis of the revival of allegory in relation to site-specific art, Craig Owens argues that
the mythical content of site-specific work is preserved in photographs, which not only
reveals the preservationist essence of the photographic form but also “suggests the
allegorical potential of photography” (71). Thus, it is the desire for preservation itself and
not the represented content that is the subject of all photographic images. At the same
time, Owens detects an “allegorical motive in photomontage” (72), a practice common to
not only site-specific art but various forms of contemporary literature, including the
novels of W.G. Sebald. Despite its clear presence in the work of Kafka and Borges and,
even earlier, Courbet and Baudelaire, allegory has been construed as antithetical to not
only art in particular (67) but modernity in general (76). On either side of the modernist
project, its metaphorical nature has reduced it to Romanticist fantasy and its meta-textual
aspect to a postmodern utopia. Not surprisingly, photography and allegory share a similar
impulse, “to rescue from historical oblivion that which threatens to disappear” (68). Both
allegory and photography, it seems, have much in common with the outsize buildings
created with an eye for their eventual destruction. The preservationist impulse contained
within these monumental structures is at once the knowledge of their inevitable ruin.
In the novels of W.G. Sebald (and other so-called postmemorial works), what
threatens to disappear is a particularly idealized image of the past based on the fantasy of
a lost social bond reified in the figure of the mother. Thus, while memory scholars
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conceive memory as a contemporary site of resistance to social amnesia and capitalist
oblivion, Sebald’s writing situates memory within a poetic structure that reveals its
normative function in the production of modern subjectivity. Paradoxically, memory (and
photography) simultaneously resists the destruction of historical knowledge while
reproducing the preservationist impulse underlying the history of enclosure. Thus, the reappropriation of material sites of historical violence that has become a central strategy of
resistant memory movements, exemplified by the global proliferation of site-specific
memory museums, has inevitably contributed to the rise of atrocity or trauma tourism83.
The commodification of memory inherent in this process is further facilitated by the
spreading out of time in space and the attendant reification of the past through the
production of “tourist landscapes” (Boyarin 19). Reading Sebald’s novels allegorically
allows us to see the ways in which the politics of memory both resists and reflects the
series of violent material and epistemic separations endemic to the ongoing expansion of
capitalism. Under the guise of historical recovery, images of the past reified in the ruins
of historical violence catalyze their transformation into contemporary sites of primitive
accumulation.
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Laurie Beth Clark defines “trauma tourism” as “the global practices of visiting memory

sites,” which are “sites so marked by trauma that they cannot be fully recuperated for
normal quotidian use” (65-66).
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Postscript
Beyond Recovery: Preservationist Aesthetics and the Logic
of Gender

Forgetting the old is a necessary aspect of any revolutionary transformation.
—Nicolas Holm

New cultures of memory exemplify the promotion and naturalization of the ideology of
preservation through specific aesthetic avenues and practices; I name this overall process
the preservationist aesthetic. This aesthetic has a dual function: on the one hand, it
recovers and preserves those aspects of cultural heritage and history that have been
threatened with erasure by the innovations of capitalist production; on the other hand, it
produces new spheres of enclosure by colonizing those spheres previously excluded from
the production of capital. We are faced, then, with a paradox: in defending against the
threat of erasure or obsolescence, preservationist aesthetics contribute to the creation of
new spheres of colonization and enclosure. Within the realm of memory politics this is
expressed as an impasse between the call to remember (which resists the capitalist drive
toward obsolescence) and the call to forget (which recognizes the conservative aspect of
memory in the capitalist context).
The impasse between these two imperatives is exemplified by the following two
accounts. On the one hand, thinkers like Nicolas Holm argue against the widespread
veneration of memory as a vehicle for political resistance that we must renew the
revolutionary aspects of forgetting. In his analysis of contemporary “archives of
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resistance” (such as Brodsky’s and Jaar’s), Holm explains that contrary to popular belief
remembering does not ensure that history will not repeat itself (as Adorno had hoped).
According to Holm, resistant (memory) archives reproduce the logic of capitalism, while
forgetting “offers a way to think through the current impasse of capitalism as the horizon
of all thought” (2). On the other hand, we have both historical and contemporary thinkers
who argue precisely the opposite. Theodor Adorno famously equated forgetting with
commodification and, more recently, Andreas Huyssen has argued that “the call to forget
memory just reproduces the industry’s own fast-paced mechanism of declaring
obsolescence. And it fails to give us a plausible explanation for the obsession with
memory itself as a significant symptom of our cultural present” (Huyssen 3). The tension
between memory and forgetting is present in Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the
Philosophy of History,” which Boyarin points out “attempted to articulate memory as a
resources for political action” (Boyarin 26). Asserting that “the past was a material
resource—in Marxist terms, perhaps ‘the means of imagination’—control of which was a
key aspect of class struggle” (26), not surprisingly Benjamin advocated a temporallybased “politics of ‘amnestic solidarity’” (Boyarin 26). And yet contemporary writers such
as Andrew Witt maintain that urban gentrification projects must be understood as a kind
of “conservative amnesia.”
Jay Winter answers Andreas Huyssen’s question of why memory cultures are
such a significant aspect of our current social and political landscape with the claim that
their proliferation is a result of an increase in disposable income and leisure time
following WWII. Memory, in this sense, is not a response to trauma as much as it is a
cultural commodity among many designed to stave off middle-class ennui. Klein’s
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account of the rise and fall of memory in the twentieth century, however, seems to
contradict this claim and even posit the opposite. He explains that following the
publication of Frederick Bartlett’s Remembering in 1932 “[m]emory grew increasingly
marginal, [and] in 1964 The Dictionary of the Social Sciences claimed the word verged
on extinction” (131); by 1976 it was entirely absent from Raymond Williams’ Keywords
only to resurface in full force nearly a decade later. This re-birth in the late 80s and early
90s marked its transformation into a “structural rather than individual phenomenon”
(131). As we know, the current economic downturn, which peaked with the global
financial crisis of 2008, began with the oil crisis of 1973 (the same year as Pinochet’s
coup) and the subsequent neoliberalization of the global economy in the 1980s
(beginning, arguably, with Pinochet’s economic reforms). Cultures of memory seem to
develop in the wake of economic recession. Without presupposing a purely economic
foundation, it is nevertheless clear that memory’s rise to prominence at this particular
historical moment is not unrelated to shifts in the global marketplace.
Recognizing a link between economic flux and the rise of memory,
Preservationist Aesthetics has explored the relationship between the call to remember and
the expansion of capitalism from the perspective of primitive accumulation, arguing that
memory movements reflect a series of new enclosures that have been underway since the
1970s. Contemporary Marxists have demonstrated the ongoing nature of primitive
accumulation; its relationship to debt, homelessness and socialist collapse; and its current
operation in five main spheres (noted above)—to which I added a sixth: the enclosures of
common knowledge. The persistence of the museum as a site of political struggle
exemplifies the relationship between epistemic (knowledge-based) and material (land-
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based) enclosures. Memory museums in particular reveal the ways in which the call to
remember is inflected with the very logic of preservation guiding current forms of
environmental activism and ecological preservation, as well as the large-scale urban
renewal projects that have been underway since the 1950s. Accordingly, in my
dissertation I argued that global memory movements are complicit with the new global
enclosures signified by the recent housing and debt crises. Given the fact that Marxist
feminists such as Silvia Federici have placed the expropriation of women’s bodies
(homologous to the expropriation of nature) at the center the ongoing processes of
primitive accumulation, making the logic of capital accumulation inseparable from forms
of gendered repression and exploitation, we would be wise, in closing, to reconsider the
relationship between preservationist aesthetics and the logic of gender beginning with the
relationship between memory and primitive accumulation. Ultimately, this final analysis
will lead to a closing proposition regarding the use of the commons as a testing ground
for a feminist politics of the twenty-first century. Accordingly, we must ask: Can the idea
of the commons serve as a cosmopolitan ideal with a material existence? Can it serve as a
framework for a dialectical ecofeminism that resists the conflation and fetishization of
Woman and Nature? Most importantly, can the commons serve as a unifying principle
and theoretical framework for a materialist feminist politics today?
In the first chapter, entitled “The Paradox of Preservation,” I discussed Federici’s
analysis of the European witch-hunts in which she reframes the mass slaughter of women
explicitly in terms of the expropriation of women’s bodies and implicitly in terms of the
erasure of women’s specialized body of reproductive knowledge. This
reconceptualization highlights two aspects of the relationship between gender and
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primitive accumulation central to both feminist and memory politics: the alienation of the
body and the subjugation of knowledge. Memory theorists’ responses to the repression of
historical trauma indirectly address these forms of enclosure with reversals of the
dominant logic in the form of embodiment and the recuperation of repressed knowledge.
In her theory of postmemory, for example, Marianne Hirsch argues that second
generation representations of historical trauma strive to “reactivate and reembody more
distant social/national and archival/cultural memorial structures by reinvesting them with
individual forms of mediation and aesthetic expression” (111). Alison Landsberg’s theory
of prosthetic memory similarly privileges embodied transmission, arguing that the
installation of traumatic memory in those at a generational remove creates living
memories based on embodied transference that might lead to a “radical politics of
empathy,” which “recognizes the alterity of identification” (82). Embodiment in both of
these cases is linked to the recuperation of repressed knowledge, forms of knowledge
ostensibly stored in the body and transmitted in symptomatic terms.
Influenced by Freud’s discovery of traumatic repression, a discovery that
emphasized the symptomatic and embodied constitution of repressed memory (first
conceived through the observation of female hysterics), these theories of memory contain
an implicit gender dimension, one that after the deconstructive turn severed feminist
politics from its material history. As a result, the concepts of post- and prosthetic memory
rest on three interrelated assumptions: 1) embodied knowledge bears greater authenticity
and has greater access to truth than “disembodied” historical knowledge; 2) a “sense of
living connection” (Hirsch) or living memory (Landsberg) provides an ethical and
political foundation based on affective identification; and 3) the “‘guardianship’ of a
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traumatic personal and generational past” is not only desirable but paramount. Gender in
this context operates as a medium of deconstruction rather than a material foundation
through which specific forms of exploitation are legitimated. In her analysis of Austerlitz,
for instance, Hirsch argues that the “trope of the lost mother” is a preformed image within
the social imagination that demonstrates the relevance of gender and family to questions
of traumatic memory. This focus on the trope of the lost mother indicates the degree to
which a gender analysis takes place in the realm of representation. Paired with the trope
of the lost mother, family becomes an important site through which questions of gender
and memory are filtered. Accordingly, Hirsch claims further: “Familial and, indeed,
feminine tropes rebuild and reembody a connection that is disappearing, and thus gender
becomes a powerful idiom of remembrance in the face of detachment and forgetting”
(124). However, as Marco Abel argues of Landsberg, Hirsch’s analysis of gender seems
to be a symptom of the problem it addresses. The feminized domains of embodied
knowledge and traumatic memory become panaceas for historical repression and
exploitation. Gender serves as therapeutic hermeneutic in which embodied knowledge
redresses historical violence. We might call the effect of this form of therapy the
feminization of history, which, not unlike the feminization of labour, results from the
deconstruction of gendered spheres of production and the movement of women into the
traditionally male-dominated domains of work and history.
On the contrary, Federici’s call to save the historical memory of primitive
accumulation’s gender dimension is neither therapeutic nor hermeneutic. Rather, by
attending to the material history of gendered exploitation, Federici makes an important
distinction between historical repression and the logic of gender that calls for the
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preservation of both the specialized knowledge of a prior social order and the memory of
its enclosure: women’s reproductive knowledge. Embodied knowledge from this
perspective does not refer to a form of affective or empathetic identification based on the
traumatic experience of exploitation, but rather a specialized body of knowledge
(reproductive, in this case) grounded in a previous mode of production, which Jacques
Lacan has referred to as “know-how,” or that practical knowledge uniquely possessed by
the slave and coveted by the master. From Federici’s materialist perspective we can make
a further distinction between conceptions of embodied knowledge and repressed
knowledge, which refers to the enclosures of knowledge that transform embodied
knowledge into the raw material for capitalist accumulation as opposed to those
experiences of exploitation excluded from the official narrative of history. While
embodied knowledge is distinguished from repressed knowledge, forms of gendered
exploitation are inseparable from the enclosures of historical knowledge that transform
the embodied knowledge of the slave into the repressed knowledge of the master.
Federici’s observations suggest that gender is not merely one framework among
many through which capitalist exploitation can be reinterpreted from the perspective of
the oppressed; like the enclosures of common land and knowledge, gender is a material
condition of capitalist accumulation that is embedded within its mode of production from
the outset. As Marx claimed: “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (Marx n.pag.).
Accordingly, in this final analysis we begin with the assumption that new enclosures and
their preservationist aesthetic are structured by the logic of gender and not the other way
around.
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In general, memory is associated primarily with the sphere of the personal or the
private and history with the public or the state. We begin then with the dichotomy
history/memory, where, in popular parlance, history refers to an official public record of
the past and memory refers to the individual recollection of a past event. According to
historians like Klein, the “emergence of memory in historical discourse” has caused a
troubling collapse between the two terms, a collapse many artists and theorists of
memory would celebrate. The recent collapse of history and memory echoes the parallel
collapse between public (the institutional) and private (the everyday) inspired by avantgarde artists in the 1920s. As feminist theorists have long pointed out, this division
between public and private is a gendered one: historically, women have been relegated to
the domestic sphere and men to the realm of public affairs.
Radical feminists in the 60s and 70s sought to undermine this dichotomy by
politicizing the personal through the advent of consciousness raising groups. In a piece
that coined the second wave rallying slogan “The Personal is Political,” Carol Hanisch
discusses the ways in which this idea was misinterpreted as a form of therapy—that is
“personal therapy,” a concept she ultimately replaces with “political therapy.” In order to
understand the stakes of such a claim, we can express this in the form of an equation: the
personal + the political = political therapy, where therapy is traditionally associated with
the personal or the private and the political with the public. The concept of political
therapy is meant both to introduce the idea that group discussions centering on the
personal aspects of women’s lives have political foundations and effects and to
undermine the idea that these groups are primarily therapeutic in the sense that they are
meant to cure women of their individual ailments. Political therapy bestows collective
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responsibility for the material conditions of women divulged through individual and
personal grievances.
The concept of therapy is intrinsic to contemporary memory movements,
suggesting that discourses of memory belong to this same logic of personalizing the
political. In Klein’s words, memory in “an age of historiographic crisis” serves as a
“therapeutic alternative to historical discourse” (145). These therapeutic aspects of
memory culture are precisely what lead Huyssen to distinguish memory from trauma,
claiming that “too much of the contemporary memory discourse focuses on the
personal—on testimony, memoir, subjectivity, traumatic memory—either in
poststructuralist psychoanalytic perspective or attempts to shore up a therapeutic popular
sense of the authentic and experiential” (8). Like earlier politicizations of the personal,
memory politics are based on the entry of repressed or excluded knowledge into public
discourse. In contemporary memory theory, this excluded knowledge is given material
expression in two forms: the archive and the body (represented by the institutions of the
museum and the family). With respect to the body, repressed knowledge is also
understood as embodied knowledge. As I have suggested, this form of knowledge is
essential to two leading theories regarding the transmission of historical trauma:
postmemory and prosthetic memory, both of which attempt to bridge the gap between the
material and the virtual.
While radical feminists resisted the public/private divide by politicizing the
personal, Marxists feminists have demonstrated the ways in which this particular
dichotomy is related to the capitalist division of labour. Against the binary terms used by
Marxist feminists to characterize the “gendered forms of domination under capitalism”—
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including public/private—the UK collective Endnotes attempts to “propose categories
which will give us a better grasp of the transformation of the gender relation since the 70s
and, more importantly, since the recent crisis.” They begin with the definition of gender
as a “separation between spheres,” an assumption that allows them to re-conceptualize
the relationship between public and private as the generalization of the economic. While
Endnotes affirms the Marxist feminist mapping of public and private onto home and
state, they emphasize, “contrary to most feminist accounts, it was only within the context
of pre-modern relations—prior to the separation of the political and the economic under
capitalism—that the private sphere constituted the household. By contrast, in the modern
capitalist era, the scope of private exploitation spans the entire social landscape”
(Endnotes n.pag.). In Marxian terms, they continue, the public is simply an abstraction
called the state; based on the logic of formal equality, it is “an abstract ‘community’ of
‘equal citizens’” through which individuals “appear as equals on the market” (n.pag.).
This market, however, is a “sex-blind” market within all individuals are formally granted
equal capacity to engage in market activities, but women as potential child-bearers are
punished for “having a sex, even though that ‘sexual difference’ is produced by capitalist
social relations, and absolutely necessary to the reproduction of capitalism itself”
(n.pag.).
Given the ongoing enclosures of common land and knowledge in the realms of
both culture and nature, the question of the relationship between preservationist aesthetics
and the logic of gender is central to the question of what constitutes a feminist politics for
the twenty-first century. Despite the persistence of a feminist essentialism in certain
brands of environmental activism, this has nothing to do with the second-wave
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celebration of the innate majesty and reverence for both “Mother Earth” or women’s
special reproductive capacities. Nor has it anything to do with the very real and pressing
scientific evidence that our current state of environmental degradation is entirely
unsustainable. Rather, it has precisely to do with Marxist feminist insights into the
relationship between the expansion of capital and the exploitation of both natural
resources and women’s bodies (Mies 1986; Federici 2004). The equation of Woman and
nature, which has been problematized by postmodern anti-essentialists but is endorsed by
both radical and socialist ecofeminists, suggests that the relationship between
preservationist aesthetics and the logic of gender is relevant not only to enclosures of
common knowledge in the context of memory but also to questions of ecological
preservation and environmental activism. While Federici rightly situates the
expropriation of women’s bodies at the inception of the capitalist mode of production, the
desire for a pre-capitalist Eden signified by the commons contains more than a hint of
nostalgia and utopian longing for a time when class inequality was rife but women’s
work was equal. The mythical Medieval Eden serves as the point of departure for both
Federici’s critique of capitalism and much current ecofeminist theory. However, Federici
argues that “[w]e must be very careful, then, not to craft the discourse on the commons in
such a way as to allow a crisis-ridden capitalist class to revive itself, posturing, for
instance, as the environmental guardian of the planet” (Federici, “Feminism” n. pag.)
Preservationist aesthetics drive the redistribution of public space and signify a
shift in the logic of primitive accumulation whereby the enclosures of common
knowledge precede the enclosures of common land. The relationship between
preservationist aesthetics and gender implies that questions of violent erasure symbolized
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by the recent feminization of history and housed under the sign of Trauma (as the erasure
of all substantial content, a violent hollowing out that describes the appearance of the
pure form of primitive accumulation) are central to the question of feminism’s
contemporary relevance. Given the conservative nature of preservation and its
relationship to the production of trauma, the feminization of history and the new
enclosures, the question remains of whether or not the idea of the commons can serve as
the foundation for a material feminist politics today. The answer to this question can only
be discovered through the collective production of the commons, and not through their
recovery from the ruins of history.
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